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Abstract 
 
 
ETHICS IN THE INFERTILITY CLINIC: A QUALITATIVE STUDY 
 
 
 
This thesis is a qualitative study of infertility clinicians in the UK, exploring how 
they manage ethical issues: a study that uses empirical methods to explore ethical 
questions. I use a broadly Aristotelian conception of the relationship between theory 
and practice to develop a methodology for considering practical ethical issues. I then 
show how this approach, when allied with contemporary qualitative methodologies, 
can provide particularly valuable insights and produce practical recommendations. 
An important element of my approach is that a close attention to actual practice can 
also result in refining and developing our ethical theories and principles – practice 
informs theory just as theory can inform practice. This account of the ethical 
decision-making processes of infertility clinicians can not only highlight new ethical 
problems, but also develop more nuanced moral norms and ethical theories to deal 
with the conflicts and issues that arise in the clinical setting. 
 
 
Infertility treatment is a speciality that has attracted much attention from the public 
and bioethicists. The focus has been predominately on the dramatic aspects such as 
the status of the embryo or underlying issues such as the ethical boundaries of 
procreative liberty. Relatively little, however, is known about the everyday moral 
workings of infertility clinics: how clinicians approach ethical issues on a daily basis; 
what for them are troubling issues; and how they resolve ethical conflict. This study 
aims to gain insight into the way clinicians actually make ethical decisions. Moving 
on from this, it critically evaluates such processes and offers both an analysis of the 
strengths and weaknesses of the clinicians‟ ethical decision-making and considers 
how this form of decision-making can be extended and supported in practice.  
 
The aims of this thesis are to contribute to the debate on both how ethical decision-
making in the infertility clinic can be improved and, more generally, how bioethics 
can make a useful contribute to practical problems. 
 
 
 
 v 
List of Table and Figures 
 
 
 
 
 
Figures 
 
Figure 1 – Memo from ATLAS software    page 104 
Figure 2 – Ethical issues raised     page 149 
 
 
Tables 
 
Table 1 – Data on IVF provision in the UK    page 122 
Table 2 – Informants‟ views on contested ethical issues  page 151 
Table 3 – Informants‟ views on impartiality    page 197 
Table 4 – Structure of Clinical ethics committees in the Clinics page 226 
Table 5 – Informants‟ views on Clinical ethics committees  page 234 
 
 vi 
Declaration 
 
 
 
This thesis is the result of my own work. The material contained in the thesis has not 
been presented, nor is currently being presented, either wholly or in part for any 
other degree qualification. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 vii 
Acknowledgments 
 
 
I would like to thank my supervisors Ann Jacoby, Mark Gabbay and Simon 
Hailwood for their support, comments and insights. 
 
My division (Primary Care) provided me with a supportive place to carry out my 
work and a sabbatical in the latter stages of writing. 
 
I would also like to thank Heather Draper for being a very good friend and for her 
continued support over the years. 
 
The clinicians who gave up their time to talk to me, often for over an hour, and who 
shared their difficulties, worries and concerns over aspects of their practice deserve a 
big thank you. They were not paid for participating and many of them did it simply 
because they were interested in talking about ethics, without them this study could 
not have been carried out. 
 
Finally, I would like to acknowledge my partner Mark‟s contribution to this thesis. 
His support has been above and beyond the call of duty.  
 
 
 
 viii 
Abbreviations 
 
 
AI – Artificial Insemination 
 
AID – Artificial Insemination by Donor 
 
AIH – Artificial Insemination by Husband 
 
DH – Department of Health 
 
CEC – Clinical Ethics Committee 
 
IVF – In vitro fertilisation 
 
NHS – National Health Service 
 
NICE – National Institute of Clinical Excellence 
 
PCT – Primary Care Trust 
 
PGD – Pre-implantation genetic diagnosis 
 
SET – Single Embryo Transfer 
 
 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
This thesis is a qualitative study of infertility clinicians, exploring how they manage 
ethical issues in their everyday practice: a study that uses empirical methods to 
explore ethical questions.  
 
I use a broadly Aristotelian conception of the relationship between theory and 
practice to develop a methodology for considering practical ethical issues. I then 
show how this approach, when allied with contemporary qualitative methodologies, 
can provide particularly valuable insights and produce practical recommendations 
when applied to ethical issues in practice. An important element of my approach is 
that a close attention to actual practice can also result in refining and developing our 
ethical theories and principles – practice informs theory just as theory can inform 
practice. The aim is to contribute to the debate on both how ethical decision-making 
in the infertility clinic can be improved and, more generally, how bioethics can make 
a useful contribute to practical problems. This account of these ethical decision-
making processes can, as Caplan (1982) suggests, not only highlight new ethical 
problems, but also develop more nuanced moral norms and ethical theories to deal 
with the conflicts and issues that arise in the clinical setting.  
 
RESEARCH INTO INFERTILITY PRACTICE 
This thesis crosses a number of different disciplines as it uses empirical methods to 
explore ethical issues in medical practice. Consequently, there are many areas of 
literature that are relevant to this study and it would be impossible to sum up or 
consider all the research that has been conducted in these disciplines on infertility 
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practice. The aim of this introduction, therefore, is to locate this study very broadly 
in the body of ethical literature and research that has been conducted on infertility 
treatment and to demonstrate how my study contributes to an area that has not 
received sufficient attention. 
 
Research on ethical decision-making 
There has been little empirical work on how infertility clinicians make ethical 
decisions. Much of the empirical work that has been done on ethical decision-making 
has used standardised tools that seek to measure subjects‟ responses to hypothetical 
situations.
1
 This cannot always tell us what might actually happen in practice.
2
 Hurst 
et al argue that although there are studies done on ethics consultations (a feature of 
decision-making that is much more common in the US than in the UK) and the use of 
ethics committees, „[t]here has been no systematic, empirical examination of 
strategies actually employed by physicians to deal with the ethically problematic 
situations they face.‟(2005:7) 3 This is not completely correct, Braunack-Mayer‟s 
work (2001, 2001a, 2005), for example, considers these very issues. There is, 
however, a paucity of empirical work done on ethical decision-making and even 
fewer studies conducted on decision-making in infertility treatment. 
 
Research on ethical aspects of infertility provision 
Infertility treatment is a speciality that has attracted much attention from the public 
and bioethicists, it is one where the focus has been predominately on the dramatic 
                                                 
1
 See Frederick, et al (2000) for a review of the literature on this type of approach. 
2
 See Chapter Four for problems with this approach. 
3
 The quote goes on to say, „without help from ethics committees or [ethics] consultants.‟ (2005:7) 
Although my study does consider the use my informants made of ethics committees there is not a 
systematic structure of such committees in the UK, as there is in the US, to aid decision-making see 
Chapter Nine. 
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aspects such as the status of the embryo or underlying issues such as the ethical 
boundaries of procreative liberty. Thus, although there is a substantial body of 
research on reproductive technologies from a bioethical perspective, the vast 
majority of this concentrates on more the general issues raised by these technologies. 
 
Reproductive technologies have fascinated bioethicists since their inception and the 
ethical debates on artificial reproduction go back at least 60 years (Caplan, 1988). ten 
Have (1995) argues that there are two main sorts of ethical questions that can be 
directed at reproductive technologies: the first are, „[m]oral questions that concern 
the technology itself‟ – these are questions that address the very underpinnings of 
reproductive technologies, asking the fundamental question, should we be carrying 
out these technique at all?; the second are, „[m]oral questions that arise within the 
framework of the technology‟ – these are questions that, „remain within the 
framework of the technology, they proceed from a basic acceptance of the 
technology….their underlying concern is how its responsible and appropriate use can 
be defined.‟ (ten Have, 1995:143). ten Have argues that when evaluating a new 
reproductive technology most of the ethical questions raised are of the second sort 
and not enough attention is paid to considering if we should be doing it in the first 
place. However, I would argue, contrary to ten Have, that a pattern in the ethical 
debate over reproductive technologies has been an initial discussion over whether we 
should be doing it at all and then the debates develop into considerations of how such 
techniques can be employed ethically and then the specific ethical dilemmas that 
arise out of their use.
4
 
                                                 
4
 I conduced a literature search in Web of Knowledge by searching the term „ethics and reproductive 
technologies.‟ I then scanned the abstracts of relevant articles from 1975 to get a sense of the changing 
debate over these issues. It must be recognised that Web of Knowledge does not index books or all 
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This can be seen in the debates that followed the birth of Louise Brown in 1978 by 
IVF. There was much initial discussion over whether IVF and AID were techniques 
that should be allowed on the grounds that they were unnatural (Singer & Wells, 
1982. Walters & Singer, 1982. Caplan, 1988. Rothman, 1989). The Warnock Report 
considered many submissions to its inquiry that argued that such reproductive 
technologies were immoral on the grounds of their unnaturalness, that they 
represented the introduction of a third party into the reproductive process and, „this 
was held to be morally wrong in itself, whatever the motives of those involved might 
be.‟ (Warnock, 1985:20) These concerns were often voiced by religious 
commentators, in particular the Catholic Church (see Rothman, 1989). The Warnock 
Report took the view that, „[a]s a question of individual conscience, there will be 
those who will not wish to receive this form of treatment nor participate in its 
practice, but we would not rely on these arguments for the formulation of a public 
policy.‟ (Warnock, 1985:31) This was, in effect, directing the debate to the second of 
ten Have‟s questions, how can reproductive technologies be employed ethically?  
 
There was a parallel debate in the feminist literature that mirrored this wider 
discussion of reproductive technologies. One school of feminist thought, represented 
by writers such as Corea (1988) and the Feminist International Network of Resistance 
to Reproductive and Genetic Engineering (Spallone & Steinberg, 1987), viewed 
reproductive technologies as intrinsically harmful to women. Reproductive technologies 
were practices constructed by a patriarchal medical and technological establishment to 
further control and colonise women‟s bodies. Reproductive technologies were seen as 
reinforcing a biologically deterministic view of women that encouraged a kind of 
                                                                                                                                          
journals that are relevant in bioethics. Included in this literature search was a search of COPAC for 
relevant books on the subject. 
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pronatalism, that subordinated women‟s identity to their reproductive role, rather than 
seeing them as full human persons with a range of interests. It was the social context in 
which the technologies were developed that made them inherently harmful to woman. 
Reproductive technologies were not benign techniques that could possibly be harmful 
to women –  they were deliberately constructed mechanisms of control.  
 
This view was criticised by other feminist authors, such as Stanworth (1987), who saw 
reproductive technologies as benign forces that could be used inappropriately but were 
not inherently harmful to women. The crucial issue for these authors
5
 was that 
reproductive technologies should operate in an ethical framework, to ensure that women 
were protected from abuse and exploitation.  
 
Whether or not the debate for allowing IVF was „won‟ or scientific developments 
carried on regardless is a moot point, but nevertheless much of the ethical literature is 
now concerned with issues that arise from the conduct of the techniques rather than 
whether we should have them at all. Within the consideration of this second question, 
different issues are pertinent at different times. For instance, the development of 
techniques to create embryos outside the body led to much ethical debate on this in 
the early days of IVF (Dyson & Harris, 1990. Singer et al, 1990). The appropriate 
treatment of the embryo was one of the main concerns of the Warnock Committee 
and this was one of the predominant impetuses behind calls to license infertility 
treatment centres providing treatment with embryos or conducting embryo research. 
The case of Diane Blood in 1996, who wanted to use her deceased husband‟s sperm 
for treatment, prompted a debate on the ethics of posthumous reproduction (Delany, 
                                                 
5
 See Stanworth‟s (1987) collection of essays on reproductive technologies. 
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1997). Recently, there has been a lot attention paid to the ethical issues raised by 
people travelling abroad to get infertility treatment, either due to funding restrictions 
in their own country or due to regulatory restrictions (such as non-anonymous 
gamete donation) that they wish to avoid (Pennings, 2002. Blyth & Farrand, 2005).
 6
 
 
The is not to say that debates over the acceptability of reproductive technologies are no 
longer conducted in the literature (there are still questions over the ethical acceptability 
of IVF and the possible effects on society), and when new techniques are developed, 
such as pre-implantation diagnosis, questions of their ethical acceptability are raised 
again. This changing focus of ethical debate can be illustrated by the evolution of 
concerns raised by artificial insemination (see Appendix 1). As a technique, AID, was 
once seen as immoral and therefore carried out in secret (Frith, 2001). Donors were 
anonymous to any future offspring and it was thought best that the circumstances of 
conception were kept secret from the child. Now, with changing views and a greater 
focus on the rights of the child, the law regarding donor anonymity was changed in 
2004, gamete donors are no longer anonymous to any future offspring and it is 
generally recommended that it is good practice to tell the child how they were 
conceived (HFEA,2007:G.5.4.6).  
 
In this way, debates move, not seamlessly, but in fits and starts from considering the 
fundamental acceptability of a new technique (IVF, Pre-implantation genetic diagnosis 
(PGD)) to discussing how such techniques should be employed ethically and a 
consideration of specific ethical dilemmas that might be raised by their use. With the 
development or modification of new techniques this process starts again.  
                                                 
6
 See Baird (1996), Fasouliotis & Schenker (1999), Frith (1998) and Harris & Holm (1998) for good 
overviews of ethical issues raised by the application of reproductive technologies. 
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This thesis is an extension of this process. Rather than considering general dilemmas 
that arise in the conduct of infertility treatment, it examines how clinicians make 
particular decisions in their everyday practice. This can be seen as akin to a funnelling 
process. The issues becoming focussed down onto the specificities of practice: looking 
at how clinicians actually approach and think about the many troubling ethical issues 
they face on a day-to-day basis.  
 
In sum, relatively little is known about the everyday moral workings of infertility 
clinics: how clinicians approach ethical issues on a daily basis; what for them are 
troubling issues; and how they resolve ethical conflict. One of the main aims of this 
study, therefore, is to gain insight into this – an area that has received insufficient 
attention. 
 
CONTENT AND ARGUMENT OF THE THESIS 
Having discussed the gaps in the literature, which this study seeks to address, I will 
now outline the general structure of the thesis.  
 
Chapter One places this study firmly within the  „empirical turn‟ in bioethics and 
looks at the different ways in which empirical data has been employed in ethical 
analysis. It highlights the similarities and differences this study has with other works 
in empirical ethics. 
 
Chapter Two looks critically at two of the main approaches to bioethics and how 
they conceptualise the relationship between theory and practice. First, the 
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engineering model, where the principal focus is on theory, and second, contextualism 
where the principal focus is on context/practice. 
 
Chapter Three advances the conception of bioethics that will be used in this thesis. It 
proposes an Aristotelian notion of the relationship between theory and practice to 
develop a methodology for approaching ethical issues in practice. 
 
Chapter Four outlines the qualitative methods I use in this thesis. The justification for 
choosing this type of qualitative research methodology is discussed. I then detail the 
methods and rationale for the data collection and the strategies of data analysis 
employed. 
 
Chapter Five gives a broad picture of the regulatory and organisational context of 
infertility treatment in the UK and how such treatment is funded. This discussion 
delineates the context in which the infertility clinicians make ethical decisions and 
the external constraints that shape such decisions.  
 
Chapter Six, the first of the data chapters, examines what the informants saw as 
ethically troubling in their practice. It develops theories of „settled‟ and 
„controversial‟ moralities to account for the complexities and contradictions revealed 
in the way the clinicians understood their everyday practice. 
 
Chapter Seven examines how the informants dealt with these ethical issues in 
practice. I show how the attempt to reach a consensus was a central aim of their 
decision-making processes. I then go on to develop a theory of consensus 
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showing how the process of decision-making itself, rather than reaching 
agreement over substantive ethical issues, was of central importance to the 
clinicians. 
 
Chapter Eight is an evaluation and critique of this form of decision-making. I argue 
that the informants‟ consensus decision-making process can be morally justified, as 
there is a firm moral basis that underpins it; a „moral vision‟ shared by both doctors 
and the wider community.  
 
Chapter Nine draws out the practical implications of this study and discusses how 
ethical decision-making can be best supported in the infertility clinic. I bring together 
the data on how the informants thought about and used clinical ethics committees 
(CECs). Then, recommendations for how CEC support could be strengthened are 
made.  
 
The Conclusion summarises the main findings of the thesis and discusses the utility 
in adopting this theoretical approach to ethical issues in practice.   
 
TERMINOLOGY 
Throughout the thesis the term „bioethics‟ will be used as a generic term to denote 
the disciplines of applied and practical ethics, such as medical ethics and health care 
ethics for example, recognising that it can encompass many different approaches to 
ethical issues. The term „empirical research‟ will be used to denote research 
conducted largely in the sociological, anthropological and psychological disciplines 
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using qualitative and quantitative methodologies. It is recognised that although there 
are vast conceptual differences between these methodologies and disciplines, the 
similarity is that they all seek to gather empirical information to make some type of 
claim about the world.
7
 I will use the term „data‟ broadly to refer to the products of 
such studies. I will use the terms „context‟ and „practice‟ interchangeably to mean 
wider features of the world, the „empirical contingencies of life‟. These features are 
anything that could be said to have an impact on or relevance to the situations in 
which ethical decisions are made.  
 
Further, I will use the term „principle‟ to refer to the type of mid-level principles that 
people often deploy in ethical discussions, such as the imperative not to lie, patient 
autonomy, beneficence, fidelity, non-discrimination, fairness, sanctity of life etc. I 
shall use the term ethical theory rather than moral theory as this does not suggest the 
separation of human life into the moral and non-moral (see, Nussbaum,1990:169). 
Ethical theory will be used to denote not just comprehensive ethical theories such as 
utilitarianism, but less all-encompassing theories such as theories of justice or 
theories of consensus decision-making. 
                                                 
7
 See Bennett & Cribb (2003) for a discussion of the problems of characterising „empirical research‟ 
as a homogenous whole. It is recognised that empirical research can be grounded on many different 
theoretical stances and ways of approaching and conceptualising „reality‟ or the „outside world‟. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
EMPIRICAL RESEARCH IN BIOETHICS 
 
INTRODUCTION 
This chapter places this study firmly within the context of the „empirical turn‟8 in 
bioethics. It traces the increasing use of empirical studies in bioethics and places 
such studies within three broad categories which are used to shed light on the 
different ways in which the relationship between ethical theory and empirical data 
can be conceptualised.  The position of this study in relation to this question and the 
literature in the area is then explored.  
 
THE EMPIRICAL TURN IN BIOETHICS 
Like any discipline, bioethics is a developing form of academic inquiry and recent 
trends in scholarship have been towards more engagement with empirical research 
and ethicists carrying out such research themselves. Bioethics is changing as it 
engages with wider currents in contemporary thought, „the discipline of bioethics 
itself is confronted with a sudden shaking at its core and a questioning of its actual 
identity and methodology.‟ (Borry et al, 2004:1) Bioethics has been subjected to a 
number of critiques that have, possibly, had an impact on the way the discipline is 
conducted (see Chapter Two for a discussion of this). 
 
Borry et al (2006) have charted the rise of this „empirical turn‟, conducting a 
quantitative analysis of peer-reviewed journals in the field of bioethics in the period 
1990-2003 to analyse the evolution and nature of published empirical research in 
                                                 
8
 This phrase is borrowed from Borry et al (2005). 
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bioethics.
9
 They found that the proportion of empirical research rose in these journals 
from 5.4% in 1990 to 15.4% in 2003 and concluded that, „it is likely that the 
importance of empirical methods in medical ethics and bioethics can only be 
expected to increase.‟ (2006:254) This has led some authors to argue that a new form 
of ethics paper is emerging (Arnold & Forrow,1993). The Journal of Medical Ethics, 
for example, has given guidance on submitting empirical papers since 1997. 
 
This statistical increase in the amount of empirical work conducted in bioethics has 
been matched by an increasing interest in the relationship between bioethical inquiry 
and the social sciences (used here in the broadest sense). There have been a number 
of special issues of journals devoted to discussing such a relationship: for example, 
Health Care Analysis,2003. Medicine, Health Care & Philosophy, 2004. Sociology, 
Health & Illness, 2006; and a growing literature on the subject (Hoffmaster,1990. 
Hedgecoe,2004. Haimes,2002, Holm & Jonas, 2004. Haimes & Williams,2007). In 
the UK there has been an increase in funding programmes for empirical work in 
bioethics. The Wellcome Trust, for example, began a programme for encouraging 
empirical and multi-disciplinary research in bioethics in 1997. 
 
Borry et al (2005) have argued that this „empirical turn‟ in bioethics can be attributed 
to three factors. First, the rise of evidence-based medicine, where ethical arguments 
should either be tested by empirical evidence or ethical decisions should be grounded 
in the best scientific evidence. Second, the development of clinical ethics as a distinct 
field, which has a greater focus on the specificities of actual practice than 
mainstream bioethics.  Finally, the increasing dissatisfaction with the discipline of 
                                                 
9
 Sugarman et al (2001) conducted an earlier study that pointed to the rise of empirical research in 
bioethics during the 1980s. 
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bioethics as exemplified by the social science critique has contributed to the 
„empirical turn‟.  Draper & Ives (2007) argue that it is this critique that has been the 
main motivating factor behind the increase in empirical research conducted by 
bioethicists.
10
 It is beyond the remit of this thesis to consider in depth why bioethics 
as an academic discipline is changing,
11
 this is more a topic for a sociology of ethics 
(Haimes,2002). However, it is reasonable to say that there is an increasing focus on 
the role of empirical research in bioethics and more empirical studies conducted 
within the discipline. This study is a part of such a trend: a study that uses empirical 
methods to explore ethical issues. 
 
EMPIRICAL WORK IN BIOETHICS 
I now want to give an overview of the empirical work conducted in bioethics to 
illustrate where my current study sits within current literature and scholarship. 
 
To do this I will draw on Ives and Draper‟s (2007) categorisation12 of the different 
ways empirical research has been employed in ethical reasoning. The three broad 
categories are a: sociology of bioethics; sociology for bioethics; and sociology in 
bioethics.
13
  It is possible that some studies could fall into more than one category – 
the categories are not mutually exclusive and, as will be argued, my study has 
elements of all three categories.  
                                                 
10
 See Ashcroft (2003) for a different analysis of the development of empirical ethics, that analyses it 
from a Foucauldian perspective, seeing it as a form of politics, „a set of ways of arguing and making 
decisions and representations to maintain a sort of civic stability while changing it in the interests of 
the competing or co-operating agents making up society.‟ (2003:12) 
11
 It could also be argued that a trend in academia in general is towards inter-disciplinarily work. For 
example, the funding council for philosophy, Arts and Humanities Research Council, launched an 
inter-disciplinary funding stream on religion and society in 2007. The growth in the discipline of 
experimental philosophy which uses the methodologies of psychology is another area of such 
interdisciplinary (see Appiah, 2008). 
12
 There are obvious limitations with constructing any typology of this nature, the intention is to 
broadly group approaches that share certain characteristics for clarification purposes. 
13
 These categories are similar to those often used in medical sociology (White,2002).  
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In using this categorisation I will draw attention to the different ways in which the 
relationship between empirical data and ethical theory can be conceptualised. Does 
empirical data leave ethical theory unaltered? Or does empirical data have some 
influence on the actual content and structure of ethical theory itself? These are 
central questions in the development of my own use of empirical research.  
 
Sociology of bioethics 
 
The first way empirical data has been used in the study of bioethics is in sociology of 
bioethics. This incorporates two aspects: seeing bioethics and bioethicists as objects 
of study; and examining the social context of bioethical issues or problems. 
 
A sociology of bioethics takes bioethics as another area of society to study, bioethics 
becomes a social phenomenon rather than an abstract philosophical discipline. 
Bioethics and ethicists become the object of study, just as doctors have been the subject 
of study in medical sociology. For Haimes (2002), ethicists are a fascinating 
occupational group and she argues that even if one sees ethics as an abstract discipline 
the same cannot be said for ethicists, they are members of a professional and social 
group. Hence, there is a utility in studying them in their social context - to understand 
more about ethicists, to understand how their social identity affects the influence they 
have or do not on the conduct of ethical matters.  
 
Bosk (1999) argues that social scientists can contribute to bioethics by studying the 
discipline itself. As the role of „bioethicist‟ is relatively new, little is known about 
how this role actually functions and Bosk calls for research on the following 
questions: what do bioethicists do? For whom? Under what conditions? How are 
bioethicists trained? How do those in the field define their domain of responsibility? 
 15 
How is orthodoxy established? How is dissent managed? Thus, social scientists 
should undertake a, „description and analysis of the everyday work of people in the 
new social role we now call bioethicist.‟ (1999:66) 
 
Fox is a sociologist who has attempted such work and has written widely on 
bioethics as a social and cultural phenomenon (Fox, 1989, 1990). She argues that 
bioethics is an important subject as it, „deals with nothing less than beliefs, values, 
and norms that are basic to our society, its cultural tradition and its collective 
conscience.‟ (1999:11) However, Fox argues that bioethics is unaware of the wider 
social and cultural context in which it and the „ethical issues‟ that are debated in 
bioethics are located. This is a failing in Fox‟s view and is not helped by bioethics‟ 
focus on the individual clinical encounter between doctor and patient. Bioethics 
approaches such an encounter, „with sparse reference to their respective social and 
cultural backgrounds, their “lived lives,” the psychodynamics of what transpires 
between them, and the social milieu of the hospital in which these doctor-patient 
encounters take place.‟ (1999:12) A sociology of bioethics, for Fox, can bring these 
issues to the fore and profitably locate bioethics in its social context. 
 
The second focus of a sociology of bioethics is examining what may (or indeed may 
not) get categorised as ethical areas. What gets constituted as an ethical problem and the 
way dilemmas are constructed in the ethical literature all become a form of social 
interaction to be studied by the sociologist. 
Social scientists provide just the kind of context bioethicists so often obscure 
when we produce ethnographies of medical settings that describe as thickly as 
possible how ethical problems are ignored, unattended, recognized, managed and 
resolved in medical settings….the goal is not to show how these problems are 
properly or improperly resolved. Rather the focus is on how the problems are 
structured. (Bosk, 1999:64-65) 
 16 
 
Further, ethical issues may be studied by the methods of social science. The papers in 
de Vires et al‟s edition of Sociology of Health & Illness (2006), for example, are 
largely an attempt to put bioethical issues (such as the ethics of research and social 
policy) into a social context.
14
 
 
A sociology of ethics can engage with ethical theory to a greater or lesser degree. 
Bosk‟s (1992) study of genetic counselling in a paediatric hospital, for example, 
although looking at an area of great ethical concern, does not explicitly employ or 
consider ethical theory in his analysis. Other studies and authors critically engage 
with ethical theory and use their studies to demonstrate what they see as failings in 
the traditional bioethical engineering model.  Anspach (1993), for example, in her 
study of decision-making in an intensive care nursery explicitly engages with the 
bioethical debate over life and death decisions in intensive care. Alderson (1990) also 
uses her empirical findings to advance a form of the „social science critique‟ of 
bioethics.
15
 
 
Braunack-Mayer‟s study of general practitioners in Australia reached a different 
conclusion from the studies just mentioned and argued that forms of ethical 
reasoning found in bioethics did have some purchase in the „real world‟. Her project 
was concerned with, „how do the styles and approaches used in bioethics scholarship 
relate to moral deliberation?‟(1998:3) She argued that bioethicists assert that moral 
theories match real life and in part they are, „systematising every-day moral activity.‟ 
(2001:71) Her project investigated whether this was the case. For example, she 
                                                 
14
 See also Haimes‟ work on genetic databases discussed in Haimes & Williams (2007). 
15
 See the discussion in Chapter Two of these authors. 
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argued that her empirical research, „suggests that there is a role for casuistry in 
every-day moral reasoning.‟ (2001:80)  
 
A sociology of bioethics is a valuable form of inquiry that has produced many 
fascinating studies of what constrains and influences ethical decision-making in 
practice. 
 
Sociology for bioethics 
A second way in which empirical data has been used by bioethics can be grouped under 
the term a sociology for bioethics. Used in this way empirical research produces data 
for bioethics.  In practice, says Weisz, social scientists, „can provide ethicists with data, 
ranging from descriptions of the historical origins or current ethical debates to 
information about how people in different cultures and at different social levels actually 
behave in ethically problematic situations.‟ (1990:5) 
 
One way empirical research could be used is to identify moral issues that need to be 
studied. Baruch Brody argues for this sort of role for empirical research in bioethics: „It 
can identify issues that actually arise and processes actually used for dealing with them, 
thereby suggesting where normative analysis is most needed.‟ (1993:218) Musschenga 
(2005) gives the example that doctors rarely have to choose between prolonging life 
and euthanasia. More often the primary decision is whether or not to do everything to 
prolong life rather than whether euthanasia is acceptable in this circumstance. Thus, 
ethicists need empirical research to tell them what is going on and what are interesting 
and relevant ethical dilemmas in practice.  
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A further example of sociology for bioethics is that empirical data can be used as the 
factual component of ethical arguments (Ashcroft, 2003. Holm, 2005). Many ethical 
arguments are based on particular facts, even though these facts do not have any 
normative value. „Good ethics depends upon good facts.‟ (Sulmasy & 
Sugarman,2001:11)  Moral arguments often have the form: 
1. Whenever situation X occurs, it is permissible to do Y 
2. If Z is true, then I am in situation X 
3. Therefore, if Z is true, it is permissible to do Y (Sulmasy & 
Sugarman,2001:11) 
 
Proposition 1 is the moral premise, proposition 2 is empirical. Empirical studies can 
contribute to ethics by showing when proposition 2 is true and under what conditions, 
and this information is needed to establish one‟s obligations under proposition 3. 
Sulmasy & Sugarman give the example of the argument that one should not give liver 
transplants to alcoholics, because the chances of them relapsing into alcoholism are so 
high that the prognosis of such transplants is unacceptably low. If it turns out that the 
survival of alcoholic patients with liver transplants is as high as transplants for other 
conditions, then the argument against such transplants on the grounds of low prognosis 
is disproved. Sulmasy and Sugarman argue, „many normative arguments depend on 
factual information, even though these facts themselves do not confer normative status 
upon these arguments.‟ (2001:11)  
 
Empirical research can also be used to assess the likely consequences of actions, so 
important for utilitarians (Zussman, 2000. Sulmasy & Sugarman,2001). Brody (1993) 
gives the example of this type of study where the consequences of commercial organ 
donation were evaluated. The study concluded that due to the extremely poor prognosis 
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of those who had purchased organs, commercial organ donation was morally wrong.
16
 
Birnbacher argues that, „most controversial debates in applied ethics are not so much 
controversies in principle but about matters of empirical consequences.‟ (1999:327) He 
gives the example of debates over voluntary active euthanasia. Here the controversy is 
over whether allowing this form of euthanasia will risk a „slippery slope‟ to non or in-
voluntary euthanasia. Active euthanasia is rejected on, „contingent [the slippery slope 
reasons] rather than categorical reasons [it is wrong to kill].‟ (Birnbacher,1999:329) 
Therefore, empirical research can contribute to the contingent solution of ethical issues 
by providing data on the possible consequences of particular policies. 
 
In their study of withdrawing treatment in neonatal intensive care, McHaffie et al 
(2001) provides an example of how sociology for ethics can meet all the above 
objectives.  They argue that empirical research is useful as it can identify and describe 
important ethical issues, see how they are resolved and assess the consequences of 
current management. They conclude that the research cannot answer „ought‟ 
questions, moral judgments are still required. „Knowledge acquired from this 
research then brings us closer to what we ought to do because it sheds light on the 
important issues and aids ethical reflection, even if it cannot of itself provide a 
resolution to the issues.‟ (2001:109) 
 
Sociology in bioethics 
The models of sociology of and for bioethics largely keep the disciplinary boundaries 
between ethics and sociology separate. There is ethical theory on the one hand and 
there is sociologically gathered evidence on the other. A third approach, a sociology 
                                                 
16
 Although Brody argues that this does not settle the matter and ethical analysis is what is needed to 
determine the acceptability of the practice. 
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in ethics, attempts to break down the boundaries between empirical evidence and 
ethical theory (Hedgecoe,2004).  
 
In a special issue of the journal Medicine, Health Care and Philosophy devoted to 
the use of empirical research in bioethics, Molewijk et al (2004) outlined a form of 
sociology in bioethics that they called the Integrated Empirical Ethics approach (IEE) 
that seeks to combine ethical theory and data. „IEE refers to studies in which… 
ethicists and descriptive scientists try to integrate moral theory and empirical data in 
order to reach a normative conclusion with respect to a specific social practice.‟ 
(2004:57) This approach, IEE, contends that the distinction that is commonly held to 
demarcate bioethics and social science are not two distinct modes of understanding 
but, „can be, and often are, complementary and mutually illuminating.‟ (Jennings, 
1986:215)
17
 Molewijk et al  (2004) argue that the distinction between what is 
considered a fact and what is considered a value cannot be unproblematically 
upheld.
18
 They argue that „facts‟ produced by empirical science are not value neutral, 
as values play a role in how they are constituted.
19
 Therefore, ethical theories are 
based on „background empirical assumptions‟. As Jennings states, „ethical theorizing 
…builds on substantive sociological, psychological, and anthropological 
assumptions.‟ (1986:213) Molewijk et al argue that although the distinction between 
empirical data and ethical theory can be questioned: „IEE does not aim to achieve a 
radical integration in order to create one comprehensive theoretical unity in which 
there is not reference to any distinction between the empirical and the 
                                                 
17
 For a critique of an IEE approach see Levitt (2004) who argues the two disciplines (ethics and 
social science) should be complementary rather than integrated. 
18
 Hedgecoe argues, „There is empirical evidence that the fact/value distinction is at best overstated, 
and at worst a figment of philosophical imagination.‟ (2004:131) 
19
 As they mention this idea is based on Bruno Latour‟s work on the social production of scientific 
facts. See also Chapter Seven of Lincoln & Guba (1985) where they give examples of how values 
influence scientific inquiry. 
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normative….however, making the distinction into an irreducible gap between 
intrinsic (i.e. essential) meanings is erroneous.‟ (2004:58 & 57) 
 
Van Thiel and Van Delden‟s (2001) study on the use of the concept of autonomy in 
nursing homes is an example of the sociology in bioethics approach.
20
 This was a 
project that aimed to formulate guidelines on respecting autonomy in nursing homes. 
They first ascertained what the caregivers‟ views on autonomy were by formulating 
four conceptions of patient autonomy from the literature and asking respondents 
which they preferred for their nursing home. They then tried to formulate a coherent 
view by taking the aspects of the different views of autonomy and balancing these to 
produce a theory on how to respect autonomy in that situation.
21
 
 
In all these studies the attempt is made to use empirical data to directly alter and 
shape ethical theory. „For example, one might wish to modify the theory of patient 
autonomy towards the social practice of surgical decision making in elderly men on 
the basis of empirical data.‟ (Stigglebout, et al  2004:269)  Thus, „bioethical 
theorizing…is not removed from lived experience – it is based upon it.‟ (Draper & 
Ives, 2007:325)  
 
THE APPROACH IN THIS THESIS 
This thesis combines elements of all these ways of using empirical evidence in 
ethical discussion. It is partly a sociology of ethical decision-making in the infertility 
clinic, an investigation into the way the informants thought about, approached and 
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 See also Widdershoven & Sohl‟s (1999) study on a supported employment programme and make 
concrete suggestions as to how such a programme could be improved. Also Ives, et al, (2008) study 
on fatherhood.  
21
 See also van Delden & van Thiel (1998).  
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dealt with what they perceived to be ethical issues. It incorporates elements of a 
sociology for bioethics in that it seeks to provide information on what the informants 
thought was ethically troubling (see Chapter Six) and how they approached problems 
(see Chapter Seven) so that an ethical analysis can take into account how issues are 
resolved and assess the consequences of current management (McHaffie et al, 2001). 
The thesis also has elements of a sociology in bioethics as it attempts to say 
something about how certain principles may be formulated and used in practice (see 
Chapter Seven and Eight) and thus how empirical data could change our 
formulations and understandings of ethical principles and theory (see Chapter Three). 
 
Even if one accepts that the use of such empirical methods is a good thing for 
bioethics, are ethicists, trained in philosophy, the best people to carry out such 
research? Levitt (2004), for example, argues that bioethics and sociology should 
remain complementary rather than seeking to become more integrated. Appiah, who 
despite being very sympathetic to the use of empirical findings in the discussion of 
moral deliberation says: „Philosophy should be open to what it can learn from 
experiments; it doesn‟t need to set up its own laboratories.‟ (2008:3) This is in effect 
what I have done, set up my own laboratory. 
 
I want to give two arguments why I think it is worthwhile for ethicists to be involved 
in actually conducting empirical studies. First, a study designed by an ethicist and 
therefore driven by predominately „ethical‟ concerns could have a different emphasis 
and focus from those conducted by sociologists. This is not to say that this sort of 
investigation is the only way to approach ethical issues or areas, but that there is 
room for studies of this type alongside more conventionally conceived sociological 
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ones. Second, ethicists might (and this is a controversial claim) be better able, as a 
specialism that is predominately concerned with ethics, to design studies that 
produce data that are of more help in conducting an ethical analysis.
22
 Even if this 
second argument is not accepted (which it probably would not be by many 
sociologists), my central claim is that there is room for a distinctive type of empirical 
study: a study that uses ethical theory and principles in the analysis of the data and 
that seeks to say something about the theories and principles themselves. 
 
Perhaps there is not any difference between the two types of research project. 
Harman‟s (2003) response to the question of what is the difference between moral 
psychology and moral philosophy can be applied here, when he says there may be no 
interesting difference or only one that is of interest to university administrators. Such 
a difference might be construed as one of the degree: both disciplines use theory, but 
it is the way that they use theory in their deliberations that can differ. But as Harman 
says, „psychologists also theorise and increasingly philosophers join with 
psychologists in doing experiments and considering how that evidence…may be 
relevant to philosophical theories.‟ (2003:11) Therefore, an empirical study carried 
out by an ethicist may only differ from a social science one in the sense that it will 
always incorporate references to moral attitudes (van der Scheer & Widdershoven, 
2004). Hence, I would argue that it valuable for ethicists to carry out their own 
empirical studies and these studies can make a distinctive contribution to the 
literature. 
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 See Brody‟s (1993) critique of empirical studies carried out on ethical issues on these grounds. 
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CONCLUSION 
 
The „empirical turn‟ in bioethics is undoubtedly one of the most significant 
developments in the field in recent years. It has both challenged traditional ways of 
doing ethics and produced a range of studies that have enriched our understanding of 
ethical practice. Barriers have been broken down and new challenges and questions 
posed. The very emphasis on the empirical has led many to question and re-evaluate 
the importance of ethical theory. It is this relationship between ethical theory and 
empirical data and which lies at the heart of this thesis.  
 
In the next chapter I will look at two of the main approaches in bioethics and how 
they have conceptualised this relationship. Then, in Chapter Three, I will develop my 
own approach to the relationship between theory and data. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
DIFFERENT MODELS OF BIOETHICS 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Conducting any form of empirical study into ethical issues immediately raises 
questions about the relationship between the data and ethical theory. Sometimes the 
nature of this relationship is implicit at other times it is articulated explicitly. In this 
chapter I will look at the way both „traditional‟ and contextualist bioethics have 
understood this relationship. The problems – as I perceive them – with each approach 
help lay the groundwork for developing my own position, which is explored in 
detailed in Chapter Three. 
 
‘TRADITIONAL’ BIOETHICS 
Bioethics has generally been associated primarily with the discipline of philosophy. 
„Bioethics is characterised as the “investigation of ethical issues arising in the life 
sciences…by applying the principles of moral philosophy to these issues”‟. (Bennett 
& Cribb, 2003:10) At the „birth of bioethics‟ philosophy and theology shaped the 
discipline with their methods and structures of abstract universal foundationalist 
theorising (Jonsen, 1998). Foundationalist moralities provided a justification for why 
certain beliefs are true and from there proceeded to tell us what to do (Harman, 2003). 
For example, utilitarianism sought to justify its ethical theory on the foundationalist 
principle of utility; Kant employed the foundationalist principle of the categorical 
imperative, which tells us what must be done independent of our desires. Such 
foundational beliefs were the type of belief that could be directly (by observation), or 
self-evidently (by rational argument), be justified. From these foundational principles 
all other moral beliefs and prescriptions for action follow.  
 26 
 
Consequently, bioethics has become characterised as a discipline that seeks to apply 
ethical theories or principles to a particular set of ethical problems. In this 
„traditional‟ model ethical principles and theories are constructed in an abstract way, 
without recourse to the context in which they arise and are held to be universally true 
for all of humanity. They are applied in a top-down rationalist deductive way – 
theories and principles are constructed and then applied in a value-neutral way to the 
problem at hand (Jennings, 1986). This form of bioethics has been called the 
„engineering model‟ (based on abstract, universal, foundationalist reasoning) and is 
generally determined to be the dominant methodology in bioethics (Hedgecoe, 2004).
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According to Caplan this model, „presumes that application in ethical contexts is akin to 
application in such scientific contexts such as engineering.‟ (1982:8) This model has 
three attributes: 
1. There is a body of knowledge that we can be more or less knowledgeable about, 
in the case of ethics this is moral theories or principles; 
2. This knowledge becomes applied by mechanically deducing conclusions from 
theories in light of empirical facts, such as those supplied by social scientists. 
This would be a form of sociology for bioethics;
24
 
3. The deduction can and must be carried out in an impartial and value-free 
manner. (Caplan, 1982:8) 
Therefore, under the engineering model, bioethicists master normative theories and 
deductive logic and then combine theory with empirical data to get the solutions. Like a 
computer properly programmed with ethical theory, various bits of data can be fed in 
                                                 
23
 Although bioethics has been associated with a particular type of philosophical enterprise, one that 
stems from a foundationalist tradition, there are of course many different types and forms of 
„philosophy‟, and an association with these would not have to lead to a commitment to 
foundationalism (pragmatism, postmodernism for example).  
24
 See the discussion in Chapter One. 
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and after logical operations have been performed the definitive moral conclusions will 
be produced (Caplan, 1982:9). MacIntyre puts it this way: „Applied ethics derives its 
conclusions from a set of premises in which the conclusions drawn from ethics are 
conjoined to factual findings about some specific...social area.‟ (1984:499)  
 
Harris in his Introduction to the Oxford Readings in Philosophy on Bioethics (2001) 
argues forcefully that the central methodology of bioethics should be philosophy and, 
more than that, a certain way of doing philosophy. It should not be construed as a 
multi-disciplinary area but a sub-set of applied philosophy.
25
 If one takes this to be 
what bioethics is then, according to Harris, empirical research is only of interest in 
establishing facts (like one would need to establish the „scientific‟ facts about 
cloning before being able to start commenting on the ethical aspects of such a 
development). Empirical research, under this model, can produce rich and interesting 
information about what “is” but it is not able to tell us anything about what “ought” 
to be the case (Pellegrino, 1995). Facts do not tell us what to do, we cannot, as Hume 
famously said, derive an ought from an is.
26
 
 
Criticisms of this model – the ‘social science critique’ 
One of the most recent and influential critiques of this model of bioethics has been what 
has come to be known as „the social science critique‟ (Herrera, 2008). It is the notion of 
bioethics as a philosophical enterprise based on rational, universal „top-down‟ 
theorising and its relative neglect of the social context that has been the focus of 
many of the social scientists‟ criticisms of bioethics (Hoffmaster, 1990, DeVries & 
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 See Bennett & Cribb‟s (2003) discussion of models of bioethics. They argue that bioethics can and 
should also be seen as a multi-disciplinary area of inquiry. 
26
 Both the claim that you cannot derive an ought from an is and if indeed Hume wanted to make a 
cognate distinction between facts and values are both disputed. On the first claim see Searle (1964) 
and on Hume‟s position see the short summary of the debate in Appiah (2008:212). 
 28 
Conrad, 1998. Haimes, 2002). I will now consider the main points of this „social 
science critique‟. 
 
Ignores social and cultural aspects of ethics 
 
Light & McGee argue that bioethics suffers from having it roots in analytic 
philosophy and this, „dominance of analytic philosophical approaches to ethics and 
medicine‟ (1998:2) has produced „bad habits‟ which bioethics should try to rid itself. 
One of the main „bad habits‟ is the decontextualisation of moral problems. „Bioethics 
is constructed in such a way as to ignore the role of social and cultural factors, partly 
since it champions an “ideal of universal ethical principles”.‟  (Hedgecoe, 2004:125) 
One result of this is that bioethics, as a discipline, is frequently said to have no real 
sense of what actually goes on in practice.  „Ethicists [are] criticised for being too far 
removed from clinical reality, insensitive to peculiarities of specific situations and 
unable to adequately consider the nature of diseases and the clinical contexts in which 
clinicians and patients are confronted with ethical problems.‟ (Borry et al, 2005:64)  
 
According to this criticism, ethicists might suggest solutions that are unworkable in a 
clinical setting, or be addressing the „wrong‟ problem by focussing on the exciting or 
extreme rather than the real and everyday (Turner, 2004). To take an extreme example, 
John Harris (1986) in his paper „The survival lottery‟ suggested that everyone have a 
ticket and if their number came up they would be killed and their organs distributed 
to those who needed them. Leaving aside whether Harris was seriously suggesting 
this as a solution to organ shortages and was just pushing certain arguments to see 
where they would logically take us, these kinds of discussion lead clinicians to view 
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bioethics as rather superfluous to their everyday practice and bioethics as of little use 
in practical problem solving (Kleinman, 1999). 
 
Under this interpretation of bioethics, an ethicist is a creature who has no direct, 
practical knowledge of the subjects about which they write and thus, „bioethics as a 
discipline doesn‟t seem to be in possession of the realities of practice. Bioethics is seen 
as, „an abstract exercise carried on over sherry in the tutorial rooms of academic ivory 
towers.‟ (Wilkie, quoted in Bennett & Cribb, 2003:11) This criticism encapsulates two 
different definitions of relevant „fact‟ that bioethics is claimed to ignore. 
 
First, the bioethicist is ignorant about facts about clinical practice and does not fully 
understand what actually happens in the clinic. In talking about why doctors often feel 
let down by bioethics, Baron comments, „bioethicists tend to leave the “facts” of 
clinical medicine to the doctors; their task is then to apply elegant and compelling 
arguments drawn from first principles of ethics.‟ (Baron, 1989:41)27 Second, the 
bioethicist does not take into account an appreciation of the social and cultural 
context of bioethics: a particular type of „fact‟ that social scientists argue to be 
important for any full understanding of ethical issues. This is seen as a troubling 
omission in bioethical discussion (Fox, 1999. Haimes, 2002).
28
 
 
                                                 
27
 For example Chambliss argues that despite the great attention that ethics pays to informed consent 
(and respecting autonomy) in the bioethics literature, in practice „informed consent represents at best a 
polite fiction.‟ (1993:651) 
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 For example, Anspach argues that it is imperative to know about the social dynamics of 
communication between patient and professional or, „informed consent is likely to remain an elusive 
ideal rather than a practical reality.‟ (1993:37) 
 
 30 
 
 
The application gap 
 
A further element of this „social science‟ critique is what has been called the 
„application gap‟. The engineering model presupposes that moral principles are 
specified independently and prior to their application (MacIntyre, 1984. Caplan, 1982. 
Jennings, 1986. Hoffmaster, 1994, 1992, 1990). As stated above the engineering model 
rests on the logical sequence of: the formulation of universal (ethical) principles; social 
situations empirically described; then moral principles applied to possible courses of 
action (Jennings, 1986). MacIntyre states the problem: 
 in applied ethics the rules or principles which on the dominant conception [the 
engineering model] constitute morality cannot be being applied in the way that 
is commonly supposed. For the relationship between a rule and its applications 
cannot be what on the dominant view it is taken to be; that is, it cannot be the 
case that we can first independently comprehend the rules of morality as such 
and then only secondly enquire as to their application in particular specialized 
social spheres. For, were this to be case, the rules of morality as such would be 
effectively contentless. (1984:501) 
 
According to MacIntyre: „Moral rules exist only in and through their range of 
applications and the history of moral rules in key part is the history of the changes in 
their application.‟ (MacIntyre, 1984:508) There is an „application‟ gap. 
 
Hoffmaster makes a similar point when he argues that there is an, „application gap 
between general norms and specific facts that can be bridged only by considerations 
external to moral theory.‟ (1990:242). Although conceptual analysis can clarify 
different meanings of a concept, such as autonomy, it cannot resolve substantive issues 
as it cannot tell us what that concept “really means”‟. (Hoffmaster, 1992:1423) Moral 
rules have to be given substantive content through their application and by 
considerations that are external to the moral theory.  
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Hedgecoe (2004) gives an exposition of what factors might be necessary to give moral 
theory „substantive content‟, that are in Hoffmaster‟s sense „extra-theoretical‟. He says 
there is important „moral work‟ being done before it is possible to apply theory or 
principles as, „applied ethics relies on the assumption that the categories in a moral 
problem (e.g. „patient‟, „informed‟…) mirror those in the ethical theory being applied.‟ 
(Hedgecoe, 2004:127) This „moral work‟ of categorising concepts, deciding which 
concepts are relevant and how they apply to the specific situation are matters that have 
to be done prior to the application of the ethical theory, and as Hoffmaster notes this, 
„moral work can determine how issues are resolved.‟ (1994:1157) 
 
Hedgecoe gives the following example of this „moral work‟: „Deciding whether 
children of a particular age are competent to give informed consent is a categorisation 
that can only be made on the basis of empirical evidence. Yet it has serious implications 
for ethical medical treatment, and thus such empirical research is basic “moral work”‟. 
(2004:127) This type of research could be the measurement of children‟s understanding 
of certain concepts or how much information they are able to absorb. Hence, the 
problem here is two fold: first, this important moral work is not made explicit and this 
can lead to assumptions and premises that have not been justified being incorporated 
into the argument; second, if this type of work is not conducted empirically (i.e. studies 
to see how much children could actually understand), then it could be based on 
philosophers‟ unsubstantiated intuitions and assumptions.29  
 
Appiah puts this point in the following way: „In the real world, situations are not 
bundled together with options. In the real world, the act of framing – the act of 
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 See Draper & Ives (2007) for a discussion of the problems with philosophers‟ intuitions. 
 32 
describing a situation, and thus determining that there‟s a decision to be made – is itself 
a moral task. It‟s often the moral task.‟ (2008:196) He goes on to say: „In life, the 
challenge is not so much to figure out how to play the game; the challenge is to figure 
out what game you‟re playing.‟ (2008:197) Thus, to take Appiah‟s analogy, once you 
have decided what game you are playing – the relevant principles may then be applied. 
However, for Hoffmaster the decision of what the game is is external to these 
principles. It is this decision that crucially frames the problem, determines what sort of 
principles one uses and therefore produces a certain type of answer. 
 
Data from sociological studies 
 
Certain studies on ethical decisions made in a medical context also draw attention to 
problems with a „traditional‟ engineering model of bioethics. Anspach (1993),30 for 
example, in her study of decision-making in an intensive care nursery, explicitly 
engages with the bioethical debate over life and death decisions in intensive care. 
She uses her findings to criticise traditional bioethical concepts such as autonomy, by 
arguing that in practice such concepts have little meaning, „bioethics individualizes 
the decision-making process….[however] life and death decisions are not private 
matters, but rather take place in the context of organisations, institutions, and power 
relations.‟ (1993:164)  
 
Alderson (1990) also uses her empirical findings to advance a form of the „social 
science critique‟ of bioethics. She devotes a chapter31 of her book on children and 
informed consent to discussing the shortcomings of the main theories and methods of 
bioethics. She takes issue with the use of abstract conceptions such as personhood, 
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 See also Anspach‟s  (1989) discussion of the limitations of the four principles of health care ethics 
in medical practice. 
31
 Chapter Nine. 
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for example, that are used in the bioethics literature. Alderson argues that the notion 
of personhood is of limited use in solving practical dilemmas, a notion often used by 
bioethicists such as Harris, Singer and Tooley. She argues that the assumption that 
children are not rational and therefore not persons can prevent them from being 
involved in the process of gaining consent for their treatment. Whereas, her research 
found that some children could, in certain circumstances, participate fully in medical 
decision-making. Further, Alderson argues that the personhood debate in bioethics 
focuses on the wrong question, namely, „does this human being have a right to 
treatment?‟ 32 A possible answer being: no, because they are not a person (1990:196). 
She says that this question „makes no sense‟ for those caring for handicapped 
neonates: „Their central question is: What is appropriate treatment for [the neonate]? 
Leading on to the tentative question: What will help him have a tolerable life now 
and in the future?‟ (1990:196) Thus: 
The “rational person” debate overlooks children‟s needs and capacities. It lends a 
spurious certainty to the most complex, tentative questions, but contributes little 
to real discussion. It is therefore not a useful basis for discussing medical 
dilemmas involving children. (Alderson,1990:196) 
 
For Alderson, the concept of personhood does not have any practical „grip‟, it does 
not do any useful moral work in helping health care professionals or parents make 
decisions or think about the problems they face.
 33
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 It could be said here that the bioethics are not addressing the right „game‟ in Appiah‟s sense 
(discussed above) and the bioethics commentary misses the important debates that those working in 
the field need to address. 
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 It could be argued, contrary to Alderson, that the problem is not with the concept of personhood but 
rather in the situation she describes practitioners are more concerned about beneficence for the child 
and this is the important ethical principle here. Therefore, her findings can be used to point traditional 
bioethics in the right direction rather than suggesting the whole project of traditional bioethics is 
flawed. 
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Rebuttals 
There are a number of rejoinders that can be made to this „social science critique‟ of 
bioethics. First, it is worth noting that this is not the only way bioethics is practised, 
and to characterise bioethics as a monolithic discipline is simply wrong. There are 
other ways of doing ethics - casuistry, virtue ethics for example - that do not rely on 
such a methodology (Callahan, 1999). It is, however, often argued that other models 
are „in the minority‟ in academic bioethics (Hedgecoe, 2004). The point of 
highlighting these alternative views is merely to indicate that there is disagreement over 
what constitutes „bioethics‟ methodology and therefore any criticism levied at one 
conception is bound to fall foul of critics who can reply that „this is not what we do 
anyway‟. The authors who are most associated with this method of bioethics, 
Beauchamp & Childress, have developed their views on the role of principles in 
moral deliberation and in the fifth edition of their Principles of Biomedical Ethics, 
explicitly state they reject such a „top-down model‟ (2001:408). 
 
Second, in response to these critiques of a „traditional‟ model of bioethics it might be 
replied that it is not surprising that studies find no support for such a model as this 
model is a straw man. Herrera (2008) mounts a case against the social science 
critique of bioethics along these lines. He argues that bioethics is already a multi-
disciplinary area and the idea of bioethics as populated by abstract philosophers is an 
outmoded one. Herrera gets a „sense of unfamiliarity‟ (2008:140) when reading 
criticisms, such as Hoffmaster‟s. He asks whether any bioethicist would seriously 
dispute that the social context of ethical problems are important or that ethical 
problems cannot be solved solely on rational grounds? 
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Jennings also makes a similar point when he argues that: 
[f]or while the engineering model is often used by applied ethicists as a 
second-order methodological account of their enterprise, it does not in fact 
accurately describe what these studies are doing. The engineering model, I 
contend, is best seen as an ideology of applied ethics and not as an accurate 
reconstruction of the nature of applied ethical analysis. (1986:212) 
 
As Nussbaum notes when discussing those who are hostile to the use of ethical 
theory, „anti-theorists take mediocre and excessively simple targets. Does any 
distinguished ethical theorist believe, for example, that a theory is simply a system of 
rules?‟ (2001:xxvii) Thus, the model of bioethics that is criticised by the „social 
science critique‟ could be said not to represent what bioethics really is and what 
bioethicists really do.  
 
There is, however, one element of the „social science critique‟ that has some value, 
the recognition of the problem raised by the „application gap‟ – that principles and 
ethical theories need to get their content through application and it is an attention to 
this process that is important for any approach to bioethics (Birnbacher, 1999). My 
approach to this problem will be discussed in the next chapter.  
 
A common response to the „social science critique‟ is to posit a more self-
consciously contextual meta-ethical theory and it is to this that I will now turn. 
 
CONTEXTUAL BIOETHICS 
Out of perceived deficiencies in the „traditional‟ engineering model of bioethics has 
grown an interest in a contextual morality, a move away from foundationalist 
theorising towards an approach that sees the context of moral or political theory as 
being important. Contextualists generally view “contexts” not only as a field for 
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applying ethics, but also as a source of morality.‟ (Musschenga, 2005:468) Contextual 
morality pays careful attention to the context in which decisions and dilemmas are 
played out and therefore gives a central place to social science research in 
discussions of moral issues. This concern to reinstate the particular context in moral 
reasoning has been a growing trend in philosophy and political theory in recent years.
34
  
 
Contextualism is a broad term that can embrace many different positions depending on 
the role that context is seen to play in determining the morality of the situation. Some 
forms of contextualist morality reject the claim that morality can be expressed in 
explicit propositions, moral theory or principles (Bader & Saharso, 2004). These 
„strong‟ contextualists would claim that it is not possible to make ethical judgements 
that have any wider application beyond the case in question, as morality rests solely 
in each individual context (MacIntyre,1988).
35
 This approach would jettison 
„traditional‟ forms of ethical theory and concentrate on description and mapping the 
moral terrain, without seeking to make any general normative claims beyond the 
particular context.  
 
Other forms of contextualism would retain ethical theories but view the nature of this 
theory as different from the universalist, foundationalist conception. Carens (2000), for 
example, advances a form of moderate contextualism that has a notion of context-
transcending principles, but attempts to see how the circumstances of particular cases 
determine the content of these principles. For the purposes of this discussion I want to 
concentrate on one formulation of contextualist morality advocated by Hoffmaster. 
                                                 
34
 This has been a general trend and has occurred within the discipline of philosophy see Dancy 
(2004) and political theory see (Carens, 2000. Bader & Saharso, 2004). 
35
 Although in later works MacIntrye has made his use of context-transcending principles more 
explicit. 
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Hoffmaster considers the relationship between social science research and bioethics and 
his account has been very influential in the literature (see Hedgecoe, 2004. Haimes, 
2002. Herrera, 2008).  
 
Hoffmaster’s contextualism 
Hoffmaster‟s contextualist morality rejects the claim that morality can be 
exhaustively expressed in explicit propositions, „traditional‟ ethical theory or 
principles and the focus is on understanding the context of ethical issues rather than 
debating ethical theory. 
 
Moral philosophy and its adjunct “applied ethics” movement run into trouble 
because they remain stubbornly acontextual….Reading books and engaging in arm-
chair speculation, does not supply contexts, however. (1992:1427) 
 
Hoffmaster while rejecting universal ethical theory does not reject all theory 
completely, „[a] contextual understanding of morality does not mean that there is no 
room for moral theory or philosophizing about morality, simply that the nature of this 
theory must be different.‟ (Hoffmaster, 1992:1428) 
 
However, for Hoffmaster the use of theory is much more limited: 
The focus of contextualist morality, rather than being theory, is practice. Its concern 
is accounting for the phenomena of morality. But understanding the practice of 
morality requires that this practice be located in its social and historical contexts. 
Morality becomes intelligible only when the background that makes it possible is 
considered. (1990:25) 
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Hoffmaster explains this background consists of three elements:
36
 
1. Vorhabe (fore-having) – the totality of cultural practices that when applied to 
morality are the „set of cultural beliefs that delimit the moral realm and thus 
determine what comes to be identified as a moral issue.‟ (1990:251) 
2. Vorsicht (fore-sight) – the vocabulary or conceptual schema that is brought to a 
problem. Thus the way moral issues are formulated. 
3. Vorgriff – a specific hypothesis which can be refuted or confirmed by the data, 
which in morality is specific judgments about moral issues. 
He argues that traditional bioethics ignores the Vorhabe and the Vorsicht. Theories such 
as utilitarianism and Kantianism focus on one moral insight from practice and ignore 
the rest to create a moral theory that, „reflects a truncated understanding of what 
morality is.‟ (1990:251) For Hoffmaster problems such as those created by reproductive 
technologies and genetic engineering cannot be solved by a traditional bioethics, 
„because they call into question the presuppositions that structure the context within 
which positivist moral theories operate.‟ (1990:252) The Vorhabe and Vorsicht of 
morality need to be altered to reach resolution of these types of problem. 
 
Thus, ethical theory, for Hoffmaster, arises out of practice rather than underlying it, and 
is not abstract, universal or context independent (1992:1428). In this contextual 
morality social science research would have a pivotal place as it is about understanding 
what happens in practice, rather than purely a focus on normative theories or principles. 
Hoffmaster outlines some of the benefits of such approach. A contextual morality in 
bioethics would move bioethics away from purely theoretical concerns making it more 
realistic and helpful (Hoffmaster, 2001:7). By putting bioethics in context it can expose 
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 These elements are based on Dreyfus‟ discussion of Heidegger‟s understanding of science. Such 
scientific understanding requires „pre-understanding‟ which consists of these three elements. 
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the gap between theory and practice, for example although informed consent is seen as 
theoretically important studies show it is a fiction (Hoffmaster, 2001:8). Studies can 
show that moral prescriptions of what ought to be done can be blocked by decision-
making procedures and power relationships in hospitals. „Putting bioethics in context 
helps to expose the institutional, social, and cultural forces that create gaps between 
theory and practice and points bioethics in directions more likely to produce moral 
reform.‟(2001:9) Bioethics should be more circumspect in judging (making normative 
judgments) and attempt to understand morality as a lived experience (2001:10). 
 
Hence, for Hoffmaster, there is no one universal method to problem-solving; it becomes 
one of seeing which approach is appropriate and the challenge is to see which approach 
fits the issue under consideration: „There is no method of morality, let alone a 
„rational‟ method of morality. Moral decision-making is, instead, a matter of 
„muddling through.‟ (1990:250) 
 
Criticisms of contextualism 
Are people contextualists? 
 
As a way of strengthening his position Hoffmaster argues that a contextualist morality 
better reflects how people think about ethical issues in practice and that principles do 
not feature in peoples‟ moral decision making.  He uses examples of research into how 
ethical decisions „actually get made‟ to illustrate how people „muddle through‟ rather 
than apply or use principles (1990:253).  
 
One example is a study of genetic counselling (Lippman-Hand & Fraser, 1979 in 
Hoffmaster), which examined parents‟ choices over what steps to take in response to 
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genetic counselling. Hoffmaster says that this study shows that these are not decisions 
taken on the basis of ethical theories or principles but ones in which the parents „muddle 
through‟.  These are highly individual decisions that may not be right for others.  
 
However, an alternative interpretation of this study can be made. While this „muddling 
through‟ may be true of how individuals make these decisions, there is a prior decision 
taken by society/medicine that that the defective foetuses can/should be aborted and that 
this is an acceptable choice to be made and counselled for in these circumstances. 
Therefore, the principle that it is ethically acceptable/tolerated to abort defective 
foetuses is in operation and this gives individuals that choice to make – it becomes an 
individual moral choice. So even in Hoffmaster‟s example, there are still ethical 
principles that are employed. His example merely shows that sometimes these ethical 
principles operate at the level of society rather than at an individual level. What it does 
not show is that ethical principles are not used.  Therefore, Hoffmaster‟s example of the 
occurrence of a contextual morality in practice could be interpreted in a way that 
actually illustrates, rather than disproves, the use of ethical principles. 
 
Other research has shown that in some areas ethical principles have been used to 
make ethical decisions. Braunack-Mayer‟s study on general practitioners in Australia 
found that forms of ethical reasoning employed in bioethics do have some purchase 
in the „real world‟. One of her findings was that the GPs she interviewed, „did have 
and use moral principles.‟ (1998:239) These moral principles were „principles-in-
use‟, that is they were not developed with the rigour or consistency found in the 
bioethical literature, but nevertheless, her GPs did have a sense of principles such as 
beneficence and autonomy and sought to use them in their ethical deliberations. 
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Normative judgments 
 
Any account or inquiry into moral life needs to have some normative leverage, ethics 
needs to be able to judge or at least have some „methods of criticism‟, so that we can 
say that something should not continue on moral grounds. 
 
Contextualism is often criticised for falling into relativism, that is adopting a position 
where any thing goes (Kukathas,2004). The worry here is that if we abandon ethical 
theory, the foundationalist belief systems that have tried to give us guidance over what 
to do, we are left with no way of making moral judgements (Rachels, 2003). 
Contextualist morality, in order for it to be a distinctive consideration of ethical issues 
rather than just description needs to have some „normative leverage‟. It needs to be able 
to say that such and such practice should not continue on moral grounds. So how does 
Hoffmaster deal with this issue? 
 
For Hoffmaster moral judgments do not depend on ethical theory, they depend on what 
he calls „rational criticism‟. This form of criticism has two distinctive features. First, 
such criticisms are directed at moral judgments that are situated in particular social 
contexts, „they assume that morality changes and that rational criticism can contribute 
to that change.‟ (1990:253) Second, the notion of rationality is more modest in 
contextual morality than that used in what he calls positivist morality, one that is 
satisfied with saying that judgments are embedded in moral practices rather than 
universal rules.
37
 Therefore, in Hoffmaster‟s view: „Contextualist morality has ample 
room for critical normativity.‟ (Hoffmaster, 1990:252) Whether this form of rational 
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 In the 1990 paper he uses Geuss‟ criteria for criticising ideologies and argues that morality can be 
criticised along the same lines (1990:252-3). 
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criticism can adequately perform a normative role is debatable.
38
 However, I want to 
consider the wider claim that ethical theory has no role to play in contextualist ethics. 
 
A contextualist morality does raise the important point that any ethical theory or 
deliberation must be sensitive to the context in which it is played out. However, in 
certain formulations, the rejection of any form of ethical theory makes it difficult to 
make judgements about practices that we might be unhappy about. Molewijk, when 
commentating on a problem he sees with conceptions of ethics that leave no role for 
ethical theory in the production of normative judgments, says,  „I am not suggesting 
that moral theory should function as the final arbiter, but no role at all is (at least in 
my opinion) really a waste of ethics‟ critical and constructive knowledge.‟ (2004:86) 
 
The danger of positions like Hoffmaster‟s is that they reduce our power to make 
ethical judgments. Ethical theory can play a significant critical role and to not 
employ such theories in ethical deliberations can make those discussions all the 
poorer.
39
 Ethical theory and principles gives us a way of criticising such practices that 
go beyond simple remonstrations of „I don‟t like that‟. It allows us to say some things 
are unjust, unfair or simply wrong. A rejection of any form of ethical theory could lead 
to the inability to criticise the status quo. Thus, ethical theory‟s critical facilities are 
both useful and, arguably, necessary to be able to advance moral judgments. 
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 Hoffmaster does not elaborate on this method of rational criticism in any later papers, so this 
method is not particularly well elaborated. 
39
 See Nussbaum (2000, 2000a & 2006) for a seminal discussion on why we need ethical theory in 
modern life. See also next chapter for a discussion of the role of ethical theory in the approach to 
ethics adopted in this thesis.  
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CONCLUSION 
This chapter has critically appraised two different approaches to bioethics. First, the 
„traditional‟ or engineering model where the principal focus is on ethical theory and 
where context, if it plays any role at all, usually plays a secondary role. Second, 
contextualism, where the principal focus is on context, and where ethical theory, as 
traditionally understood, plays little or no role. 
 
There are, I have argued, problems with both these ways of seeing bioethics: 
problems that are principally concerned with how they conceive the relationship 
between theory and context/practice.  In the next chapter I will develop a theoretical 
approach that focuses on both theory and practice equally. An approach based on an 
understanding of their interdependent relationship. Ethical theory is important in this 
approach but the provenance of it is different from a foundationalist conception of 
theory. Such ethical theories arise out of practice, as a contextualist might argue, but 
can still retain their wider applicability, as a traditional approach to bioethics would 
claim. This, I believe, enables bioethics to both retain its normative function and be 
attentive to the particular contexts in which moral decisions take place. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
THEORY AND PRACTICE IN BIOETHICS  
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
In the previous chapter I looked at the two dominant ways of conceptualising 
bioethics and examined their limitations. In this chapter I now want to explain the 
way that the relationship between ethical theory and practice (contexts) will be 
conceptualised in this thesis. From this I will develop a methodology for approaching 
ethical questions in practice. 
  
Stephen Toulmin (1992) advances an argument that, since the Renaissance, ethics 
has been increasingly seen as a discipline that should emulate the natural sciences 
and leave behind its Aristotelian concerns with the particular, concrete diversity and 
localised judgements. Philosophy was to be concerned with issues of theory and not 
with practical matters.
40
  
After the 1650s, Henry More and the Cambridge Platonists made ethics a field for 
general, abstract theory, divorced from concrete problems of moral 
practice….Modern philosophy was concerned not with minute “case studies” or 
particular moral discriminations, but rather with the comprehensive general 
principles of ethical theory. (1992:32)  
 
Toulmin argues that these core beliefs of modernity are now being questioned.
41
 
„Today, this theoretical agenda is wearing out its welcome, and the philosophical 
problems of practice are coming back into focus.‟ (1992:186) The movements of 
post-Renaissance thought from the oral to the written; from the particular to the 
universal; from the local to the general; and from the timely to the timeless are no 
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 This is, of course, a view of one strand of, largely Western, philosophical thought, but it has had a 
profound influence on the way ethics has been carried out in the Anglo-American tradition.  
41
 However, some beliefs of modernity are, arguably, worth keeping, human rights, freedom of speech 
etc (see discussion in the previous chapter). 
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longer seen as unproblematic. One conclusion of this critique of modernism is, 
obviously, post-modernism which in some formulations does away with any form of 
(ethical) theory. At this extreme there is a danger of adopting a position that allows 
no critical faculty and slips into relativism. This can be seen in the developments 
discussed in the previous chapter, a contextualist morality that seeks to replace a 
traditional (modernist) bioethics.  
 
Toulmin, however, argues that, „we can neither cling to Modernity in its historic 
form, nor reject it totally – least of all despise it. The task is, rather, to reform, and 
even reclaim, our inherited modernity, by humanising it.‟ (1992:180) For Toulmin 
the way to humanise philosophy is to „recover practical philosophy‟, „a renewed 
acceptance of practice, which requires us to adapt action to the specific demands of 
particular occasions.‟ (1992: 192) The rejection of foundationalism does not have to 
mean the rejection of rationality for Toulmin, just a different conception of it that 
reinstates Renaissance concerns for the particular and does not solely focus on 
abstract theorising. We need to, „reappropriate the wisdom of the 16th-century 
humanists, and develop a point of view that combines the abstract rigor and 
exactitude of the 17th-century “new philosophy” with a practical concern for human 
life in its concrete detail.‟ (1992:xi) This is, in effect, advocating a middle way 
between the purely theoretical concerns of 17
th
 century philosophy and the more 
contextual concerns of the 16
th
 century humanists. Toulmin terms this a „pre-
modern‟ rather than a post-modern approach. My approach could be said to be a way 
of conceptualising a middle way between these two forms of philosophy.
42
 I will 
argue that using Aristotle‟s account of the relationship between theory and practice 
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 Toulmin argues that casuistry is a useful „middle way‟ for making ethical decisions. 
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can help us develop an approach which, while paying due attention to context, retains 
universal principles and theories and therefore avoids the pitfalls of more relativistic 
accounts (such as strong contextualism). This will enable bioethics to both retain its 
normative function and be attentive to the particular contexts in which moral decisions 
take place. 
 
ARISTOTLE ON THEORY AND PRACTICE 
My concern here is to draw on elements of Aristotle for a conception of, „a more 
inclusive conception of what moral philosophy is‟ (Nussbaum, 1983:204). The 
importance of the particular circumstances in which the moral decision takes place 
are more fully recognised and the empirical contingencies of life are not seen as 
separate from the ethical enterprise. However, in this enterprise ethical theory still 
has a role to play. The attempt here is not to give a full systematic account of 
Aristotle‟s thought or provide a historical or textual analysis, but to pick out and use 
some features of Aristotle for my own purposes.
43
  
 
I shall draw on Jonsen & Toulmin (1988) and Nussbaum‟s44 work on Aristotle in 
regard to the relationship between theory and practice, recognising that this is one 
interpretation of the role practical wisdom (phronesis) plays in Aristotle‟s ethics and 
its complex relationship to theory. As Barnes says, „on many issues in the 
interpretation of Aristotle‟s philosophy it is not plain where the orthodoxy lies.‟ 
(1995:xi) However, I shall endeavour to indicate alternative interpretations of key 
                                                 
43
 See Dunne (1993) who approaches the study of Aristotle (and indeed other philosophers) in a 
similar way. Also Flyvbjerg (2001) who advances a form of „phronetic‟ social science based on a 
broadly Aristotelian foundation. 
44
 Nussbaum has also modified and changed her views over time. See the discussion in Fragility of 
Goodness (2001:278-282) and in the preface of this updated edition of Fragility. 
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points that have caused particular controversy and locate the debate in the wider 
literature on Aristotle as far as possible.
45
 
 
Theory and practice 
Aristotle saw a difference between different types of theory. For example, geometry 
was seen in classical Athens as a proto-type of theoretical reasoning, statements 
about the state of world from which, by deduction, conclusions about particular 
instances could be reached. Aristotle held that theoretical knowledge could be 
divided into two kinds: formal or analytic argumentation such as geometry; and 
theories about the natural world, such as Aristotle‟s work in zoology and the 
categorisation of natural types.
46
 Ethics, however, did not fall into either of these 
categories. Jonsen & Toulmin argue that:  
the absence of any such pre-existing divisions in the subject matters of Ethics 
– the fact that the circumstances and cases that human conduct deals with do 
not come neatly packages in “natural kinds” – is precisely what prompted 
Aristotle to deny that ethics can be a science: that is, a field for “universal and 
external” principles and quasi-geometrical argumentation. (1988:64) 
 
Hence, according to Aristotle not all knowledge could be subject to this kind of 
„scientific‟ theorising, practical fields, such as ethics and medicine for example,47 
have a different form of knowledge
48
 – one that is the product of experience.  
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 I say „as far as possible‟ because as Broadie notes, „scholarship on Aristotle‟s Ethics is a vast and 
thriving industry.‟ (2002:81) 
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 See Barnes (1995) for a succinct introduction to Aristotle‟s work in general and his inquiries into 
zoology and the categorisation of species. And Hughes (2001) for a discussion of Aristotle‟s 
biological studies impact on his ethical thought. 
47
 See Nussbaum (1994) Chapter Two for a detailed analysis of the analogy Aristotle makes between 
medicine and ethics and where Aristotle sees such an analogy breaking down. 
48
 See Reeve (1992) on the relationship between scientific knowledge and ethical knowledge, who 
disputes this contention (Chapter One). He argues that, „Aristotelian ethics is much more like a 
science than it is usually represented as being.‟ (1992:27) 
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Ethics was a practical activity that differed from „science‟49 in the following ways: 
1. Scientific theories attempt to formulate general and universal truths whereas 
ethics is about particular facts and circumstances. 
2. Scientific knowledge lays claim to certainty by the soundness of its 
theoretical principles, whereas practical knowledge certainty is grounded in 
knowledge of the particulars. 
3. Scientific theories are a temporal, whereas ethical judgements are specific to 
their time and place.
 50
 
Therefore, we cannot expect the same amount of precision in ethical knowledge as 
other forms of inquiry. 
But our account would be adequate, if we achieved a degree of precision 
appropriate to the underlying material; for precision must not be sought to the 
same degree in all accounts of things, any more than it is by craftsmen in the 
things they produce.(Nicomachean Ethics (EN), 1094b13)
 51
 
Hence, 
It is the mark of an educated man person to look for precision in each kind of 
inquiry just to the extent that the nature of the subject allows it. (EN, 1094b24) 
 
Therefore, for Aristotle there are two ways of knowing. Episteme which can roughly 
said to equate to what we mean by scientific knowledge today and phronesis – the 
kind of wisdom that is relevant for ethical deliberation – an articulation of 
judgement, experience and deliberation about what is the right (in the ethical sense) 
thing to do. 
Nor is wisdom
52
 only concerned with universals: to be wise, one must also be 
familiar with the particular, since wisdom has to do with action, and the sphere of 
action is constituted by particulars. That is why sometimes people who lack 
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 It is not at issue here whether this is an accurate reflection of what science is. 
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 These are taken from Jonsen & Toulmin (1988). 
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 All quotes from the Nicomachean Ethics are taken from the Rowe translation (Aristotle, 2002), 
unless stated otherwise. 
52
 Wisdom in this context is phronesis – practical wisdom. 
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universal knowledge are more effective in action that others who have it – 
something that holds especially of experienced people.
53
 (EN, 1141b15-20) 
 
Aristotle goes on in this passage to give the famous example of why chicken is good 
to eat. There may be a scientific explanation of why chicken is good to eat (he 
suggests that as it is a light meat it is easy to digest); however, direct experience tells 
us it is good to eat – we do not need this kind of theory to tells us what is good to eat. 
For Aristotle, then, the realm of practice requires a different form of knowledge, an 
accumulation of experiences that gives one a particular kind of wisdom – phronesis – 
and ethics is included in this realm.  
 
For Aristotle ethics cannot be reduced to simply following or applying a series of 
abstract rules as might be possible in those disciplines that are more properly seen as 
scientific. „Practical wisdom…cannot be acquired solely by learning general rules. 
We must also acquire, through practice, those deliberative, emotional, and social 
skills that enable us to put our general understanding of well-being into practice in 
ways that are suitable to each occasion.‟ (Kraut, 2007)  
Things in the sphere of action and things that bring advantage have nothing stable 
about them, any more than things that bring health. But if what one says 
universally is like this, what one says about particulars is even more lacking in 
precision; for it does not fall under either expertise or under any set of rules – the 
agents themselves have to consider the circumstance relating to the occasion, just 
as happens in the case of medicine, too, and of navigation. (EN, 1104a4-10) 
 
Hence, for Aristotle practical reason is both understanding and experience and each 
particular situation one is confronted with enhances that understanding.  
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 Dunne quotes this passage and gives a commentary in parenthesis that make the point about the 
importance of practical knowledge clearer: „But phronesis is practical and therefore one needs both 
kinds of knowledge [i.e. of the universal and the particular] but particularly the latter [i.e. of 
particulars].‟ (1993:313) 
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Everything which is done is particular, that is to say an ultimate. So the 
person of practical wisdom [phronesis] needs to recognise particulars, just as 
understanding and judgement too are concerned with things which are done, 
and so with ultimates. (EN,1143a32) 
 
These [particular insights] are origins of the end one has in view, since 
universals are derived from particulars. Of these particulars, then, we must 
have a perception, and that is insight. (EN, 1143b5)
54
 
 
Aristotle is concerned with how a general understanding of the virtues is to be 
applied and used and it is here that phronesis plays an important role. Practical 
universals (such as the virtues, directions on how we should act) are known to us by 
seeing instances of them. There are no hard and fast rules over what to do in a 
specific situation
55
  – there is a difference between scientific universals and practical 
ones. Practical universals are flexible and inexact and we need experience to build up 
our picture of what they are.  
 
Ethical theory and principles play a role in Aristotle‟s ethics. Aristotle formulates 
what can be seen as an ethical theory, one that examines how we are to live well and 
concludes that the practicing of the virtues (such as justice, courage etc) can fulfil 
this aim. Ethics, for Aristotle does have universal rules or principles, but these 
universals cannot be applied to a problem and an answer derived in the same way as 
scientific universals. Ethical theory cannot offer a definite answer to a problem by 
the application of certain universals. It can offer some guidance, on things to be 
considered, but how these will be balanced with and against each other will be a 
matter decided by looking at the particular case and employing one‟s practical 
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 These two translations are taken from Hughes (2001:101-102) 
55
 As Appiah says, „Normative theories, if they are sensible, do not offer algorithms for action.‟ 
(2008:193) 
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wisdom (phronesis).
56
 Thus, universal rules or principles play a role in Aristotle‟s 
ethics but he does not abstract them from the case in hand, he posits phronesis as a 
mechanism for getting from a universal rule to its application in practice. For my 
purposes the important point is not the acceptability of Aristotle‟s ethical theory – a 
virtue ethic – but the way he conceptualises the relationship between ethical theory 
and the particular case. 
 
This relationship between theory and practice or between the universal (generalities) 
and particular
57
 is important for my account. Aristotle‟s conception of this 
relationship distinguishes his ethics from Plato‟s, who saw the Form of the Good as a 
purely abstract entity.
58
 Jonsen and Toulmin interpret Aristotle as holding that ethical 
generalities were important, but these generalities differed from the Platonic Ideal: 
first, „the relevance of such generalities [ethical theory] must always be criticised in 
the light of detailed facts of the particular situation.‟ (1988:71) And, second, these 
generalities are based on the wisdom and experience of human beings. This type of 
theory will not meet the criteria of theory as episteme or sophia, its subject matter 
will not permit the same level of exactness, as we would find in maths for example.  
„Human affairs…contain so much variety and fluctuation, that a theoretical account 
of it can only be given “roughly and in outline” and can do no more than suggest 
what is true, “for the most part”.‟ (EN,1.3 summarised in Dunne,1993:243) 
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 Kraut interprets Aristotle as holding that, „although he [Aristotle] holds that ethics cannot be 
reduced to a system of rules, however, complex, he insists some rules are inviolable.‟ (2007) Rules of 
this nature, for Aristotle, are theft, malice, adultery and murder. These are not actions that one can 
exercise appropriately or apply ethically, „it is not possible, then, ever to get it right with affections 
and actions like these, but only to go astray.‟ (1107b14-15, EN quoted in Kraut) 
57
 Defined as: a universal is a type or kind of thing (doctors); whereas a particular is one of such a type 
(Dr Smith). 
58
 Aristotle argued that this abstract „ideal of the good‟ is not something that man can, in practice, 
achieve (1096a11-97a14, EN). See also Devereux (1986) for a discussion of the difference between 
Plato and Aristotle‟s views on the universal and the particular. 
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Nussbaum has written extensively on the relationship between theory and practice in 
Aristotle‟s thought. She argues that for Aristotle, „universal statements are posterior 
in ethical value to concrete descriptions, universal rules to particular judgments.‟ 
(2001:301)
59
 Rules can be used as a form of a rule of thumb, as summaries rather 
than, „the ultimate authorities against which the correctness of particular choices are 
assessed.‟ (Nussbaum,1990:68) For Aristotle it is not possible for any universal 
formulation to cover all the particulars that might arise – any law is the summary of 
wise decisions – and laws should be corrected when they are not in accord with good 
judgment. „General principles are authoritative only insofar as they are correct; but 
they are correct only insofar as they do not err with respect to particulars.‟ 
(Nussbaum,1994:66)
60
   In this way, „that is why it remains important for [ethical] 
theories to consult good practice.‟ (Nussbaum,2000:246)61  
 
This attention to the particularity of a situation, as Crisp notes, can be accepted by, 
„ethical theorists of any stripe.‟ (2000:28)62 Any ethical theory faces the problem of 
generalisations running out when confronted with particular situations – moral rules 
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 This claim that judgments about particular situations are normatively prior to general rules in 
Aristotle has been questioned by Irwin (2000) for example. He argues that, „Aristotle believes he can 
find theoretically significant generalizations.‟ (2000:129) The debate here for Irwin is that Nussbaum 
(among others) is trying to press a particularist interpretation onto to Aristotle, particularism here is 
defined as particulars are normatively prior to generalities. This turns the debate into one about moral 
metaphysics – reasons are not determined by principles (Vayrynen, 2002). This is one interpretation of 
particularism, a further one is that a particularist would have no time for moral principles (at whatever 
stage they were employed – i.e. Dancy (2004)) in this respect Nussbaum is not a particularist (see her 
discussion of this point in the Preface to the revised edition of Fragility of Goodness (2001)). 
60
 See Nussbaum‟s Therapy of Desire for good account of Aristotle‟s methodology and goals of 
ethical inquiry. 
61
 For a more detailed elaboration of Nussbaum‟s interpretation of Aristotle on this point, that is 
beyond the bounds of this chapter, see „The Discernment of Perception‟ in Nussbaum‟s Love’ 
Knowledge (1990). 
62
 Arguably Kant would not agree with this, but argue that the problem was a lack of theory, „It is 
therefore not the fault of the theory if it is of little practical use….The fault is that there is not enough 
theory.‟ (Kant, 1793/1991:61) 
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are indeterminate.
63
 However, it is the formulation of the moral rules and how they 
can be revised and interpreted in the light of experience and situations that is 
important for my account and where it differs from the „engineering‟ model of 
bioethics based on foundationalism. The contention that the moral rules arise out of 
experience, as Nussbaum puts it, „the discernment rests with perception‟, is key in 
my account.  
The particular case would be absurd and unintelligible without the guiding and 
sorting power of the universal….Nor does particular judgment have the kind of 
rootedness and focus required for goodness of character without a core of 
commitment to a general conception – albeit one that is continually 
evolving….There is in effect a two-way illumination between particular and 
universal. Although the way we have described the particular takes priority, they 
are partners in commitment and share between them the honors given to the 
flexibility and responsiveness of a good judge. (Nussbaum,2001:306) 
 
Thus, this account does not reduce ethical theory to a superfluous and meaningless 
enterprise,
64
 it has a key role to play in moral deliberation. This point is summed up 
by Nussbaum when she responds to critics who have charged her with being „anti-
theory‟ in the Preface to the revised edition of Fragility of Goodness:65 
Theories can and should incorporate a decent respect for judgements based on 
experience and cultivated perception; Aristotle‟s is one that does so. But the 
whole of his theory is ready to be wheeled on stage at any time, in order to 
criticise perceptions that are deformed….Judgments will test theories as theories 
test judgment. (2001:xxvii) 
 
In this way, theories arise from practice, experience and perception. They are useful 
ordering principles, rules of thumb for conduct and they can be criticised by practice 
and good judgment.  
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 This is a debate akin to the discussion of Kant‟s maxims – what maxim covers a particular 
situation?  
64
 As some formulations of the social science critique of bioethics would do. 
65
 See also Nussbaum  (2000) for an elaboration of these views. 
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The position that I am adopting can be seen as a form of „philosophy from the inside 
out‟ as opposed to philosophy outside in (which would correspond to the engineering 
model of bioethics). Dworkin argues:  
We can begin with practical problems….and then ask which general 
philosophical or theoretical issues we must confront in order to resolve those 
problems…When we reason from the outside in, a practical issue must shop 
from among ready-made theories on the racks to see which theory asks and 
tries to answer questions that best fit its own dimensions. When we reason 
from the inside out, theories are bespoke, made for the occasion, Savile Row 
not Seventh Avenue. (1993:29) 
 
Thus, ethical theories can arise out of the practical problems, context and dilemmas 
that face us in bioethics. The practice can inform theory just as theory can inform the 
practice – the two are symbiotically related. It is this explicit attempt at ethical theory 
creation and modification that distinguishes this approach from more sociological 
approaches. Although such approaches do influence ethical theory (i.e. Alderson‟s 
critique of the concept of personhood might lead to such a concept falling out of 
use)
66
 there is no explicit aim to engage with ethical theory and attempt to, out of the 
practice, construct theories that more closely match the circumstances, theories that 
therefore may be more likely, „to succeed in the political forum.‟ (Dworkin,1993:29) 
 
Nussbaum argues that a reflection on practical problems can result in the reshaping of 
ethical theory.  Although ethical theories such as justice should be able to have a 
theoretical power to reach beyond the specific case, „they must also be responsive to the 
world and its most urgent problems.‟(2006:1) She argues that certain problems facing 
theories of social justice such as doing justice to those with physical or mental 
impairment cannot be solved by, „merely applying the old theoretical structure to the 
new case.‟ (2006:4) 
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 See previous chapter. 
 55 
The problem of extending education, health care, political rights and liberties, and 
equal citizenship more generally to such people seems to be a problem of justice, and 
an urgent one. Because solving this problem requires new ways of thinking about 
who the citizen is and a new analysis of the purpose of social cooperation (one not 
focussed on mutual advantage), and because it also requires emphasizing the 
importance of care as a social primary good, it seems likely that facing it well will 
require not simply a new application of the old theories, but a reshaping of the 
theoretical structures themselves. (2006:2) 
Nussbaum‟s work on women in developing countries (2000a) and the practical 
problems facing women in these situations has led both to different perspectives on 
existing theories of justice and to the need to think in terms of constructing new 
theories of justice as a way of approaching such practical issues. 
 
Carens (2000) gives an analysis of how practice can change or influence ethical 
theory. He argues: „The idea is to engage in an ongoing dialectic that involves mutual 
challenging of theory by practice and of practice by theory.‟ (2004:123) Empirical 
research or practice can challenge theory for Carens in the following way. In 
attempting to apply theory to „real cases‟ it can highlight conflicts between theory 
and practice, „that may not be apparent if one stays within the framework of the 
theory and considers only the examples that theorist himself or herself puts forward.‟ 
(2004:120)
67
 Souder, for example, conducted a detailed analysis of thought 
experiments that have been used by philosophers and argues that there is a, 
„reciprocal influence between the assumptions of the arguer‟s position and the details 
that describe the thought experiment.‟ (2003:216) In his view the thought experiment 
contrives to back up the theorist‟s position by the subtle choices of detail (not an 
unsurprising conclusion as the experiments are designed to do just that). Thus, 
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 As Wittgenstein said, „a main cause of philosophical disease – a one sided diet: one nourishes one‟s 
thinking on only one kind of example.‟ (1968:593) 
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empirical research can be more challenging to ethical theories than the made up cases 
and hypothetical scenarios that characterise some ethical discussions.
68
  
It is this conception of the relationship between theory and practice, which draws on 
Aristotle, that will form the conceptual basis of my use of empirical research in 
ethical discussion. An analogy can be drawn here between Nussbaum‟s use of 
literature in ethics
69
 and my use of empirical research. For Nussbaum literature can, 
„show us, in a way that isolated philosophical examples cannot, what it means to 
organize a life in pursuit of what one values, and what conflicts and obstacles beset 
such a search.‟ (1999:175) Nussbaum seeks to use the study of literature in ethics in 
three main ways. First, to provide a richer conception of the circumstances and 
context in which moral decisions are taken; second, ethical theory can bring analytic 
tools to the study of literature that can be productive; and finally, novels can be used 
as places in which different conceptions of the good life (Kantian, Utilitarian for 
example) can be played out, to exemplify what morality looks like and how 
characters exemplify this. The third use is, arguably, the most important to her 
project – but for mine it is the first two uses of literature that mostly closely mirror 
my use of empirical research in ethics. 
 
                                                 
68
 For instance, Judith Jarvis Thompson‟s (1986) famous example of the violinist illustrates the 
problem with using hypothetical cases to generate moral theory. In her paper about the morality of 
abortion she discusses the question of the pregnant woman‟s obligation to the foetus she is carrying. 
As an illustration of such obligations she makes an analogy between being pregnant and being wired 
up to a famous violinist who needs the use of your organs for nine months to survive and then you 
will be disconnected and free to go your separate ways. The problems with this example is that is does 
not really tell us anything about the actual obligations one might or not might not have towards a 
foetus one is carrying and introduces many extraneous matters (such as obligation to strangers and 
what counts as a reasonable level of help) that, to my mind, does not help settle the issue of the 
morality of abortion. However, Thompson is using the example to make clear the differences between 
different moral obligations and as an exercise in using counterfactual thought experiments to highlight 
theoretical concerns the article is a worthwhile project. See Appiah (2008) who has a lot to say on 
such thought experiments and the problems of „trolleyology.‟ He makes an important and neglected 
point that there is an assumption that peoples‟ reactions to these hypothetical examples mirrors our 
responses to real cases, and this assumption might not be warranted (2008:100). 
69
 See Love’s Knowledge (1990), a collection of her essays on philosophy and literature. 
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The conception of ethics advanced here shares many similarities with casuistry, the 
use of a case-based approach in moral deliberation. In Jonsen & Toulmin‟s The 
Abuse of Casuistry they chart casuistry‟s roots in Antiquity, paying particular 
attention to the work of Aristotle and the role phronesis plays in ethical deliberation. 
Ethical issues are approached by considering the outcomes of previous deliberation 
and using procedures and techniques that were successful in the past to solve the 
problem. Casuistry plays down the importance of principles or any universal 
considerations but seeks to build up a store of paradigmatic cases that can be used to 
throw light on new dilemmas – as case law does.70 Jonsen & Toulmin (1988) argue 
that although casuistry has its roots in Aristotle, Aristotle could not be said to be a 
casuist. The main differences between casuistry and the view of ethics that is being 
advanced here are that: first, there is no „paradigm case‟, a key element in classic 
casuistry; and second, my position does not do away with any form of universal 
values – rather there is a concern to see how these theories are influenced by 
practice. This concern with ethical theory also distinguishes my approach from a 
strong contextualist position that would reject any form of ethical theory in seeking 
to make ethics more contextually based.  
 
 
APPLYING THIS FRAMEWORK 
Having outlined the broad conception of ethics, drawn from Aristotle‟s 
understanding of the relationship between theory and practice, that underpins the 
work conducted in this thesis, a broad methodology for approaching ethical questions 
in practice will be developed. This introduces the approach that will be used to 
analyse my data and draw normative conclusions. The elements of this approach are 
                                                 
70
 There are, of course, different formulations of casuistry see Strong (1999). 
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not, necessarily, applied sequentially to ethical issues, but are rather used when 
relevant and appropriate to the analysis being conducted. 
 
Setting out the endoxa 
A starting point of this method is to set out what Aristotle calls the endoxa – the 
phenomena. The phenomena are those aspects, views, opinions of the matter under 
consideration and also the world as it appears to us in the broadest sense. There has 
been much discussion and controversy over what Aristotle meant to include in a 
definition of the phenomena and whose views Aristotle thought important to take 
into consideration.
71
 This strategy would be uncontroversial in most bioethical 
discussions and Allmark argues that explaining the endoxa in bioethics, „is perhaps 
beyond dispute.‟ (2006:71) Most ethical discussions begin by setting out of different 
views and arguments. A common approach in bioethics papers is to focus on the 
views or a particular aspect of a philosopher‟s work and subject that to criticism and 
possibly out of that critique develop one‟s own stance.   
 
However, Aristotle, arguably, had a wider conception of the phenomena than this 
(Nussbaum,2001:244) and therefore simply summarising the „views of the wise‟ 
could, arguably, not be enough. Attention to the way the dilemma is played out in all 
its facets, a more detailed description of the issue than is commonly found in 
(some/many) ethical discussions, would enable the circumstances and particularities 
of a situation to be adequately described. Hence, a full description of a problem, area, 
dilemma, and the circumstances in which it is located could be usefully uncovered 
and discussed. Thus, for my purposes the endoxa will be interpreted in a broad sense. 
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 See Bostock (2000) Chapter Ten. 
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This element closely resembles a sociology of bioethics, that is examining the social 
context of bioethical issues or problems.
72
  What gets constituted as an ethical problem 
and the way dilemmas are constructed in medical practice all become a form of social 
interaction to be studied. A close attention to the circumstances of an ethical problem 
can be just as illuminating as the writings of bioethicists on the matter.  
 
Using ethical theory as a tool of analysis 
Using this method, ethical theories and principles can be used as tools to analyse the 
data (part of the endoxa). Here, ethical theories are used to discern the areas of 
disagreement, to clarify terms that are used and reveal ambiguities. Callahan argues 
that ethical principles, the formulation of which are an important part of ethics, 
should be seen as, „ways of organizing our moral thought, giving it a shape and 
formal structure.‟ (1999:291) Therefore, ethical theory is a body of knowledge that 
can be brought to bear on different issues and used as an analytic tool.  
 
Caplan makes this point when he says that ethical theory and principles are, „tools by 
which moral issues can be examined from a variety of perspectives.‟ (1982:15) For 
Caplan, those trained in ethics have a set of traditions and theories that enable them to 
deliberate about and judge moral issues. „A fully developed applied ethic would afford 
the moral philosopher an opportunity to examine the delicate interplay that occurs 
among fact, social roles and prescriptive principles in reaching moral decisions.‟ 
(Caplan,1982:16) An ethicist has an expertise in both normative theories and concepts 
and should be an expert in the descriptive ethics of their chosen area (the endoxa). Thus, 
                                                 
72
 See Chapter One for a discussion of this. 
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the ethicist has the role of diagnosing moral problems rather than simply offering 
solutions. An important aspect of this role is not just accepting the moral problems as 
presented by, say, doctors, „[a] knowledge of ethical theories, traditions and concepts 
allows the moral philosopher to see the normative aspects of ordinary events in ways 
that those more directly involved do not and sometimes will not.‟ (Caplan, 1982:14) 
Using ethical theory could highlight and clarify the areas of disagreement more clearly 
and discern underlying ethical issues. Thus, theories and principles can be a tool for 
elucidating and analysing the data, just as sociologists use theories of social 
interaction to approach their data for example (Maxwell, 1996).   
 
It could be questioned in response to this, that it appears here that the ethical theory 
used to analyse the empirical data is preformed, a given in a foundationalist sense, 
and then used to analyse the data. Whereas, previously it had been argued that the 
specifitivities of theory were developed in a particular context. Therefore, exactly 
what is being used to analyse the data? Where have these particular ethical theories 
come from and what gives them their warrant? I would argue that this is construing 
the relationship between theory and practice as a linear one, whereas it is better 
characterised as more akin to a symbiotic relationship. Theory can be used to 
approach the data and it can also arise from the data itself. Then the theory might be 
modified or extended – theory interprets data and data interprets theory – and the two 
processes can occur in the same study. As Alasuutari says when talking about studies 
in the social sciences, „[i]t is very difficult…to make a clear distinction between the 
“empirical” and “theoretical” parts of a study…. Ideas that surface with empirical 
data cannot be separated from insights that are gained while reading theories and 
earlier research.‟ (1995:175) 
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Specifying theories and principles 
 
Empirical findings contribute more than just descriptive information to which the 
ethicist applies their theories. They contribute to our very understanding of the 
principles themselves. As discussed in the previous chapter, for the engineering model 
of bioethics sees moral principles as specified independently and then applied to actual 
problems. As MacIntyre states, if this were the case, „the rules of morality as such 
would be effectively contentless.‟ (1984:501) And have no power to direct action. 
Therefore, „moral rules exist only in and through their range of applications.‟ 
(MacIntyre, 1984:508)  Formal principles take on their content through successive 
applications and interpretations (Jennings, 1986). This is the Aristotelian point that it is 
the particular situation that is the measure of an ethical principle and the principle needs 
to be „specified‟ to both fit the situation and to be made meaningful.  
 
One way that this can be done is by specification of principles (Richardson, 1990. 
Beauchamp & Childress, 2001). The specification of ethical principles provides one 
account of the way in which they can be made less abstract and therefore can be 
applied meaningfully to particular cases. Principles may be formulated abstractly, 
such as the principle one should not harm others, but for them to have any 
meaningful content they need to be specified in a particular context. Formal moral 
principles take on their content through application and this is how they direct action.  
 
Richardson (1990. 2000) gives a detailed account of how ethical principles need to 
be specified in order to bridge the „application gap‟ and therefore be practically 
useful. This specification should not be the introduction of an exception to the 
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principle (P), but a qualification (q) that makes it fit the case in hand. So for instance, 
„repeated cycles of IVF are harmful and should not be performed‟ could be a 
practical specification of the principle „do no harm‟.  P is specified by q, „by adding 
clauses indicating what, where, when, why, how, by what means, by whom or to 
whom the action is to be….done.‟(1990:295) To use an example of Richardson‟s, the 
norm „euthanasia is generally wrong‟ could be specified by, „it is generally wrong to 
shut off the respirator of a patient in a potentially reversible coma.‟ (1990:296) What 
would not count as a specification of a principle would be the move from „torture is 
always wrong‟ to „torture is sometimes wrong‟, as specification proceeds either, „by 
setting out substantive qualifications that add information about the scope of 
applicability of a norm or the nature of the act or end enjoined or proscribed.‟ 
(1990:296) The move from prohibiting torture to allowing it sometimes would 
therefore be a revision of the principle,
73
 it would alter its force rather than giving 
more detail on how it was to be applied. In this way principles are under-determined, 
for instance, „liberty or equality may not exactly formulate what is positively 
required in different contexts and cases but clearly excludes any serious lack of 
freedom such as slavery or serious inequality.‟ (Bader & Saharso,2004:110) For 
Richardson specification is always needed as, „the complexity of moral phenomena 
always outruns our ability to capture them in general norms.‟ (1990:294) Thus, 
specification is the refining and tailoring of the principle to fit the precise 
circumstance.
74
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 This move would be prohibited by one of his clauses that for it to be a specification of a norm, 
„every possible instance of the absolute counterpart of  p would count as an instance of the absolute 
counterpart of q.‟ (Richardson, 1990:295) (Where p is the specification of q)  
74
 See Verweij (1998) who gives a useful example of such specification when he considers a case of 
getting informed consent for a drug trial, in this case he argues, „the principle of autonomy is not 
revised; the moral institutions and the morally relevant facts of the case are considered to be the 
reasons to propose a specific understanding of the principle.‟ (1998:37) 
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A product of specification is to clarify and convert ethical theories and principles into 
practical guides for action. Birnbacher sums this up when he says, „applied ethics 
deals with the “translation”, as it were, of theoretical principles into workable 
practice rules, making them available for everyday judgements and decisions.‟ 
(1999:321) If we see the meaning of principles specified in the context of application 
then they can be useful for directing action. This is taking a more Aristotelian view of 
ethical theory where the construction of a „practice rule‟, in Birnbacher‟s sense, is given 
a more central role. It is in practice that such theories become meaningful. 
 
There are of course limitations to specification. Moral conflict may never be totally 
avoided however closely one seeks to specify a principle. Further, specification may, 
„be arbitrary, lack impartiality, or fail for some other reason.‟ (Beauchamp & 
Childress, 2001:17) Beauchamp & Childress (2001) argue that the specification of 
principles needs to be used alongside the balancing of principles.
75
 The balancing of 
principles, deciding which principle takes precedence in a particular case, making a 
judgment over the relative weight to be given to potentially competing principles, is 
part of my approach – an exercise in phronesis. Furthermore, in a close attention to 
the particular context as set out by a sociology of the practice, this balancing of 
principles is an important component of ethical decision-making. 
 
Making normative judgments 
A final of element of my methodology is to make normative judgments about the 
practice under study. For bioethics to be a distinctive and, I would argue, a useful 
discipline this normative element is important. I will first consider how this issue is 
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 See DeMarco & Ford (2006) who advocate the use of balancing instead of specification, because, 
they argue, it more clearly displays the reasons behind the decision. 
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approached in Aristotle‟s ethics and then, following on from this, the way such 
judgments are made in my approach. 
 
Normative judgments in Aristotle 
 
One of the key criticisms of Aristotle is that if such an emphasis is placed on 
phronesis and the individual judging and responding to situations how can one ever 
be sure that a „right‟ solution has been reached? Aristotle puts much store on 
problems being resolved when an agreement is reached. At the beginning of book 
VII of the Nicomachean Ethics Aristotle begins a discussion of, „lack of self-control, 
and softness or weakness for comfort‟ (1145a35-6, EN) – akrasia. It is in this 
discussion that his method is most clearly illustrated.
76
 
As in other cases, we must set out what appears true about our subjects, and, 
having first raised the problems, thus display, if we can, all the views people hold 
about these ways of being affected, and if not, the larger part of them, and the 
most authoritative; for if one can both resolve the difficult issues about a subject 
and leave people‟s views on it undisturbed, it will have been clarified enough. 
(1145a3-8, EN) 
 
In essence this method sets out what the relevant opinions are and then considers 
what puzzles they may give rise to (such as contradictions for example), and finally 
these puzzles are resolved. This Aristotelian method has caused a lot of 
controversy.
77
 What has been termed a „dialectical‟ method should, hopefully, move 
us towards a „better‟ resolution in some way. A critic, however, could simply say that 
just because agreement has been reached, this does not indicate anything – all parties 
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 This is not to say that Aristotle always employed this method. Bostock, for example, argues that, 
„very little of the Ethics can be explained as simply an application of the method set out in [book] 
V11.‟ (2000:219)  
77
 See Allmark‟s (2006) discussion of this criticism of Aristotle that the dialectic cannot deliver first 
principles, namely that it cannot move us towards the truth. And Irwin (1988) who argues that 
Aristotle‟s dialectic can produce first principles. 
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may be wrong, there is nothing in Aristotle‟s ethics against which competing 
solutions can be judged, no first principles on which to base justification.  
In response to this criticism it can be argued that Aristotle is not trying to set up a 
priori ethical theories against which „progress‟ can be judged. Aristotle does not 
posit the existence of any systematic theory on which solutions can be judged and it 
is not possible to formulate truth in ethics in any exact way. Thus, ethical truth does 
not consist in the formulation of abstract theories, but in the nuanced application of 
ethical theories using practical wisdom phronesis (rationality) and an appreciation of 
the specificity of each situation. Aristotle‟s method is a form of dialectic moving 
between what is agreed and areas of disagreement to try and formulate a resolution. 
Nussbaum argues that there are no rules about how to do this but the aim is, „to 
arrive at a view that is internally coherent, and also one that is broadly shared and 
shareable.‟ (1990:174)78 Aristotle argues that there is something true in most 
opinions and therefore by considering all commonly held opinions it is possible to 
whittle them down to something that approaches the „truth‟. For Aristotle this notion 
of truth, „insists on a rigorous scrutiny of appearances and on the fundamental role of 
consistency. It claims correspondence, too, with the deepest human beliefs and 
desires.‟79 (Nussbaum,1994:65)  
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 This has similarities with Rawls‟ (1972) method of reflective equilibrium, see later discussion in 
this chapter. 
79
 This approach could be underpinned by adopting a version of Aristotle‟s functionalism argument in 
which what counts as a fulfilled life and certain human capabilities can be used as standards against 
which our ethical theories and beliefs can be judged. Nussbaum has, in her later work, defended a 
capabilities approach (2000a,2006) that has its roots in Aristotle. Nussbaum argues that her 
capabilities approach holds, „that certain universal norms of human capability should be central for 
political purposes….[in] making cross-cultural comparisons and to developing a defensible set of 
cross-cultural categories.‟ (2000a:35) Hence, this approach attempts to provide a universal theory 
upon which to make ethical judgments. This account has been criticised on many grounds, see Flax 
(2001 & 2001a) for a critique of Nussbaum‟s use of universal values. For my purposes agreement 
with this kind of approach is not crucial, my approach can also be justified on the more pragmatic 
grounds of producing useful and better accounts.  
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Hence, Aristotle‟s method can be seen, not as a way of delivering the „truth‟, as 
would be understood in the sense of a recognition of a Platonic form, but of moving 
towards „better accounts.‟ As Hughes (2001) argues, Aristotle is not concerned with 
justification in ethics as modern moral philosophers are. There might not be any 
proof that the products of phronesis are „right‟ but there can still be an explanation of 
the outcome; the person can, „invite us to see the situation as they saw it, in the hope 
that we too will agree that they read the situation alright.‟ (2001:115) This way of 
moving forward seems the best we can do, „the universal account always has to be 
responsive to particulars and is to that extent provisional; but it is a theory 
nonetheless.‟ (Nussbaum, 2001:xxvii) 
 
Normative judgments in my approach 
Having examined the debate over the ability of an Aristotelian approach to come to 
normative conclusions, the implications for my approach will now be discussed. This 
symbiotic relationship between theory and practice can raise the problem that such 
mutual adjustment between theory and practice does not provide any means of 
adjudicating between the two claims in any a priori way. In response to this it is 
argued that while it is true that there is no way of ranking theory or practice so that 
one „trumps‟ the other, this is accepted and any adjustment of either element needs 
explicit justification (Molewijk et al, 2004). This type of decision cannot be made 
abstractly: which element (ethical theory or the practice or both) would have to be 
adjusted would depend on the context and the delicate interplay between theory and 
practice. Like Hughes‟ point above, about the conclusions of employing phronesis, 
what is required is a careful justification of why one element was modified. I would 
argue that in reality, this is the best that can be done. 
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In my approach it is not argued that we can reach the „true‟ or ultimately justifiable 
account, it is rather to gather a finely grained description of the problem (using all 
our resources, empirical research and those of ethical theory) to produce a defensible 
(on the basis of reason and argument) solution or recommendation. The emphasis in 
my approach is on how useful ethical theories are, rather than how „true‟ or „right‟ 
they are. This is not a new conception of the role of theory or principles in bioethics. 
Many philosophers such as Beauchamp (2000), Strong (2000), and Jonsen (1998) 
have argued that there is no generally agreed theory of right and wrong, no ethical 
theory that is sufficiently well established as to be able to provide some kind of 
system within which to address moral problems. „Bioethics, for them, is about 
resolving cases in ways which can be justified to those involved but not in ways that 
are necessarily right.‟ (Smith Iltis, 2000:273) Hence, reasoning can be judged by how 
useful it is in the public sphere and how acceptable it is to the „public‟ or the groups 
it might affect, rather than how „close‟ it is to the truth.  
 
This type of aspiration for bioethics has been viewed as a move towards pragmatism 
in bioethics (Arras,2001): so how does my approach to ethics stand in relation to 
(philosophical) pragmatism? Many of the elements of my position have a distinctly 
pragmatic flavour: seeing principles as tools and attention to what works in practice 
rather than what is true or right.  It has been argued that bioethics has incorporated 
many pragmatist features without being a self-consciously pragmatist movement 
(Schermer & Keulartz,2003).
80
 Arras (2003) argues that much of Beauchamp & 
Childress‟ work could be categorised as pragmatist in a Dewian sense. In Principles 
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 Jonsen (1998) contends that bioethics has its roots in American pragmatism from the beginning. 
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of Biomedical Ethics, „principles function very much like Dewey‟s tools, helping us 
sort out what to attend to in a morally freighted situation.‟ (Arras, 2003:608) In this 
way Arras argues that modern bioethics embraces a form of freestanding 
pragmatism, one not based on the cannon of pragmatist thought such as Dewey, 
James etc, and therefore in a sense, „we are all pragmatists now.‟ (2001:70).81  
 
Therefore, although ethical theories and principles are not held to be „true‟ in any 
straight forward foundationalist way, in my approach they can still be used to reflect 
on and make judgments about ethical issues. General ethical theories or principles 
can be useful in that they give us guidance on what to look for and how to appraise a 
situation, but close attention has to be paid to how they relate to that specific 
situation. And further, such theories can arise out of practice. In deciding, does a 
practice respect patient autonomy?, for example, the theory of patient autonomy 
would have to be a more nuanced one, one that had been developed by an attention to 
the specificities of a situation as well as the prevailing theory. 
 
OTHER METHODOLOGIES IN EMPIRICAL ETHICS 
My broad methodology for approaching the study of ethical aspects of practice is an 
amalgam of elements based on an Aristotelian conception of the relationship between 
the theory and practice. There are, of course, other methodological approaches that 
seek to provide a methodology for empirical ethics, the most popular of these are: 
reflective equilibrium and pragmatic hermeneutics. I shall briefly outline the main 
elements of these methodologies and discuss why I have used my approach in this 
study as opposed to these other methodologies. 
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 For a critique of Arras‟ views see (Schermer & Keulartz,2003). For an overview of the debate over 
the role of pragmatism in bioethics see (Tollefsen & Cherry,2003). 
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Reflective equilibrium  
This is an approach in empirical ethics that attempts to integrate theory and practice 
(Musschenga, 2005. Van der Scheer et al, 2004). It is based on Rawls‟ notion of 
reflective equilibrium that he used to build and provide justification for moral 
theories and principles. As Daniels defines it: 
The method of reflective equilibrium consists in working back and forth 
among our considered judgments (some say our “intuitions”) about particular 
instances or cases, the principles or rules that we believe govern them, and 
the theoretical considerations that we believe bear on accepting these 
considered judgments, principles or rules, revising any of these elements 
wherever necessary in order to achieve an acceptable coherence among them. 
(2003)
82
 
 
Beauchamp and Childress in The Principles of Biomedical Ethics use this method, 
uniting it with their version of a common morality theory, they state that: „Method in 
ethics properly begins with our “considered judgments”, the moral convictions in 
which we have the highest confidence and believe to have the lowest level of 
bias.‟(2001:398) These considered judgements are, as Rawls argues, subject to 
revision: „The goal of reflective equilibrium is to match, prune, and adjust considered 
judgments in order to render them coherent with the premises of our most general 
moral commitments.‟ (Beauchamp & Childress, 2001:398) 
 
When applied to empirical ethics there are various ways of incorporating this into 
empirically answerable questions. The research would attempt to find out what were 
peoples‟ considered judgments. Once these judgments were mapped, as Musschenga 
(2005) notes, ethicists would be concerned with finding the right answers to practical 
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 See also Daniels (1996) a collection of essays addressing reflective equilibrium in theory and 
practice and van der Burg & van Willigenburg‟s (1998) edited collection. 
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problems and this could be done in various ways. The ethicist could aid the people 
whose views they had studied to formulate „a well considered judgment‟ that was 
consistent with their views and beliefs on other issues, or: „Empirical ethicists 
[could] also use the method of reflective equilibrium for determining whether a set of 
principles that forms the core of an ethical theory is in alignment with the well-
considered judgments of a particular community.‟ (Musschenga, 2005:481) An 
example of a research project in empirical ethics that used this methodology is Van 
Thiel & Van Delden (2001). They used the methods of reflective equilibrium to try 
and formulate guidelines on respecting autonomy in the nursing homes.
83
 
 
There have been many criticisms of reflective equilibrium: some focusing on the 
philosophical problems with the claim that our considered moral judgments carry 
weight; problems with the vagueness of the concept of coherence; and that reflective 
equilibrium idealises human rationality – that in practice people will not modify their 
views in light of critical pressure (Daniels, 2003). There is not space to fully debate 
these issues, as they do not strike at the heart of the reason why reflective 
equilibrium was not used in this study. The reason is that the research questions 
posed in the study described in this thesis were not answerable by employing this 
methodology. I did not set out to examine the ethical „considered judgments‟ of the 
clinicians and then to see if these could be revised to, eventually, form a coherent 
moral view. Reflective equilibrium, as a method, would have not answered my 
research questions.
84
 As Daniels says, „we do ethics to solve many different kinds of 
problems and that the methods we use plausibly vary with the problems we want to 
solve and the interests we have in solving them.‟ (1996:333) He goes on to say: 
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 See Chapter One for an outline of this study.  
84
 See detailed discussion of my research questions and the use of research methodologies to „fit‟ 
one‟s research questions in Chapter Four. 
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„There is no one thing we do that is always central to solving an ethical problem for 
there is no one paradigmatic ethical problem.‟ (emphasis in the original. 1996:339) 
Therefore, this methodology was not appropriate for „solving‟ the ethical issues I 
wanted to examine. 
 
Pragmatic Hermeneutics 
The overriding aim of pragmatic hermeneutics is to not simply to find out what the 
moral beliefs of people are but to, „reconstruct the practice‟s internal morality.‟ 
(Musschenga,2005:482) Van der Scheer et al (2004) give an overview of this 
methodology that is a combination of pragmatism and hermeneutics as found in the 
work of John Dewey and Hans Georg Gadamer respectively. The significance of 
pragmatism is its theory of meaning. The meaning of a theory derives from the 
practical consequences of its usage, concepts and theories, „do not represent any a 
priori or absolute authority, but they owe their value to their mediation in achieving 
that for what they were intended to be. Thus, their value is determined by their 
context.‟ (Van der Scheer et al, 2004:93)85 Hermeneutics is the attention to 
communication and especially dialogue as a form of interaction, knowledge is 
always a matter of interpretation rather than objective truth (Widdershoven, 2005). 
This approach aims to, „make explicit the normative orientation in daily life.‟ (Van 
der Scheer et al, 2004:93). It is not merely descriptive but aims to see how specific 
practices can be improved, in so far as theories are used they are directly related to 
the practices under consideration. Hence, theories are valuable if they can do what 
they are supposed to do (i.e. a theory of autonomy could be evaluated by considering 
whether it actually promoted autonomy in particular situations). 
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 Hence, this could be seen as a form of contextualism, see Chapter Two for a discussion of this. 
 72 
 
Widdershoven & Sohl (1999) study is an example of this methodology. This study 
focussed on one case of supported employment and collected stories from all the 
participants. The overall aim was to improve concrete practical situations, by taking 
into account all the diverse elements that go to make up someone‟s experience of a 
supported work programme. In doing this, they argue that it is possible to see that 
some concepts such as integration and autonomy are too crude and that, „participants 
use concepts that are more subtle, and therefore might be more adequate to get hold 
of the intricate nature of processes of care for people with mental handicap.‟ 
(Widdershoven & Sohl, 1999:127) Hence, this method pays close attention to 
participants‟ constructions and use of terms and their understandings of the situation. 
 
This methodology would have been more fitted to answering my research questions 
than reflective equilibrium. However, a problem with this methodology is a similar 
one to the main criticism made against contextualist forms of ethics, that it gives a 
lesser normative role to ethical theory and this can reduce the critical force of ethical 
deliberation.
86
 This is a criticism made by Molewijk (2004) of Widdershoven & van 
der Scheer‟s (2004) pragmatic hermeneutic method. An important aspect of the 
methodological approach that I have proposed is that it seeks to both use and say 
something about ethical theory. Theory construction and criticism are central aims of 
my approach. Ethical theory is useful to criticise practices and to guard against any 
serious contraventions of particular principles, for example, liberty or equality.
87
 
                                                 
86
 See Chapter Two for criticisms of contextualism. 
87
 See previous discussion in this Chapter. 
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Thus, I would argue that in trying to integrate theory and practice in a more sustained 
way, for certain tasks, my approach has certain advantages.
88
 
  
CONCLUSION 
In this chapter I have given an account of my approach to the relationship between 
theory and practice and how this impacts on using empirical data in ethical 
deliberation. From this I have developed a broad methodology that can be applied to 
examining ethical issues in practice. As will be seen later in the thesis this 
methodology can produce not only theoretical contributions to the debate but 
practical suggestions for improving the practice under study. The next chapter will 
focus on the qualitative methods used in conducting my study of infertility 
clinicians‟ approaches to ethical decision-making. 
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 See The Conclusion for an evaluation of the usefulness of my approach. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
 
METHODS 
 
INTRODUCTION 
In this chapter I will outline the research methods used in the thesis for conducting 
and analysing the interviews with the infertility clinicians. These are the social 
science methods that I combined with my approach to conducting empirical research 
in bioethics as outlined in the last chapter. First, I will give an overview of 
definitions of qualitative research. Then the justification for choosing this type of 
research method for studying my research questions will be developed. Second, I 
will discuss the evolution and subsequent progression of my research project 
detailing the methods and rationale for the data collection. Finally, the analytic 
strategies I used to approach and make sense of my data will be elaborated.  
 
WHAT IS QUALITATIVE RESEARCH? 
 
An initial difficulty in defining qualitative research is that authors often begin 
discussions by stating that there is little consensus over what qualitative research 
actually is (Mason, 1996. Marshall & Rossman, 2006). „Qualitative research methods 
are a complex, changing and contested field – a site of multiple methodologies and 
research practices. “Qualitative research” therefore is not a single entity, but an 
umbrella term which encompasses enormous variety.‟ (Punch, 2005:134) However, 
despite this rich diversity there are a number of features that, gathered together, can 
be seen to constitute qualitative research. Mason, for instance, argues that it is useful 
to look for some common elements, „so that we can develop a sense of what is 
qualitative about qualitative research‟ (1996:4). Such elements include:  
 75 
 Qualitative research is based, broadly, on an interpretivist approach that 
attempts to seek meaning in the social world. Where this meaning lies and 
how it is interpreted are highly contested questions but nevertheless some 
derivation of meaning from the social world characterises qualitative 
research. 
 Description of the settings and a close attention to the context of the subjects 
of study. A strength of qualitative research is that it can often provide fine 
grained description of social worlds about which there may not be very much 
known.
89
 Qualitative research pays close attention to the context in which the 
phenomena under study arise and unlike quantitative research that attempts to 
isolate and manipulate variables, qualitative research attempts to provide 
explanations that are based on rich, contextual and detailed data that takes 
place in the natural world. 
 Qualitative research is based on data collection methods that are flexible, 
rather than seeking to impose rigid structured or standardised forms of data 
collection on situations. There is a hesitation in imposing a priori frameworks 
before data collection and study designs can sometimes „emerge‟ during the 
research process.
90
 
Therefore, with these common elements in mind, it is possible to talk of a qualitative 
research „genre‟ (Marshall & Rossman, 2006). The term is a well-used heuristic 
device that delineates a type of research methodology and approach to social 
research. 
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 This can be a useful methodology for the first stage in the examination of ethical issues discussed in 
Chapter Three, that of considering the endoxa. 
90
 These points have been adapted from Mason (1996), Murphy et al (1998) and Marshall & Rossman 
(2006) 
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The relationship between qualitative and quantitative methodologies 
In this section I want to discuss why I have chosen to use qualitative rather than 
quantitative research methodologies to approach and study my research questions.  
 
The debate over the relationship between qualitative and quantitative research 
traditions is long and fraught and there is not space to give a comprehensive account 
of the minutia of this debate.
91
 Indeed, it has been argued that qualitative researchers 
should no longer have to justify their approach to data collection and analysis as 
though it was a poor relation to quantitative inquiry and a deviation from the 
„normal‟ way of conducting social research (Wolcott,1990).  
 
The relationship between qualitative and quantitative research can be seen, broadly, 
in two ways: one that sees the two research traditions as fundamentally different; and 
one that sees them as complementary and amenable to possible collaboration. I shall 
base this discussion on Murphy et al’s (1998) very useful literature review of this 
area. The first approach, the „two paradigm approach‟, argues that the philosophical 
beliefs of the two traditions are fundamentally different; qualitative research is „anti-
positivist‟ and constructivist and holds, „there exists multiple, socially constructed 
realities.‟ (Guba & Lincoln, 1989:86) Whereas, quantitative research is positivist and 
grounded in realism. Thus, qualitative and quantitative research methods are based 
on two fundamentally different philosophical paradigms. 
 
There have been numerous critiques of the approach that sees quantitative and 
qualitative research as fundamentally different (Silverman,1993). This has led to a 
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move towards an approach that chooses the research methodology on grounds of the 
problem or question to be investigated. This second approach sees the two 
methodologies as possibly complementary. Within this approach methods are seen 
simply as research techniques that can be used when and where they are relevant, 
rather than seeing such techniques as arising out of a particular philosophical system 
(as the two paradigm approach does). This approach of choosing between methods 
on instrumental grounds can be further divided (Murphy et al, 1998), into those that 
see: 
 qualitative research as the junior partner (for instance using qualitative 
research to generate hypotheses that can then be tested by quantitatively) 
 qualitative research as the senior partner, where it is seen as a methodology 
that is better able to capture social processes and meaning 
 and the „horses for courses‟ approach that rejects any pre-determined 
hierarchy of methodologies. „Different kinds of information about man and 
society are gathered most fully and economically in different ways, and that 
the problem under investigation properly dictates the methods of 
investigation.‟ (Trow, quoted in Murphy et al, 1998:59) Therefore, research 
methodologies are a tool-kit that can be used when and where they are 
needed.
92
 
In this thesis a broadly „horses for courses‟ approach will be adopted in the sense that 
my justification for using qualitative methodology is that it best fits my research 
questions and is the most appropriate way of „finding out‟ about the elements on 
which I want to focus. 
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 This approach has a pragmatic flavour to it, the methodology used is the one most useful for 
answering a specific set of questions. 
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My research questions were broadly to look at how doctors thought about ethical 
issues: to gain insight into the way clinicians talked about how they made ethical 
decisions, and to see how the informants approached and managed ethical issues in 
their everyday practice. Further, I was also concerned with what constituted an 
ethical issue for them, rather than using preconceptions of what they might find 
ethically troubling. My research questions focused on understanding how clinicians 
thought about different types of situations and therefore a quantitative methodology 
would not be a viable vehicle for fully exploring and answering these kinds of 
questions. Silverman states, „in choosing a method of research, everything depends 
upon what we are trying to find out. No method of research, quantitative or 
qualitative, is intrinsically better than any other.‟ (2005:6) Therefore, the research 
questions have driven the choice of methodology in this study rather than 
formulating questions to match a prior methodological commitment (Punch, 2005).  
 
QUALITATIVE RESEARCH IN BIOETHICS 
It has been argued that qualitative research is particularly suited to studying ethical 
issues in practice (Fox & DeVries, 1998. Hull et al, 2001). Such research can enrich 
bioethics, „by emphasizing and examining the contextual and situated nature of 
morality and moral choice. We should focus more on process and outcome and see 
how what we call bioethics is accomplished by human beings interacting in a social 
context.‟ (DeVries & Conrad, 1998:250) Arnold & Forrow (1993) also argue that 
studies in empirical ethics could usefully incorporate „rich descriptions‟93 of actual 
practice and that qualitative methods could, „shed light on the most serious normative 
questions in clinical ethics.‟ (1993:196) 
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 Descriptions that a full and penetrating picture of what is going on (Maxwell, 1996). 
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Jennings (1990) in a paper on ethnography
94
 and ethics examines the contributions 
that ethnography can make to the study of moral issues. He argues that ethnography 
can be useful for bioethics in a number of ways and I shall consider two of these that 
are relevant for my purposes. First, he says that ethnography can lay bare a „moral 
phenomenology‟ that shows how moral concepts and categories are, „embedded in 
ongoing forms of social practice and experience and are structured via particular 
institutional patterns.‟ (1990:269) This was a central aim of my research to see how 
clinicians actually discussed and approached ethical issues. Second, ethnography can 
show bioethics better ways of effecting social change. Bioethics‟ strategy has been a 
philosophical one that seeks to bring about change by rational persuasion and 
argument. Jennings argues that change often needs to be more organisational and 
structural and that ethnography can point us in the right direction to affect such 
change. For my research purposes it is useful to see how decisions were actually 
made in practice and therefore what processes are necessary to bring about change. 
Although my research methods are not those of ethnography and I did not carry out 
any participant observation,
95
 Jennings‟ points about the value of ethnography can 
also hold for my chosen method of interviewing.  
 
ten Have and Lelie put the case for more qualitative research in bioethics in the 
following way, „the proper type of empirical ethics research will have more affinity 
with the qualitative methods of anthropology or sociology, than with the quantitative 
methodologies of epidemiology and decision analysis.‟ (1998:271) They claim that 
an important part of the morality of medicine is missing in contemporary health care 
ethics, the internal morality of medicine. This internal morality is, „the value, norms 
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 Ethnography is broadly a set of methods that involve the ethnographer participating in peoples‟ 
lives, watching and observing social phenomena (Hammersley & Atkinson,1995). 
95
 See later discussion of why I did not carry out any observations of practice. 
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and rules intrinsic to the actual practice of health care [and these have] special 
significance for the interpretation and solution to moral dilemmas.‟ (ten Have & 
Lelie,1998:263)
96
 The external morality of medicine is the values and social rules 
prevailing in society and culture in general. Thus, „[i]n order to identify the internal 
morality of practices, in-depth description of cases as well as participatory 
observation studies of behaviour in “real-life” situations are more appropriate than 
quantifying responses towards hypothetical case vignettes or questionnaires.‟ 
(1998:271)  
 
In this thesis I will concentrate on the features of ethical decision-making that lie 
within the clinicians‟ remit, decisions that they are able to make about their practice 
in the clinic (although obviously influenced by external factors such as wider cultural 
norms and regulatory restrictions and funding criteria.) In order for these to be fully 
understood there needs to be greater attention paid to the, „particularities of the 
practical setting.‟ (ten Have & Lelie, 1998:267) Through the use of qualitative 
methods, my project is a way of obtaining a greater understanding of the 
„particularities‟ of the practice of infertility treatment. 
 
Such particularities of practice have often been neglected. Although infertility is a 
speciality that has attracted much attention from the public and bioethicists, it is one 
where the focus has been predominately on the dramatic aspects such as the status of 
the embryo. Relatively little is known about the everyday moral workings of 
infertility clinics.
97
 It has been argued that describing in detail aspects of our social 
worlds is a central aim of qualitative research (Mason, 1996). Qualitative 
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 See The Introduction for a discussion of research carried out on the ethical dimensions of infertility 
practice. 
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methodologies are often said to be useful if little is known about the area to be 
studied and it is argued that this kind of research can provide a description of, „the 
apparently superficial trivia and minutiae of everyday life.‟ (Bryman, 1988:63) Thus, 
one important aim of using qualitative research in this thesis is to provide  „thorough 
description‟ (Dey, 1993) of this setting to illuminate how ethical issues and decisions 
are approached in infertility practice. 
 
Despite there being a growing body of literature that highlights the particular 
relevance of qualitative research for bioethics, Borry et al (2006) found that most of 
the empirical research published in bioethics journals used quantitative 
methodologies (64.6%). This finding was mirrored in an earlier study on empirical 
research in bioethics conducted by Sugarman et al (2001) who found over half of the 
research conducted in this area during the 1980s used survey research methods. 
Sugarman et al (2001) attributed this to medical ethicists‟ lack of familiarity with and 
expertise in qualitative methods, methods that require, „substantial expertise and 
resources that might not be available to those conducting empirical research in 
medical ethics.‟ (2001:25) This thesis is, therefore, an attempt to readdress this 
imbalance and utilise qualitative methodologies (in combination with my theoretical 
approach as outlined in the previous chapter) to explore ethical issues in practice. 
 
THE RESEARCH PROCESS 
Any research project, once completed, can be reconstructed to look as though it 
followed a smooth trajectory from start to finish. However, in this section, I want to 
give an account of my research project in the form of a „natural history‟ (Silverman, 
2005. Alasuutari, 1995). This is a means of giving an account of the research as it 
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progressed, the thinking behind the decisions taken in the organisation of the 
research and the dead ends and false leads that, probably, happen in all research 
projects. Silverman argues that, „by asking your readers to engage with your thinking 
in process, they are in a far better position to assess the degree to which you were 
self-critical.‟ (2005:306) By making the process of the research explicit, the reader is 
able to, „trace the route by which you came to your interpretation.‟ (Mason, 
1996:150) The researcher gives both a clear exposition of data collection and the 
process of data analysis and this can enhance the validity of the study (Murphy et al 
1998). 
 
This can be seen as a form of narrative account of the research process. Anspach 
(1993) used this approach in her study of neo-natal intensive care units. She 
described how she had conducted the research and the practical decisions she took 
that influenced the data she collected and her findings to produce an „analytic 
narrative.‟ (1993:183) Such a narrative or natural history is designed to make clear 
the theoretical assumptions, the choices made and the interpretation of the data. This 
account of my research process is designed to provide such a „clear exposition‟ and 
contribute to strengthening the validity of the research. 
 
The research project 
As a health care ethicist working in a medical school I became increasingly 
interested in the medical profession and how they thought about the ethical issues 
that they faced in their practice. Through my teaching of ethics to both medical 
students and qualified health care professionals I had to think about how ethics as a 
discipline could be made more accessible to practitioners. Further, the ethical aspects 
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of reproductive technologies was one of my long-standing research interests and this 
coupled with an interest in the growing use of empirical research in bioethics all 
contributed to my decision to conduct an empirical study on infertility clinicians.  
 
Initially my research interests were focussed on how clinicians thought about gamete 
donor anonymity. The debate over gamete donor anonymity was something I had 
written about from a purely ethical perspective. In this debate there were often claims 
that the majority of clinicians opposed moves towards making gamete donation non-
anonymous. Haimes (1993) wrote a paper arguing that there was little known about 
clinicians‟ views in this area and I thought that it would be interesting to explore this 
hitherto neglected area. After talking to a number of infertility clinicians informally 
at a conference, I began to wonder if this topic would sustain a PhD thesis. 
Restricting the study to the debates over donor anonymity seemed to neglect more 
general discussions of how they made ethical decisions and other topics that might be 
fruitful. Therefore, I decided to broaden my study to examine these wider questions 
and the main purpose became to build up a detailed picture of how ethical decisions 
were made and approached in infertility clinics. The main research questions 
became: 
 What aspects of their practice do infertility clinicians find ethical troubling  
 How do they approach and think about these aspects of their practice 
 How do infertility clinicians make ethical decisions and/or resolve ethical 
issues 
I applied to the Multi-centred Research Ethics Committee for ethics approval, as the 
study would take place in different regions and received approval (see Appendix 2). 
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Interviews 
I decided to use semi-structured interviews
98
 as my data gathering method.
99
 This 
form of interviewing has the following characteristics: 
 there is a list of the range to topics to be covered in the interview, but not a 
structured list of questions 
 they are relatively informal, rather than a formal question and answer format 
(Mason,1996) 
There are, broadly, two types of research interview: the standardised and the 
unstructured (Murphy et al, 1998). The standardised interview is the type commonly 
used in quantitative research where respondents answer from a pre-determined list of 
questions. This form of interview is meant to try and control bias by asking 
respondents for the same information in the same order in the same way. 
Unstructured interviews are more difficult to define and Murphy et al say that, „it is 
more accurate to see interviews as ranged across continuum…from standardised to 
non-standardised.‟ (1998:112-113) Therefore, there can be varieties of non-
standardised interviews ranging from those that have a list of topics or questions to 
those that do not use topic guides but ask respondents to reflect on certain areas 
(Denzin, 1970). 
 
There has been much criticism of the standardised form of interview. The aim of 
such interviews is to eliminate bias in attempting to gain access to „facts‟ that are out 
there waiting to be elucidated, a form of positivism. The main criticisms of this view 
of interviewing have been on the grounds that such „bias‟ cannot be eliminated and 
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 For an overview of the increasing use of interviews as a research tool see (Gubrium & Holstein, 
2002. Fontana & Frey, 2000). 
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further that there is no need to see bias as a bad thing in itself. It has been argued that 
to try and strip the context away from an interview can lead to a loss of meaning 
(Mishler, 1986).  
 
Qualitative interviews have often been seen as a solution to the shortcomings of the 
standardised interviews and it is argued they can have the following benefits.
100
  
 
1. Exploring the way respondents themselves define their experiences and 
practices and uncovering the insider‟s perspective. 
2. Penetrating respondents‟ public accounts – unstructured interviews are more 
likely to produce „truer‟ accounts (Denzin,1970).101 
3. Flexibility – they are useful in hypothesis generating or exploratory research, 
researchers can open up new dimensions that they had not anticipated in 
advance. 
 
Rationale for data collection methods 
All decisions made about how to design one‟s research project should be made on 
principled grounds (Mason, 1996. Coffey & Atkinson, 1996). Therefore, I want to 
elaborate the reasons why I chose this method of data collection in preference to 
other methods that social scientists have at their disposal.  
 
My first overriding reason for choosing to interview my research subjects was that it 
was, arguably, the best way to answer my research questions. My concern was with 
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 These are adapted from Murphy et al (1998). 
101
 The notion of being able to produce „pure‟ description, a direct reflection of reality has been 
criticised (Hammersley, 1992). Hammersley argues that it is not possible to have a theoretical 
description and that descriptions are always made from a particular (value-based) point of view. 
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how clinicians thought about and conceptualised ethical issues in practice, how they 
approached the ethical aspects of their work and what they saw (and defined) as an 
ethical issue. Hence, I thought that the best way to elicit data on these concerns of 
sufficient depth was to interview them.  
 
I did not use vignettes in my interviews although this has been a popular approach in 
some empirical research in bioethics.
102
 Presenting a formulated „ethical dilemma‟ 
for clinicians to discuss would have pre-judged what they actually thought were 
dilemmas, an issue that I wanted to explore in the research. Further, as Hurst et al, 
note situational features such as time constraints and inter-professional relationships 
can influence ethical decision-making and these features are lost to analysis if studies 
use, „hypothetical or otherwise standardised cases.‟ (2005:7) 
 
It could be argued that there are a number of benefits in using a semi-structured 
interview format to elicit information from doctors. First, doctors can be seen as „an 
elite‟ and there can be useful information to be gathered from such „expert‟ subjects 
(Marshall & Rossman, 2006).
103
 Second, doctors are familiar with the interview 
format as a way of gathering and conveying information (Braunack-Mayer, 1998). A 
semi-structured interview can be seen as similar in certain respects to a medical 
consultation (although generally much longer!) in that the general purpose is to 
gather information but the interviewer (or the doctor) needs to be flexible so that they 
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can pick up important pieces of information that the informant (or patient) does not 
realise are pertinent. Third, doctors are very busy and an interview that only requires 
an hour of their time is preferable to other methods that might be more time 
consuming for them (i.e. to organise access for a researcher, or to travel to other 
places for focus groups).  
 
The argument that doctors are busy could of course be turned around and it could be 
argued that a postal questionnaire would have been a time saving device and would 
have enabled me to get a greater number of responses. However, such a 
questionnaire would not have allowed me to fully explore my research questions. I 
wanted to probe and develop my informants‟ answers and this would have been 
impossible in this format. Further, it was not an aim to produce a representative 
sample, in the sense of getting a statistically significant number of responses. 
Therefore, the possible increase in numbers of informants produced by this format 
would not have been of significant benefit. 
 
Using observation as a method was also considered. I could have chosen to observe 
clinic consultations between clinicians and patients and/or group or team meetings 
between clinicians and/or meetings of ethics committees to determine how ethical 
decisions were made and approached. Dingwall (1997) has argued the problem with 
interview data is such that observation should always be the method of choice. This 
reflects the view that „naturally occurring data‟ is always preferable to that that has 
been „artificially‟ constructed. Silverman, however, argues that, „the attempt to erect 
a polarity between “natural” and “artificial” settings is spurious.‟ (1993:29) 
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Therefore, methodologies should be chosen on the grounds of what one is trying to 
find out rather than any prior ideological preference. 
 
There were a number of reasons why I choose not to do an observation study. First, 
my research questions focussed on how doctors thought about their practice, what 
accounts they gave to explain and conceptualise ethical issues and dimensions. My 
view was that observing them would not elucidate these questions. Second, it was 
unclear what and where I would have to observe to „see‟ ethics happening. Would it 
take place in the consultation with patients or in meetings with colleagues or in ethics 
committees or in corridors, or in the hospital canteen? As a result of my interviews I 
now have a much clearer idea of where it might be said that ethics „takes place‟104 
and so would now have a more focussed approach to observation. But before I began 
the research this focus would not have been possible and I would have been in 
danger of generating a lot of data that was not relevant to my research questions. 
Third, practical aspects of time and access would have been difficult. I have done my 
PhD while having a full-time job in academia and long periods in „the field‟ would 
simply not have been possible for me. All projects will have some practical 
limitations imposed on them: funding body criteria; time frame; resources – time and 
money. Therefore, it is important to recognise the practical context in which a 
research project takes places (Maxwell,1996). Finally, access issues and consent 
could have also posed difficulties in trying to negotiate observing clinics (though 
they probably could have been overcome if I had decided to do such a study). 
                                                 
104
 Discussions and team meetings with colleagues and in some instances CEC meetings now appear 
to be possible sites where ethics „takes place‟. 
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Sampling 
With any study one of the key questions to address is who to observe or interview. 
The sampling frame for this study was, in certain respects, straightforward. As it was 
a consideration of infertility clinicians‟ views about the ethical aspect of their 
practice, the population from which I sampled was infertility clinicians in the UK. 
Every infertility clinic in the UK providing treatment that falls within the category of 
„licensed‟ treatment is regulated by the HFEA.105 There are 115 clinics offering 
licensed treatment in the UK (HFEA,2008) and I took this as my sampling frame (see 
Appendix 3 for the details of the clinicians I interviewed). I used a theoretical 
sampling approach which, rather than aiming for a representative sample, aims to 
sample interviewees until the categories reach theoretical saturation, in order to, 
„make key comparisons and to test developing theoretical propositions.‟ (Mason, 
1996:93). In my research this was an iterative process, „one in which there is a 
movement backwards and forwards between sampling and theoretical reflection.‟ 
(Bryman,2001:324) 
 
Mason argues that it is important to think how meaningful conventional 
categorisations (such as age, gender, social class) are in your sampling (1996:87). I 
started off unsure if there were any particular variables such as age, gender, length of 
practice, or geographical location that might be relevant to my research questions. At 
the beginning of the study I thought that gender might be a relevant variable, that 
women might have a different perspective on ethical issues and reproductive health 
matters.
106
  As the study progressed I did not find any significant difference in the 
responses between the female and male informants, so I abandoned using gender as a 
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 See Chapter Five for a discussion of what is covered by the HFEA licensing regulations. 
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 See Gilligan (1982) and Noddings (1984) for example. 
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sampling variable.
107
 One aspect that did become important was the length of 
practice and consequent seniority of informants. A central question was how the 
informants made decisions and those who were consultants had different decision-
making responsibilities than those who were registrars.
108
 Therefore, I decided to 
include in the sample some informants who were not consultants and interviewed six 
sub-speciality trainees.
109
  
 
I began my sampling by contacting infertility clinics reasonably near to where I lived 
and worked. This was a practical measure to minimise both the costs and time it 
would take to conduct the interviews. Once I had interviewed someone from a clinic 
I asked them if they could give me the names of any other clinicians in their clinic 
that I might talk to. This could be seen to be a form of snowball sampling, where by 
the researcher makes contact with people and then uses them to establish contact 
with others (Bryman,2001). This method was useful as the HFEA website that lists 
all the clinics only includes the name of the licence holder, the „person responsible‟, 
so other doctors who work in that clinic are not listed, and not all infertility clinics 
have their own websites where details of the staff can be found. Once I had 
interviewed several members from a particular clinic I began to get a sense from the 
data of a clinic ethos and approach to issues. Therefore, I thought it would be useful 
to get a reasonable number of clinicians from each clinic to explore this notion of a 
clinic ethos further. This was a form of theoretical sampling based on emerging 
themes from the data. I interviewed all the clinicians in Clinics 1, 2/3rds of the 
clinicians from Clinics 2 and 4, and half of the clinicians from Clinic 5, some of the 
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 I interviewed 7 women and 15 men, see Appendix 3 for the sampling matrix. 
108
 This is discussed in Chapter Seven on consensus. 
109
 I stopped specifically sampling sub-speciality trainees when I had reached theoretical saturation.  
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clinicians were the only ones I interviewed from a clinic so do not have a clinic 
number (Drs Case, Jenson, Tarn and Vance).  
 
I wrote to the clinicians asking them to participate in the project. I sent them a letter 
asking if they would participate including, a tear off slip to sign, an outline of the 
study and a consent form and a stamped addressed envelope (see Appendix 4 for this 
material). I received a response rate of about one interview to every eight letters sent. 
Once the informants had responded I contacted them and arranged an interview date. 
The clinicians who responded could, of course, be seen as a self-selected group who 
might have a prior interest in ethics. However, unless the purpose of the study, to get 
their views on the ethical aspects of their practice, was concealed from the 
informants (i.e. I portrayed the study to be about something else and this would be, 
arguably, an unwarranted form of deception) that was inevitable. However, I avoided 
contacting any clinicians who had published on ethics or who had a clear academic 
or policy interest in the subject to try and minimise this kind of bias. 
 
Logistics of the interviews 
The interviews were semi-structured, I had a topic guide that I followed broadly, but 
which still allowed the clinicians to direct the focus of the interview.  The topic guide 
was made up of general questions (see Appendix 5) such as: what do you see as 
ethical issues in your practice?; How do you approach such issues?; How do you 
resolve them? I probed and asked additional questions to get the clinicians to 
elaborate on issues that I thought were interesting and relevant to my research 
questions. The topic guide evolved over the course of the interviews, as I altered and 
revised it in light of both efficiency (some questions did not produce useful 
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responses) and theoretical aspects that developed as I gathered more data. I tape-
recorded the interviews with the informants‟ consent. Recording the interviews had 
been mentioned in the information I sent with the interview request and I asked them 
at the beginning of the interview if they were still happy for me to record it. None of 
the informants refused. One interview (with Dr Street)
110
 did not record. I realised 
this as soon as I had left the room and went to the hospital canteen and made detailed 
notes on her interview. I have included this interview in the analysis, but there are no 
quotes from her due to the recording failure. 
 
The interviews lasted on average for an hour. All of the interviews took place in the 
informants‟ places of work. Nearly all the interviews were interrupted at some stage 
by phone calls and bleeps. The interview with Dr Grant was particularly disrupted 
and I had to finish it on the telephone, although I was able to record the telephone 
conversation as well. The interview with Dr Case was interrupted three times while 
he went and did embryo transfers. All the breaks and interruptions were marked on 
the transcripts. Immediately after the interview I went and made notes on how the 
interview went, any initial ideas, thoughts and impressions so that I would have a 
contemporaneous account of the interview. 
 
I conducted 22 interviews. I stopped at this point as I felt I had reached theoretical 
saturation (Strauss & Corbin,1998) in that no new categories or themes were 
emerging and I was beginning to hear similar accounts and stories of how the 
informants approached ethical decision-making. 
 
                                                 
110
 All informants were given pseudonyms, see discussion below. 
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Reflexivity 
Holstein & Gubrium in their consideration of what they call the „active interview‟ 
argue that, „all interviews are interpretively active, implicating meaning-making 
practices on the part of both interviewers and respondents.‟ (1995:4) Therefore, the 
interviewer does not just gain access to respondents‟ beliefs, views or opinions, but 
in interviewing people the interviewer actually creates a particular reality. This has 
implications for the analysis of the data (see below) and means that attention has to 
be paid to the way the interviews were conducted, the questions and form of 
questioning used, the background knowledge and expertise of the interviewer. All 
these factors shape and construct „the interview‟.  
 
My position of going into the interviews as a health care ethicist
111
 and asking 
doctors questions about ethics clearly influenced the way the doctors approached and 
positioned themselves as „experts‟ in ethics. In my day job I teach a Masters in 
Health Care Ethics that largely attracts existing health care professionals and so I 
have a lot of experience in talking to health care professionals about ethics. The 
interviewees often positioned themselves as non-experts, that they were medics and 
as such had no particular ethical knowledge or expertise. My role in the interviews 
was to get them to talk about how they saw the ethics that arose for them in practice 
rather than how well they could talk about ethical issues in terms of an academic 
dialogue. Further, by the very asking of the question, „how do you approach ethical 
issues in your practice‟, I was influencing and constraining the debate into particular 
ways of seeing these features of our social world.  
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 See Richards & Emslie (2000) for a discussion of the effects of the interviewer‟s professional on 
the interview interaction. 
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Transcription 
The interviews were professionally transcribed. The recorder I used was a digital one 
and the voice files were saved on to my computer. Once I had received the 
transcripts I read them while listening to the interview, this enabled me to correct 
mistakes and misunderstandings in the transcription and add my own notes of the 
pauses, tone of voice and emphasis. Having the voice files easily accessible meant 
that I was able to replay key bits of the interviews when I was analysing the data to 
hear the interview and to more fully understand the context of the discussion.
112
 Both 
the voice files and transcripts were anonymised by giving each doctor a number and 
any identifying references in the transcript were replaced (such as a mention of a 
place was replaced with Anytown). The transcripts were stored in a locked filing 
cabinet and the voice files on the university server (more secure than an individual 
computer as it cannot be stolen and it is password protected). The doctors were then 
given both numbers and pseudonyms. The pseudonyms are used in the presentation 
on the data as it was felt that this would give the informants more personality that 
just using numbers, i.e. Dr 1 (Appendix 3 gives details of these). 
 
The transcripts were then uploaded into ATLAS qualitative software and this 
programme was used to manage and code the data. The quotes from the informants 
therefore have a unique identifier (for example 1:11), the first digit refers to the 
doctor‟s number, the second to the quote number of the transcript stored in ATLAS. 
Thus, anyone could find the quotes quickly if they had access to my ATLAS 
database (see Appendix 3 – the sampling matrix for the tabulation of doctor numbers 
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 There is a body of thought that says you should always transcribe your own data (Seidman,2006). 
However, I would argue that with new technology that enables interviews to be saved onto computers 
it is possible to work closely with the data without having to have transcribed it initially. Also see 
Bailey (2008) for a discussion of issues raised by the transcription process. 
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and pseudonyms). When quoting the informants the unique identifier will always be 
used to reference the quotes and when I am speaking in the transcripts (my questions 
to the informants) this is highlighted in bold type. 
 
DATA ANALYSIS 
I shall now discuss how I have analysed my data by detailing how I conceptualised 
my interview data and then outlining my analytic strategies. 
 
The status of interview data 
In this section I want to elaborate how I „saw‟ my interview data and draw out the 
implications this has for how the data were analysed. The question can be formed in 
such a way as to ask, „is interview data a topic or a resource?‟113 This is framing the 
debate in a particular way and it is a debate within qualitative research that I want to 
discuss, drawing out implications for this research project. 
 
The approaches that have arisen in response to the positivist paradigm can 
generically be put under a heading of naturalism
114
 (Hammersley & Atkinson, 1995). 
In one formulation interactionalists see interviews as providing access to the 
interpretations that people give to stimuli and as, „encounters between humans beings 
trying to understand one another.‟ (Silverman,1993:95) For interactionalists the 
context of the interview is crucial to understanding the data, the interview is a „social 
event‟ and to understand it, it needs to be described as such. The key is to understand 
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 Here the terminology „topic‟ and „resource‟ is that used in the literature on this issue, see Murphy 
et al ,(1998) and Hammersley & Atkinson (1995). 
114
 This term does not have the same meaning as when it is used in philosophy. See Miller (2003) for a 
discussion of the use of this term in meta-ethics. 
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how individuals interpret and give meaning to the world around them so unstructured 
interviews allow respondents to define the world in their own way (Denzin, 1970). 
 
Both types of interview, the standardised form based on positivism and the less 
structured form based on naturalism, have been subject to criticism. It is argued that 
they both struggle with the same problem: as they both try to understand social 
phenomena as something that exists independently of the researcher (Hammersley & 
Atkinson, 1995:10).  How can researchers be sure that what respondents produce in 
interviews represents reality? (Murphy et al, 1998:120) Both traditions respond to 
this question in a different way. As noted above, positivism tries to eliminate bias, or 
distortions of reality by capturing sufficient numbers of respondents and using a 
fixed questionnaire design and rigid protocols. Naturalism constructs this problem as 
one of possible misunderstandings between the researcher and respondent. Such 
misunderstanding can therefore result in the interview not producing an accurate 
account of their reality (Denzin, 1970). This can be solved by building a rapport with 
respondents (Rubin & Rubin, 2005), developing a relationship over the course of the 
research to, „obtain intersubjective depth between both sides so that a deep mutual 
understanding can be achieved.‟ (Silverman, 1993:95) In sum, within both these 
approaches, „[t]he validity of interviews is to be judged in terms of how carefully the 
interview has overcome the biases that are seen to be inherent in the situation, 
whether through standardisation or digging deeper.‟ (Murphy et al, 1998:120) 
 
The contention that research should be about representing phenomena in some literal 
sense has been criticised at a deeper level and Murphy et al (1998) call this the 
„radical critique‟. This critique sees interview data in a different way and is based on, 
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„the understanding that interviews are essentially contextually situated social 
interactions.‟ (Murphy et al, 1998:120) In this perspective interviews are no longer 
seen as more or less accurate reports of an external reality. Rather, they are occasions 
when individuals produce accounts of their actions, feelings or views and so on. 
Dingwall sees interviews as involving a „dance of expectations‟ and these accounts 
are a time when the respondent is, „required to demonstrate their competence in the 
role in which the interview casts them‟. (Dingwall, 1997:58) For instance, in these 
accounts respondents may present themselves as competent members of a 
community (i.e. Baruch (1981) found people constructed a notion of parenthood, or 
in my research as doctors who practice ethically). 
 
There are two main implications that can be drawn from seeing interviews as 
contextually situated social interactions rather than as representations of reality: 
1. Interviews can never be seen as a source of anything apart from knowledge of 
that interview itself – here interviews are treated as a topic. This position is 
adopted by ethnomenthodologists who would see the interview data as only 
telling us about the reality of the interview itself (Baker, 2003. Silverman, 
1993).  
2. Interviews can be seen as displays of respondents‟ perspectives. For example, 
Baruch (1981) treated interview data as „local accomplishments‟ in his study 
of parents‟ responses to congenital illnesses in their children. He examined 
what the parents could be said to be doing in the interviews, what account 
they were producing, arguing that in the interviews the parents were 
displaying their moral responsibility. In this way Baruch is not interested in 
the truth or not of these accounts, „he is focussing on how, in telling their 
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story to a stranger, mothers skilfully produce demonstrably „morally 
adequate‟ accounts. [Thus] human subjects actively participate in the 
construction of social and psychological realities.‟ (Silverman, 1993:110) 
 
Based on this „radical critique‟ of interview data, I shall now outline what approach I 
shall take to my data and how this has influenced my strategies for analysis. 
 
Resource and a topic 
My approach will follow that of Hammersley & Atkinson (1995). In response to the 
„radical critique‟ they agree that interview data should be placed within the context 
of its production and treated as evidence of the perspectives of those who produce 
them. However, they do not infer from this that interviews cannot tell us anything 
about the setting in which they occur. „Everyone is a participant observer, acquiring 
knowledge about the social world in the course of participating in it….such 
knowledge on the part of people in a setting is an important resource for the 
[researcher].‟ (Hammersley & Atkinson, 1995:125) Hence, my position, like 
Hammersley & Atkinson‟s, rejects the idea that just because you do not see interview 
accounts as simple representations of the world does not mean that interviews can 
never be read for what they tell us about the phenomena to which they refer or tell 
„plausible stories‟ (Strong, 1979).  
 
While data should not be „accepted at face value‟, it is not necessary to abandon the 
use of data to tell us something about reality altogether. Dingwall, although arguing 
that we cannot be certain that interviews represent literal descriptions of an 
individual‟s reality and taking the problems of interviews to be so great that 
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observation should be treated as the method of choice, acknowledges that, „in real 
life we recognise that the accounts we receive every day contain some mix of the real 
and the representation and there seems no good reason why the accounts we receive 
as sociologists should be essentially different.‟ (Dingwall, 1997:60) In certain 
respects it could be argued that my interviews with the doctors „mimicked‟ the 
clinical encounter. They took place in the clinic where the doctor would see patients, 
I was asking for information and an account from my informants as to what they did 
and how they felt. In this way there is a parallel between the research and clinical 
dialogue and although the clinical dialogue is a place where the different meanings 
and power relations between participants is rife, it is still a place where information 
is given that is trusted and used in practice. 
 
Hammersley & Atkinson do not just see interview data as representing reality in the 
way that the interactionalist position does. They also see interview data as producing 
accounts from respondents that are able to tell us something about those who 
produced them. As Silverman says, „we need not hear interview responses simply as 
true or false reports on reality. Instead, we can treat such responses as displays of 
perspectives of moral forms.‟ (1993:107) Hammersley & Atkinson say that it is 
possible to see interview data in two ways: information and perspective. Interview 
data can be analysed from both these angles and these forms of analysis are 
complementary (1995:126). Thus, „Separating the question of the truth or falsity of 
people‟s beliefs as social phenomena allows us to treat participants‟ knowledge as 
both resource and topic.‟ (Hammersley &Atkinson, 1995:126)  
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Interviews as accounts 
One aspect of my analytic strategy was to analyse my data in terms of seeing them as 
accounts produced by my informants in the context of the interview. In doing this I 
will follow a position outlined by Hammersley (2003), who argues that although 
attention to what happens in the interview is important, „this focus cannot tell us all 
there is to know about human social life.‟ (Hammersley, 2003:773) We need to pay 
attention to the context, the general knowledge we have about, „social forces and 
institutions that structure human social life.‟ (2003:772) This involves taking other 
factors, our knowledge of the social context, as well as what the informants tell us 
and incorporating this into our analysis. My data analysis incorporated a knowledge 
of the social context in which infertility clinicians practice (see Chapter Five) and 
utilised the ethical literature on decision-making to enrich the data analysis as set out 
in my methodology discussed in Chapter Three. 
 
My interest in thinking about the interview data as „accounts‟ arose when, having 
looked at my transcripts of the interviews as a whole I became worried that there was 
no cohesive story being told. I was unsure how to manage all the different accounts 
and how to construct explanations that would reflect such a diversity. Further, in 
some of the interviews the interviewee did not advance a „coherent‟ position, they 
might contradict themselves or give conflicting examples or appear to be in favour of 
certain things but against others when, to my mind, there were no distinguishing 
reasons. This „instability‟ of respondents made me wonder, at first, if that was a fault 
with my interview technique and I should have pressed them further to produce what 
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I would term a „coherent‟ account.115 I had these worries in mind when I read Gilbert 
and Mulkay‟s (1984) study on scientists‟ accounts of scientific practice. I thought 
that this work might be useful for my project as it had similarities with mine, in that 
they were interviewing highly specialised professionals about their practice in a work 
setting. Gilbert & Mulkay argued that trying to present a definitive version of an 
account of a particular social setting, or trying to theorise one way social life operates 
is mistaken and a mistake that characterises much of sociological analysis (1984:2). 
Instead they say that in trying to produce such a definitive account sociologists 
ignore and select particular parts of their data and give these the label of the right or 
best representation of what the respondents are „really saying‟. In doing this the 
analyst misrepresents the respondents. „This is not only because different actors often 
tell radically different stories; but also because each actor has many different voices.‟ 
(1984:2) This had parallels with what I had found in my data and gave me another 
way of approaching the analysis of my data. 
 
Seeing interview data as accounts can enable us to, „think of talk itself as socially 
meaningful text. That is, as individual social actors recall and retell events or 
describe past experiences, they may be performing particular types of speech acts.‟ 
(Coffey & Atkinson,1996:100) Baruch sees these sorts of speech acts as types of 
recipes, „that are culturally or personally prescribed sequences of typifications 
involving typical problems, typical solutions, typical actors.‟ (Baruch,1981:278) By 
using the „recipes‟ social life can become stable and routine. Thus, part of the aims of 
my examination of my informants‟ accounts was to uncover and make explicit these 
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 By coherent account I really mean one that would stand up to philosophical debate and have the 
same kind of rigour. Obviously, to expect „ordinary‟ people to produce this kind of account is naïve.  
 102 
„recipes‟ that they use to order and stabilise their reality.116 In analysing the data in 
this way, it was possible that the informants were portraying themselves in a certain 
way – as ethically competent practitioners – and this was a competency constructed 
within the interview. However, while bearing this in mind, I „bracketed‟ such 
concerns (Gubrium & Holstein, 1997) and largely concentrated on the interviews as a 
resource.
117
  
 
Strategies of analysis 
Once the interviews had been loaded into ATLAS I read and listened to the 
interviews several times, to check the accuracy of the transcription and to get a feel 
for the interview. I made notes on each interview, ideas it provoked, thoughts, 
general themes and so on. Then I coded the interviews within ATLAS. I began 
coding after having done the first two interviews and then coded each new interview 
as I went along. After coding a new interview I then went back to the previously 
coded interviews and revised them in the light of any new ideas or codes. For 
example, after I had done six interviews I saw a theme developing of different clinics 
having a particular ethos, a particular clinic view on certain issues and ways of 
approaching issues.
118
 I then went back and coded the previous interviews in light of 
this category. I discussed my coding with my supervisors and they read a number of 
transcripts to provide a checking mechanism for the coding. During this process, that 
I carried out until I had completed all my interviews, I kept memos of thoughts and 
ideas on different interpretations of the data. I kept these memos both as Word 
documents and within ATLAS, which allowed me to link memos to particular quotes 
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 See Chapter Six for a discussion of how the informants thought about the role of ethics in their 
practice – an example of such an ordering of reality. 
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 Gubrium & Holstein have developed this method of „analytic bracketing‟ see their work for a more 
detailed discussion (1997 & 2000). 
118
 See discussion in Chapter Six. 
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and codes, this was a useful strategy in developing my analysis. For example, I 
grouped together a selection of quotes on resource allocation and fairness and linked 
them to a memo. See Figure 1 below: 
 
FIGURE 1 
 
 
When I had finished coding and re-coding my data I had created 102 codes. I then re-
organised these codes into broader categories and began to think about links between 
the codes and the relationships between categories (Dey, 1993) (see Appendix 6 for a 
more detailed discussion of the development of my coding and strategies of 
analysis). At the end of this process I had reached, „a position where [I had] a stable 
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set of categories and [had] carried out systematic coding of all the data in terms of 
these categories.‟ (Hammersley & Atkinson, 1995:213) 
 
I analysed my data by using the following ways of validating qualitative research: 
 The constant comparative method 
 Deviant cases analysis 
 Comprehensive data treatment 
 Using appropriate tabulations (Silverman,2006:303)119 
 
I shall consider these in turn. 
 
 
Constant comparative method 
 
The constant comparative method, first developed by Glaser & Strauss (1967), 
involves trying to find another case with which to test out an „emerging hypothesis‟. 
The way that this was accomplished in my project was after particular codes were 
initially developed they were tested and the relationships between them explored by 
the new data that was gathered. Further, as I re-visited the codes after each interview 
existing codes and interpretations of interviews were revised in the light of new data. 
Thus, „the mutual relationships and internal structures of categories [became] more 
clearly displayed.‟ (Hammersley & Atkinson,1995:213) For example, I began with 
some initial thoughts about how the informants thought that it was important to avoid 
discrimination in making decisions about patients and decisions should be made on a 
case-by-case basis. For example, not having a policy on treating certain groups. 
However, other informants thought that a blanket policy was fairer and less 
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 The first two of these elements can be part of the method of analytic induction. I have not fully 
embraced this method as my approach began with some theoretical assumptions so was not totally 
inductive and analytic induction presupposes phenomena are governed by deterministic laws, a form 
of naturalism (Hammersley & Atkinson, 1995:236). 
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discriminatory. Thus this formed a hypothesis that the informants were concerned 
about discrimination and felt it was important to treat patients „fairly‟. As I gathered 
more data I tested this hypothesis and it developed into a more general account of the 
informants‟ concern with impartiality and the strategies they employed to facilitate it. 
 
Deviant case analysis 
A further analytic strategy that is designed to improve the quality of qualitative 
research, by developing and strengthening the emerging ideas, is the search for 
negative instances or deviant cases (Becker, 1998). „Willingness to seek out 
disconfirming evidence, and to allow this to modify general ideas, constitutes the 
essence of a scientific attitude.‟ (Seale, 1999:73) Clearly, cases are deviant in relation 
to the theory or explanation being put forward (Silverman, 2006:299). In this project 
cases were judged to be deviant if they contradicted a hypothesis that had been 
previously put forward on the basis of the data. As Coffey & Atkinson say: „It is 
never enough to illustrate good ideas with supportive examples. The grounding of 
theory on empirical evidence requires comprehensive searching and systematic 
scrutiny.‟ (1996:191) The main discussion of a deviant case is in Chapter Seven 
where one informant did not fit into the general account of decision-making that I 
advanced. Further, throughout the discussion of the data instances that did not 
support particular interpretations have been discussed and quotes provided, rather 
than leaving them out of the analysis. The aim was to give a sense of the data as a 
whole. This point leads to the next element of producing a „credible qualitative 
research‟ (Silverman,2006:271), comprehensive data treatment. 
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Comprehensive data treatment 
As Silverman says, „All parts of your data must, at some point, be inspected and 
analysed.‟ (2006:298) All the data that I collected was transcribed and analysed and 
although certain topics such as ethics education that were discussed in the interviews 
have not been presented in this thesis, I have attempted not to leave out any elements 
that could contradict the theories I have developed from the data. This is the issue in 
qualitative research that Seale calls „showing the data‟ (1996:158) In an ideal world 
the reader could have access to all the data and the coding schemes and would be 
able to assess the validity of making any inferences from the data themselves. 
However, this is clearly unrealistic, as even if people had the medium to present their 
full data set (CD-Roms and memory sticks for instance), few readers would have the 
time to read it all; and Seale points out that this is akin to researcher expecting the 
reader to do their work for them. As Seale (1999) says we need to develop 
„shorthand procedures‟. In this thesis two main ways have been used as such 
procedures. First, each point of data interpretation has been illustrated with a number 
of quotes so that the reader gets a taste of the data and enough of it to see the 
evidence for the interpretation. The second procedure is using appropriate 
tabulations, or, as Silverman terms it, „simple counting‟. 
 
Using appropriate tabulations 
At various points in this thesis I have used tables to set out the informants‟ views on 
a particular issues or area of the data. For example, the informants‟ views on what 
counted as an ethical issue for them have been put into a graph so that the number of 
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times each issue was mentioned can be ascertained.
120
 The benefits of this approach 
are that, according to Silverman, „[s]imple counting techniques, theoretically 
derived…can offer a means to survey the whole corpus of data ordinarily lost in 
intensive, qualitative research. Instead of taking the researcher‟s word for it, the 
reader has a chance to gain a sense of the flavour of the data as a whole.‟ (2006:301) 
Seale, for instance, used this in his study of elderly people living alone where he 
counted instances of particular occurrences for example, „33 speakers gave 44 
instances where they stressed the independence which this indicated.‟ (1996:128) 
This is a way of overcoming anecdotalism. Bryman argues that: „There is a tendency 
towards an anecdotal approach to the use of data in relation to conclusions or 
explanations in qualitative research. Brief conversations, snippets from unstructured 
interviews…are used to provide evidence of a particular contention.‟ (1988:77) By 
showing the reader how widespread particular instances were, this charge of 
anecdotalism can be avoided. It must be stressed, however, that this „counting‟ is not 
the same as the numerical justification that would be employed in quantitative 
methodologies (the sample is not representative or large enough to generate 
statistically significant results). The purpose of this „simple counting‟ is just to show 
the data and give the reader a better sense of the data set as a whole. 
 
Limitations 
The methods outlined above were designed to produce a research project that could 
be said to be credible. However, there are a number of other methods that have been 
suggested for promoting the quality of qualitative research (Seale, 1999) that I have 
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 In other places tables have been used to present more data on particular topics, such as informants‟ 
views on impartiality (Chapter Eight) and their views on particularly contested ethical issues (Chapter 
Six). 
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not fully engaged with or made limited use of and in this section I want to discuss 
why this was the case.  
 
Respondent validation 
Respondent validation uses the tool of feeding back the interpretation of interview 
data to respondents to ascertain whether the analyst has understood them correctly 
(Bryman, 2001). Lincoln & Guba (1985), for example, see this as one of the most 
important checks on the validity of a study‟s findings. In this study I did not carry out 
respondent validation in a systematic way as, for example, Bloor (1976) did in his 
study of doctors‟ decision-making in adeno-tonsillectomy. I did not conduct second 
interviews with my informants due to practical difficulties. It was hard to arrange 
times to come and interview the informants in the first instance and the interviews 
themselves were quite lengthy; therefore it would have been almost impossible to 
expect them to give up further time to talk to me. Further, I did not send them my 
interpretations of the data for checking. I took a decision not to do this on the 
grounds that respondent validation presupposes that there is some „truth‟ out there 
that can be reached and the researcher needs the respondent to check they have 
comprehended it in the right way. This did not fit in with my way of seeing my 
interview data (see above) and therefore I did not think it would add significantly to 
the project. Further, there were practical difficulties with doing this as a number of 
authors have noted (see Silverman, 2006). As Bloor argues, „The main requirement 
for the validation exercise seems to be an adequate level of involvement among 
respondents in one‟s research or a degree of commitment to the research 
project.‟(1978:551) Initially, I asked the informants if they would be interested in 
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reading through preliminary findings, but the response was that they had no time to 
do this. 
 
There have been criticisms of respondent validation as means of ensuring validity of 
research (Bryman, 1988). Bloor (1978), although finding the technique useful for 
generating further areas for research, found a number of problems with member 
validation. He argued that this technique cannot be unproblematically used to 
establish the validity of a project and that such responses should be treated as data 
and not as a test of validity.  
 
However, there were two ways that I did use a limited form of respondent validation 
in my research. First, in my last interview with Dr Vance I asked him to reflect on 
one of my findings, to in effect get an „informant‟s view‟ of my interpretation of a 
particular point of my data. One of the themes that had arisen from the data was that 
although the informants often mentioned ethical issues, they generally felt that their 
everyday practice did not present vastly challenging ethical issues. I asked Dr Vance 
to reflect on this, on whether it was a reasonable interpretation, he agreed with my 
contention and therefore this in one specific instance was a form of respondent 
validation (see discussion in Chapter Six). 
 
Second, as mentioned above, one of my sampling criteria was to build up a picture of 
particular clinics and I sampled a number of clinicians from each clinic. This 
produced a form of respondent validation as I was able to build up a picture of the 
decision-making process in the clinic from a number of perspectives. I could check 
my understanding of that clinic‟s ethos with other informants from that clinic.  
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Triangulation 
This is the combination of different methods of provide a „better‟ picture of what is 
being studied (Seale, 1999). This method has been subject to criticism in the same 
way that respondent validation has (as respondent validation can be seen as a form of 
triangulation). As Hammersley & Atkinson say: „What is involved in triangulation is 
not the combination of different kinds of data per se, but rather an attempt to relate 
different sorts of data in such a way as to counteract various possible threats to the 
validity of our analysis.‟ Therefore, triangulation may not add up to „ a more 
complete picture.‟ (1995:232) Due to these reasons and practical difficulties of 
conducting observations of clinics, I did not produce data sets from different sources. 
 
I did perform a form of triangulation in the data analysis by having my supervisors 
read a selection of the transcripts and look at my coding of these to provide a further 
check on my interpretation of the data. 
 
CONCLUSION 
This chapter has been an exploration of my research methods: how the research was 
carried out and some of the theoretical assumptions that I made in both organising 
the data collection and analysing the data. In the next chapter I shall examine the 
regulatory and organisational features of infertility treatment in England, to introduce 
the context in which the informants (the infertility clinicians) in this current study 
made their ethical decisions.  
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CHAPTER FIVE 
THE ORGANISATION OF INFERTILITY TREATMENT IN THE UK 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
In this chapter I will give a broad account of the regulatory and organisational 
context of infertility treatment in the UK and how such treatment is funded. This 
discussion delineates the context in which the infertility clinicians made ethical 
decisions and the external constraints that shaped such decisions.  
 
REGULATION 
 
Before 1990 
 
Discussions of the regulatory framework in infertility often begin with Louise 
Brown, the first baby conceived by in vitro fertilisation (IVF) (Steptoe & Edwards, 
1978). However, artificial insemination (AI), either by donor (AID) or by the 
husband (AIH) was an assisted conception technique that predated IVF. AID was first 
used in clinical practice in England in the late 1930s and was generally practised in 
secret (Nachtigall, 1993). In 1945 Mary Barton, a gynaecologist, published an article in 
the British Medical Journal (Barton & Walker, 1945) about her AID programme, that 
prompted a public outcry that accused her of performing an immoral procedure. 
  
With the development of the creation and manipulation of embryos outside the body 
and related treatments such as IVF, ethical concerns over these procedures became 
more marked. Louise Brown‟s birth in 1978 in the UK121 sparked controversy and 
debate over the ethical acceptability of interfering in human reproduction (Deech & 
Smajdor, 2007). As a response to these scientific developments the Government 
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 For an overview of the early days of IVF treatment in countries other than the UK see Cohen et al 
(2005). 
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established the Committee of Inquiry into Human Fertilisation and Embryology 
chaired by Mary Warnock, in July 1982, to debate the correct societal response to 
these developments. The terms of reference for this Committee were as follows: 
To consider recent and potential developments in medicine and science 
related to human fertilisation and embryology; to consider what policies and 
safeguards should be applied, including consideration of the social, ethical 
and legal implications of these developments; and to make recommendations. 
(Warnock, 1985:4)
122
 
 
The Committee reported its findings in June 1984 and it became known as The 
Warnock Report. Its main recommendations were: that the embryo deserved some 
protection under the law; that new legislation was needed to set out the legal limits of 
embryo research and reproductive technologies; and that a licensing authority be set 
up. The Report provoked debate and controversy, The Times for example, ran a 
headline „Warnock: Ethics Undermined‟ for an article that heavily criticised the 
Report‟s conclusions (Warnock, 1985:viii). 
 
In 1985 the Voluntary Licensing Authority (VLA) was set up, chaired by Mary 
Donaldson, as an interim measure to monitor and regulate reproductive technologies 
until legislation based on the findings of the Warnock Committee was passed. This 
body was made up of scientists, health professionals and lay people, who carried out 
inspections of clinics and issued licenses to practice. Any centre wishing to carry out 
research or treatment in this area had to apply to the Authority for a license. The 
Government then carried out a consultation and published, in 1987, a White Paper 
Human Fertilisation and Embryology: A framework for legislation that committed it 
to legislating in this area and became the basis for the Bill that was put before 
                                                 
122
 References to the Warnock Report are taken from an edition published in 1985 that contains the 
Report and two commentary chapters by Mary Warnock. 
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parliament. In 1989 the VLA changed its name to the Interim Licensing Authority to 
reflect its temporary status. 
 
The need for legislating in this area was succinctly put in the parliamentary debate 
over the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Bill. Legislation was needed, „to 
regulate research on embryos, to protect the integrity of reproductive medicine and to 
protect scientists and clinicians from legal action and sanction [and] introduce 
statutory control of a new form of clinical practice.‟ (Morgan & Lee, 1991:22-23) 
The detailed regulation of an area of clinical practice did not receive the large 
amount of attention that other clauses of the Bill (embryo research and abortion – 
one area of the Bill was to amend the 1967 Abortion Act) received. However, it is 
this element of the 1990 Act that is important for my discussion. 
 
With the passage of the 1990 Act, infertility practice became governed by a 
comprehensive piece of legislation. Although this legislation gave clinicians a role in 
interpreting, carrying out and organising infertility practice it did impose some 
limitations to their clinical freedom and how they organised their practice. For example, 
the HFEA has recently brought out a consultation document (HFEA, 2007a) on single 
embryo transfer, to consider changing policy to (generally) allow only one embryo to be 
transferred. Such a policy would clearly restrict a doctor‟s freedom to make a clinical 
judgment over how many embryos to transfer in a particular patient. Organisational 
aspects of clinical practice are also governed by national policies. For example, record 
keeping of those who have had treatment and the child born from such techniques, is 
now kept by HFEA in a standardised format. Whereas, in countries where there is no 
legislation, such as the US, the studies conducted indicate that there is no standard 
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system of record keeping and clinicians organised it according to their own preferences 
and views (Office of Technology Assessment, 1988).
123
  In the UK, however, in the 
area of infertility treatment legislation has meant a greater standardisation of practice 
and a change in the role of doctors. They have gone from the being the sole mediators 
of the practice (Noveas, 1998) to facilitators of a predetermined policy and this clearly 
affects the way they can control and influence their clinical practice. 
 
The role that the state via legislation should play in medicine is a contested one, some 
argue that medical decisions should remain outside the public sector (Bonnicksen, 
1992). For example, in a study conducted after the Warnock Report but before 
legislation, Walker et al (1987) found that among clinics, donors and recipients there 
was little support for any change in the way AID was organised, hence little support for 
legislation. Others, however, maintain that in an area like this, where so many of 
decisions are not clinical ones but reflect society‟s attitudes to family structures, 
legislation is both useful and necessary (Brahams, 1983).  
 
Regulation under the 1990 Act 
 
The Human Fertilisation and Embryology Bill received royal assent on 1
st
 November 
1990. One of the main problems with a piece of legislation such as the 1990 Act was 
that in this area (as in many other areas of medicine) what is scientifically possible 
changes so rapidly that legislation will quickly become out dated. The 1990 Act 
established the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority (HFEA), which 
began its statutory duties in August 1991, to partly address this problem of rapid 
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 Despite there being no national legislation infertility practice in the US is not an „ethical free for 
all.‟ There are professional guidelines that delineate „good practice‟. The Ethics Committee of The 
American Society of Reproductive Medicine, for example, issues ethical guidance in this area and 
publishes this on its website as open access articles from Fertility and Sterility. 
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scientific development outstripping regulatory structures. One of the HFEA‟s duties 
was to regulate new techniques that would arise as technology developed.  
 
The HFEA has a duty to regulate centres providing treatment and conducting 
research, publish a Code of Practice and maintain registers of those born from such 
procedures and those receiving treatment. The first two of these functions is how the 
HFEA provides the context for ethical decision-making in the infertility clinic. The 
Code of Practice (and associated policy documents) determines what constitutes 
„good practice‟ in the licensed centres and what limits are put on procedures on 
ethical and clinical grounds. The HFEA grants licenses to clinics to allow them to 
practice in this area and these licensing procedures ensure that such regulations are 
adhered to. A licensed centre is one that provides IVF or donor insemination, stores 
gametes or embryos, brings about the creation of an embryo and/or carries out 
research on embryos. 
 
The Code of Practice is now in its seventh edition (HFEA, 2007), and contains 
guidance for licensed centres for the proper conduct of their activities. As the Code 
of Practice is only revised periodically new guidance is given to clinics by Chair‟s 
Letter, Chief Executive Letter or Directions and these are incorporated into later 
editions of the Code of Practice.
 124
 The Directions are rules that licensed centres 
must comply with and non-compliance could result in the suspension of the clinic‟s 
license and thus an inability to continuing providing such treatment. New guidance 
on policies and ethical responses to „new‟ techniques are usually preceded by a 
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 The HFEA‟s website has a full list of the Directions and guidance given to clinics since the 
creation of the HFEA. 
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public consultation to ascertain general views on the ethical and/or clinical 
acceptability of certain procedures. For example, there have been previous 
consultations on sex-selection in 1993 & 2003, pre-implantation genetic diagnosis in 
1999, modernisation of regulation and the new fee structure in 2002 and concerns 
over multiple births in 2007.
125
 
 
Hence, via the Code of Practice and the further guidance the HFEA directs the 
position and approaches clinics are to take. There are elements of treatment that are 
not allowed in the UK and therefore patients and doctors cannot „choose‟ to utilise 
them. For instance, sex-selection for social reasons is prohibited; the HFEA 
stipulates the numbers of embryos to be transferred; and consent forms and 
procedures are set out in the HFEA Code of Practice. Therefore, clinicians‟ choices 
over how to conduct their clinical practice are circumscribed by a tight regulatory 
framework.
126
  
 
One area of regulation that merits particular discussion is the guidance offered by the 
HFEA on „welfare of the child‟, as this was an area that all of the informants in this 
study had to address in their practice. 
 
Welfare of the child 
Current legislation provides that: „a woman shall not be provided with treatment 
services unless account has been taken of the welfare of any child who may be born 
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 Details of these consultation documents can be found on the HFEA‟s website. 
126
 Such restrictions of choice in this way has led, arguably, to what has been called „reproductive 
tourism.‟ (Pennings, 2002. Blyth & Farrand, 2005). 
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as a result of the treatment  (including the need of the child for a father), and that of 
any other child who may be affected by the birth.‟ (s 13 (5), HFE Act, 1990) This 
welfare of the child provision has, arguably, been one of the 1990 Act‟s most 
controversial provisions (Blyth, 2007). The 1990 Act did not define precisely what 
was meant by „welfare of the child‟ in this context (BFS, 1999) but the HFEA, in the 
first edition of its Code of Practice, issued broad guidance that clinics should 
consider: 
 The commitment to raising the child 
 The ages and medical histories of the family 
 The needs of any child to be born, including any possible multiple births, and 
the ability of the parents (or parent) to meet those needs 
 The risk of harm to any child/children to be born, inherited disorders, 
problems during pregnancy, neglect or abuse 
 The effect of a new baby or babies upon any existing child of the family 
(HFEA, 1991) 
Clinics found this guidance very hard to implement due to the difficulty in 
interpreting risk factors and the British Fertility Society, when issuing its own 
interpretations of the guidance in 1999, argued that: „A definition of the meaning of 
„the welfare of the child‟ has not been agreed and in its absence, implementing the 
assessment is, in practice, the subject of confusion and debate.‟ (BFS, 1999:85) 
Further, as Blyth, notes many clinicians saw such a provision of welfare of the child 
as an unwarranted incursion in an area that should be a matter of clinical judgement. 
The welfare of the child provision was unnecessary, as it was „good medical 
practice‟ to take it into account and clinicians did not need vague legislative 
provisions to ensure that they did (Blyth, 2007). Welfare of the child provisions were 
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also criticised on other grounds, that such provisions were unfair to infertility 
patients.
127
  Jackson, a professor of medical law, has argued that the provision should 
be removed from legislation as it is, „unfair to deprive some people of the zone of 
privacy that surrounds most individuals‟ reproductive decision-making.‟ (Jackson, 
2007:49)
128
  
 
As a result of these problems with the welfare of the child provision, the HFEA, in 
2004, began to review the welfare of the child requirement (HFEA, 2005) and 
produced new recommendations on how infertility clinics should implement the 
provision (HFEA, 2005a). This new guidance provided that, „there should be a 
presumption to provide treatment, unless there is evidence that the child to be born, 
or any existing child of the family, is likely to suffer serious medical, physical or 
psychological harm.‟ (HFEA, 2005b) There are in effect two main changes to the 
guidance. First, only serious risk of harm needs to be taken into account, thus, 
arguably, making the judgments easier to make. Second, information given by the 
patient is to be the first port of call and GPs only contacted if the clinician thinks that 
there are particular issues to be addressed, whereas previously GPs were contacted as 
a matter of course. 
 
Many clinicians and commentators have argued that, even in the light of this new 
guidance, it is time to remove any form of welfare of the child provision from the 
regulatory requirements (Harris, 2000), while others have argued that the provision 
can have some utility in making fair decisions about who should be allowed to have 
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 The RCOG also argued against welfare of the child provisions on these grounds in their evidence 
to the House of Commons Science and Technology Committee (2005). 
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 This is a later version of an article first published in 2002. 
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infertility treatment (Parker, 2005). Nevertheless, the HFEA seems committed to 
some explicit form of welfare of the child assessment and thus, although, with the 
new guidance, clinics are able to adopt a slightly more laissez-faire approach to 
welfare of the child assessments, clinicians are still guided and constrained by 
national policies and rulings on the issue. 
 
Review of the 1990 Act 
As seen in the case of welfare of the child provisions, the HFEA continually reviews 
and monitors the guidance it offers. However, the flexibility to do this is limited by 
the need to stay within the confines of the 1990 Act. As Biggs notes: „Legislative 
drafting can never be sufficiently flexible to keep pace with the rate of scientific 
progress in this area.‟ (Biggs & Horsey, 2007:xi) The Act has also been subject to a 
number of legal challenges, such as the case taken against the HFEA to allow the 
creation of a „saviour sibling‟ in 2005. The 1990 Act is bound by its roots and 
Morgan & Lee argue that the 1990 Act is „a Warnock Act‟: 
This is true not only in its following the report of the Warnock Committee, but 
also in the more important sense that the science in question is that of 1984, 
updated in an ad hoc and piecemeal way. The Act represents a limited attempt to 
capture or to understand the exponential technological leaps since then. (Morgan 
& Lee, 1991:4) 
 
In light of these problems and the changing scientific and technological 
developments, the Government decided to conduct a full review of the 1990 Act in 
2004. The House of Commons Science and Technology Committee began an inquiry 
into the Act that reported in 2005. As a result of this and Department of Health 
consultations, a revised HFE Act is, at the time of writing, going through Parliament. 
However, the interviews with the clinicians were carried out before the new 
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legislation was debated in parliament, so the regulatory structures were those of the 
1990 Act and associated guidance. 
 
THE FUNDING OF INFERTILITY TREATMENT 
One of the enduring controversies in infertility treatment has been the way it has 
been funded and who can and cannot be given treatment. The two issues are inter-
twined as often certain groups such as single women and those in same-sex 
relationships have been denied treatment on the NHS, but can get treatment in some 
private centres. There are no definitive figures for the percentage of infertility 
treatment carried out in the private sector. Riley (2007) estimates that only 25% of 
infertility treatment is carried out in the NHS. The HFEA does not keep figures on 
this but has an anecdotal impression from its Fertility Views Patients‟ Panel that 
around 80-85% of treatment is privately funded (Woodward, 2008). Only one clinic 
in my sample (Clinic 1) solely did treatment on the NHS, one clinic was solely 
private and the others did a mix of private and NHS. The purpose of this section is to 
give an overview of the funding criteria that operate for NHS funded treatment, and 
the consequent limitation this places on the clinicians‟ practice. 
 
NHS funding 
As Morgan & Lee note the 1990 Act drew attention to, „questions as to the provision 
and payment for assisted conception services. The Government‟s refusal to commit 
more resources to the area [has been] repeatedly criticised.‟ (1991:23) The issues 
surrounding whether infertility treatment should be offered on the NHS at all and if 
so, how much treatment (generally how many cycles of IVF should be given) and to 
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whom, have seldom been out of the public eye since the inception of the 1990 Act 
(Shenfield, 1997. Lord et al, 2001). It might be thought that with so little of infertility 
treatment provided on the NHS, any restrictions on funding and the imposition of 
eligibility criteria for patients has little effect on infertility clinicians. However, 
although the majority of their practice is private there is still approximately a quarter 
that is funded by the NHS. Further, the restrictions on NHS funding for such 
treatment has had a profound influence on infertility provision in the UK as a whole. 
The UK has one of the lowest numbers of IVF cycles per million of the population. 
Data from the European Society of Human Reproduction and Embryology (ESHRE) 
in 2004 put the UK far down the list of amount of IVF provision in Europe. 
 
TABLE 1 
Country Cycles per million of the 
population 
Cycles per thousand of 
females of reproductive age 
 
Denmark 2128 9 
Belgium 1847 8 
Finland 1765 8 
Sweden 1432 7 
France 1154 5 
The Netherlands 942 4 
Germany 755 3 
UK 663 3 
Austria 551 2 
Macedonia 252 1 
 
(Data adapted from a table in Andersen et al (2008)) 
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Clinicians‟ ability to provide a service that meets the populations‟ needs is, arguably, 
compromised by the lack of NHS funding. Further, their ability to select patients in a 
quarter of their practice is determined by the willingness of their local Primary Care 
Trust (PCT) to fund treatment. 
 
Primary Care Trusts and IVF 
At the time of the interviews NHS funding for infertility treatment was administered 
and distributed by PCTs. PCTs replaced Health Authorities in 2002, with a further 
reorganisation in 2006, and there are currently 152 PCTs in England. Each of these 
PCTs issues criteria about who they will fund infertility treatment for and how much 
and what type of treatment will be provided. Inevitably this system has given rise to 
variation in how much and to whom infertility treatment is given. This regional 
difference in provision in health care has become known colloquially as a post-code 
lottery and the „lottery‟ in infertility provision can be significant. In the South and 
West area there was 0.3 IVF treatments per 100,000 population, where as in Anglia 
and Oxford there was 21.3 per 100,000 (Lord et al, 2001). Infertility campaigners 
(such as the National Infertility Awareness Campaign (NIAC))
129
 argue that there are 
two problems: first, regional variation in infertility provision and eligibility criteria 
that they see as unfair; and second, a general lack of funding for such treatment 
across the country.  
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 The NIAC are a well-respected body which has organised surveys of PCT provision with 
government bodies and their chief executive Claire Brown works closely with the British Fertility 
Society. 
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In response to the former problem, in 2004, the National Institute of Clinical 
Excellence (NICE) issued national guidance on what PCTs should provide for those 
seeking fertility treatment (NICE, 2004). The main recommendation of this guidance 
was that couples should be offered up to three stimulated cycles of IVF and the 
woman should be aged between 23-39. Although this guidance was greeted with 
some enthusiasm by patient groups and fertility clinicians (BFS, 2005), it was not 
accompanied by any commitment from the Government for additional funding to 
enable PCTs to provide this additional service. NICE subsequently commissioned 
two surveys in 2005 to see how the implementation of the guidance was progressing, 
one with PCT commissioning managers and the other with fertility experts from 
licensed clinics. Sixty-eight percent of fertility experts thought that the guidance 
would be hard to implement and that the major barrier to this was lack of PCT 
funding and competing priorities (NICE, 2005:19). When announcing the new 
guidelines the Health Secretary, John Reid, said he expected all PCTs to, „offer at 
least one full cycle of treatment to all those eligible,‟ – a statement that would hardly 
encourage PCTs to stretch themselves to give the full three cycles recommended by 
the guidance. The survey of PCT commissioners found that in 2005 63.5% of PCTs 
were offering only one cycle, 31.7% offering two and none offering three (NICE, 
2005a:12). The NICE recommendation of providing three IVF cycles is not being 
met. This inability to provide as many cycles as the clinician deems appropriate is a 
further curb on clinicians‟ freedom to make their own clinical judgments. It is argued 
to be highly inefficient to only offer couples one cycle and there are concerns that 
with the move towards single embryo transfer, these problems will become more 
severe (BFS, 2008). 
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Social eligibility criteria 
A further problem with the NICE guidance was that it did not address the other part 
of the problem of IVF provision, namely that eligibility criteria for NHS treatment 
could vary across PCTs. The guidance says it does not address, „social criteria for 
treatment (for example, whether it is single women or same-sex couples who are 
seeking treatment, or whether either partner in a couple already has children).‟ 
(NICE, 2004:34) This was highlighted as an issue in the post-guidance survey carried 
out by NICE that,
130
 „the majority of PCTs also regarded the lack of social guidance 
as either a major or minor barrier.‟ (NICE, 2005a:16) It is often these „social 
eligibility criteria‟ that seem most unfair about the unequal distribution of resources 
for infertility
131
 and cause infertility clinicians the most difficulties. Ashcroft argues 
that by leaving out a consideration of social eligibility criteria NICE were attempting, 
„to demarcate „medical‟ from „non-medical‟ uses of IVF, and that this rested on 
contested value judgements about the borderline between the medical and non-
medical, and about who was deserving of treatment and under what circumstances.‟ 
(2006:136)  
 
The debates over NHS funding of infertility treatment are underpinned by ethical 
questions of how one sees the status of infertility. One justification for providing 
treatment for the infertile on the NHS, is that infertility is the kind of condition that 
merits medical treatment. Robert Winston, a British fertility specialist, said, „infertility 
is actually a terrible disease affecting our sexuality and well being.‟ This position 
appeals to a particular definition of what it means to be healthy. If health is defined as 
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priorities and values, local variation need not always be unjust. 
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the optimal physical functioning of an organism then it could be argued that where 
infertility is caused by some form of physical malfunction then this should be treated. A 
wider definition of health could be employed to support the claim that infertility is a 
disease such as the World Health Organisation‟s (WHO) definition, that health is a 
complete sense of wellbeing. It could be said that infertility treatments are enabling the 
infertile to function as fully healthy individuals and should be part of health care 
provision.  
 
Conversely, it has been argued that infertility is not a disease, it is rather the effect of 
other conditions, such as fallopian tubal blockage. Infertility treatments do not „treat‟ 
infertility they only ameliorate the effects of other conditions. Nevertheless, many 
established medical treatments fall into this category, for instance diabetes is not treated 
but its unpleasant side-effects managed, so this in itself does not constitute an argument 
against the merits of medical treatment for infertility. Infertility can also be seen as 
purely a social problem and one that does not need medical intervention. Couples could 
have counselling to come to terms with the inability to have children, which is an 
inability to participate in social customs rather than any specific medical problem. 
NICE, however, have avoided addressing questions of whether infertility should be 
seen as a medical need by framing the debate solely in terms of clinical 
effectiveness.
132
 NICE has left the difficult decisions to PCTs and, in doing this, has 
offered little guidance to health care professionals – when offering guidance is one of 
its stated aims (Riley, 2007). 
 
                                                 
132
 See McMillan (2003) for a discussion of the limitations of focussing solely on clinical 
effectiveness to determine treatment criteria. 
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In a Department of Health survey of PCTs and IVF provision undertaken in 2006, 
criteria that fall under the social eligibility heading are listed as: 
Age of woman 
Age of male partner 
Weight of woman (BMI) 
Smoking/health 
Previous children 
Couple‟s relationship 
Previous assisted conception 
Follicle stimulating hormone level or poor cycle response 
Previous sterilisation (treatment is often refused on these grounds) 
Other (which included conforming to welfare of the child criteria – in which their GP 
would be contacted – and sharing anonymised data with the commissioners) (DH, 
2007) 
 
Clearly, some of these criteria can be argued to be more clinically based than others. 
Follicle stimulating hormone level or poor cycle response could be seen as a purely 
clinical criterion that would lead to the assessment that a patient has little chance of 
conceiving. Other criteria such as weight, age and smoking can be justified on the 
grounds that the older you are, the higher the BMI and the greater the amount you 
smoke can all affect the success rates of the treatment.
133
 However, these criteria also 
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 However, most PCTs will not treat with a BMI of over 30, where as the British Fertility Society 
recommends not treating when the BMI is over 35 (BFS,2006). 
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carry with them a sense that there are some non-clinical value judgments at play 
(Kennedy, et al 2006), in that these might be groups seen as less deserving of 
treatment, raising the problem of how much success rates must fall before it is 
deemed appropriate to preclude someone from treatment?  
 
It is difficult to get conclusive data on all PCTs‟ social eligibility criteria. The survey 
carried out by the Department of Health in 2006 (DH, 2007) was conducted just after 
the re-organisation of PCTs and this data does not always refer to the PCT in its re-
organised form. The MP Grant Shapps requested eligibility criteria for infertility 
treatment from PCTs in 2007 and has presented the data on his website.
134
 Some 
PCTs‟ eligibility criteria are available on the web as part of PCT documentation, but 
it is not always clear if they are the most up to date policies. It appears from Shapps‟ 
data that PCTs are gradually moving towards general criteria of women‟s age 
between 23-39, no previous children and a body mass index (for the woman) below 
30. Only three trusts stipulated that couples must be in a heterosexual relationship.
135
 
 
However, there still are differences. In terms of maximum age some PCTs (such as 
Luton) have a lower maximum of 35 years. Lincolnshire PCT, for instance, reduced 
its maximum age to 35 in 2006 and estimated that this would save them £100,000 per 
year. However, they have now increased the age limit to 39 to bring them into accord 
with their neighbours (Lincolnshire PCT, 2008). Not all PCTs will not fund smokers, 
but the trend is towards a greater exclusion of smokers. These variations give rise to 
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 March 2007. 
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 South Hams and Devon PCT (2005) for example restricts access to heterosexual couples.  
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concerns that they are not based on „clinical effectiveness‟ but rather on an attempt to 
reduce the pool of potential recipients, as the example of Lincolnshire illustrates.  
 
PCTs again vary on the definition of no previous children: some will not fund 
couples who have a child living with them, whereas others couch it in terms of 
having a child at all. There is also often a distinction drawn between children from a 
previous relationship and children from the current relationship. Only two PCTs, 
Bristol and South Gloucestershire, specifically fund treatment if the couple had a 
child together, three others did not mention such a criterion and the rest would not 
offer treatment (Shapps, 2007). This type of criterion is clearly a form of social 
criterion and has been argued to be purely about reducing the numbers eligible for 
treatment. It cannot even be cashed out in terms of welfare of the child (however 
dubious some of those welfare of the child judgements may be) as no one generally 
believes having siblings is harmful. Further, already having a child could be seen as 
an indicator for successful treatment. 
 
NHS provision for infertility treatments is still subject to regional variation both in 
amount of treatment offered and the social eligibility criteria employed. Clinicians 
are constrained by PCT policies and funding criteria over who they can offer 
treatment to and how much they can give them. Thus, such funding structures have 
an important impact on the context of infertility provision in the UK and parameters 
within which infertility clinicians make ethical decisions. 
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CONCLUSION 
This chapter has illustrated the frameworks in which infertility clinicians make 
ethical decisions, from regulatory structures to funding limitations. These 
frameworks set the context in which ethics is carried out in the infertility clinic and 
parameters and possibilities of clinical ethical decisions. The next four chapters form 
the core of this study and explore and analyse the way the clinicians made and 
approached ethical decision-making. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
 
ETHICAL ISSUES IN INFERTILITY PRACTICE 
 
 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
This research project was driven by the overriding aim of seeing how infertility 
clinicians managed and resolved the ethical issues in their everyday practice. To 
begin this discussion it is necessary to have an understanding of how the informants 
thought about the ethical issues they encountered and indeed what these ethical 
issues were. This is setting out the endoxa (as discussed in the Chapter Three), to see 
what gets constituted as an ethical problem, what the different views are of the 
practice and where the conflicts are to form the basis of discussion.  
 
Generally, the informants viewed their infertility practice as a medical speciality 
fraught with ethical difficulty. However, there was a contrasting view that they were 
not constantly troubled by ethical difficulties in their everyday practice. This chapter 
is an exploration and examination of this apparent contradiction. I then apply the 
element of my methodology that seeks to develop theory, in this case a theory of 
„settled‟ morality that arose out of the data, to explain how the clinicians thought 
about the ethical issues that arose from their practice.  
 
I will argue that the informants operated within a „settled‟ morality, within which 
they sought to normalise their practice so they could develop a framework in which 
to go about their everyday clinical duties. The ethical issues that informants brought 
up in discussion will then be considered to provide a backdrop to the kinds of 
problems and concerns the informants thought ethically troubling. Particular issues 
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will also be discussed throughout the thesis when considering how practitioners 
approached and made ethical decisions. 
 
INFERTILITY PRACTICE AS AN ETHICALLY CONTENTIOUS AREA 
In this section I want to consider how the informants saw the relationship between 
their practice and ethics. In response to a question on how they (the informants) saw 
the role of ethical issues in infertility practice, 17 of the informants thought that the 
area of infertility medicine raised many difficult ethical issues. The view that 
infertility practice is an area of profound moral and ethical importance is one 
reflected both in the literature and the regulatory context of reproductive 
technologies in the UK.
136
 This is an area of medicine that has attracted considerable 
debate and exploration in the academic literature and is closely regulated by a 
specific act of parliament and a regulatory body. In their guide to the 1990 Act, 
Morgan and Lee say, „within [the Act] are some of the most difficult, most 
intractable and fundamental moral questions of which any society has become 
seized.‟ (1991:1)  
 
This view of reproductive technologies has not changed in the years since the 
passage of the Act. For example, in the Government‟s review of the Act in 2006, the 
White Paper recognised the continuing complexity of ethical issues raised by this 
area of medicine: „The development and use of human reproductive technologies 
continue to raise a range of complex and profound social, legal and ethical questions. 
Addressing those issues and questions goes to the very heart of our existence as 
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 For a more detailed overview of the regulatory context of infertility practice in the UK see the 
previous chapter. 
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individuals, families and society.‟ (DH, 2006:1) Hence, that informants viewed their 
practice as raising a substantial number of ethical issues was not an unexpected 
finding. The high ethical profile of this area of medicine was one of the reasons why 
I chose the infertility clinic as a site to conduct research on how doctors made 
decisions and approached the ethical aspects of their practice. 
 
One aspect of this view that reproductive technologies raised many difficult ethical 
issues was that ethics was an integral part of medicine. Drs Marsh and Down thought 
that generally ethics was a part of medical practice, the two could not be separated: 
So everything in every aspect of medicine, all decisions are ethical to some extent, 
or to a large extent. (13-37) 
I think ethics is a part of medicine.  I think, I think they are intimately involved 
with one another.  In all areas of medicine there is ethics. (4-90) 
 
Other informants thought that obstetrics and gynaecology and by extension infertility 
practice was, as a medical discipline, more ethically fraught than other areas of 
medicine. Drs Grant, Jenson and Havers‟ comments were typical of this view: 
Yes, I did obs & gynae as the speciality, in the medicine field it‟s got more 
ethical commitment than others. (7-69) 
 
I think fertility and ethics, we are dealing with probably the most important 
part of medicine, in my view, or ethically important part of medicine. (10-68) 
 
As you are aware in this field, more than probably in other fields on the 
medicine, ethics is very important.  (8-88) 
 
Dr Grant saw infertility medicine as the place where ethics and medicine had a closer 
relationship than in other areas of medicine: 
I see them as two, in medicine, yes, not in infertility.  I think in infertility, or 
assisted conception, I think ethics and medicine begin to come close together.  
That‟s the reason why we can turn a patient down on ethical grounds, not only on 
medical grounds. (7-19) 
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Dr Urban reiterated this view: 
Yes, it‟s just I think it‟s a part because, as I said, ethics is a big part of this IVF 
treatment, part and parcel. (21-29) 
Thus, infertility practice, by its nature, had the potential to raise a substantial volume 
of ethical issues. Dr Quest summed this up when he said: 
if you sit and think how many ethical problems we have every day, I think 
that it‟s impossible to count them. (17-44) 
 
Dr Evens said: 
Now the interesting thing for this kind of work obviously with fertility, is 
because there are so many ethical issues. (5-109) 
And Dr Vance: 
And ethical problems, plus plus plus plus.  Because I‟m lead for the Assisted 
Conception Unit, but I‟m also lead for the Termination of Pregnancy service.  So 
I‟ve got a very sort of, there‟s ethics just coming out of my ears basically. (22-1) 
 
Twelve of the informants (Drs Case, Down, Evens, Francis, Havers, Iniman, Lovate, 
Novack, Percy, Quest, Street and Vance) talked easily about the large numbers of 
issues that arose from their practice.
137
  
Whether or not infertility practice is particularly fraught with ethical difficulties is 
not the substantive issue here – palliative care doctors might disagree for instance. 
What is important is that the informants thought that their practice raised complex 
ethical issues by its very nature. The account they gave of their practice was one of 
an ethically contentious area. Hence, generally, the informants viewed their infertility 
practice as a medical speciality fraught with ethical difficulty. However, there was a 
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contrasting view that in everyday practice ethical issues and difficulties did not arise 
frequently. 
 
FEW ETHICAL ISSUES IN EVERYDAY PRACTICE 
 
Although the informants did mention a wide-range of ethical issues that they faced in 
their practice, the overall impression from the interviews was not one of their 
everyday clinical practice being suffused with difficult ethical dilemmas and issues. 
Some informants did not find it easy to think of ethical issues when asked the general 
question, „what issues do you see as ethically challenging in your practice?‟  Dr 
Robin, for instance, in response to this question said: 
Do I have to say something?‟ (18-29) 
Dr Urban, having mentioned a problem with lack of anonymity of egg donors, then 
said: 
I can‟t sort of think off the top of my head what other ethical issues, I need to sort 
of think very hard and I need some time.  I just can‟t sort of think at the moment 
what other ethical issues are. (21-14) 
 
Dr Tarn asked me, as the interviewer, to provide some guidance: 
So otherwise I don‟t think there are really, which other issues have you got in 
mind, which?‟ (20-23)  
 
Dr Orben also asked for some guidance on what I might be looking for when asking 
about what challenged them ethically in practice: 
Well I don‟t know, because my perception of it is obviously different from yours.  
I don‟t see it as particularly difficult from an ethical point of view at all.  You give 
me some examples of what‟s difficult ethically. (15-11) 
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Twelve of the informants explicitly talked about how, generally, their practice did 
not raise or did not frequently raise ethical issues. Dr Marsh responded to a question 
about how he dealt with controversial ethical issues by saying:  
Just, like I said, if it‟s contentious - if it‟s straightforward, which is 90% or 99%, 
even 95% of the times it is straightforward. (13-45)  
 
 
Dr Tarn said:  
I just think on an everyday basis there are no huge ethical issues. (20-24) 
 
Dr Lovate also made this point 
I mean I think that I actually, mostly one isn‟t faced with ethical issues, 
mostly it‟s just mundane sort of medicine. (12-43) 
 
Dr Orben, when discussing issues that might cause controversy, said that it was 
unusual for such issues to arise: 
One or two cases in, and how long have we been doing it here?  Well, I think 
I started my infertility practice in, I came in „85 and I think within a year it 
was up and running.  So in 20 years of practice here, probably the number of 
cases where we‟ve had to really scratch our heads and think you could count 
on the fingers on one hand.  (15-7) 
 
He went on to explain why he thought that this was the case: 
Well, again it doesn‟t because a lot of it‟s at the margins, we‟re talking about 
pre-implantation diagnosis aren‟t we, and we‟re talking about having siblings 
in the hope that you‟re going to match for a bone marrow donor and those 
kind of things which, of course, make up a very small number of the total 
number of patients undergoing fertility treatments.  It doesn‟t really impact 
on our practice at all. (15-18) 
Dr Grant also made the point that difficult cases were infrequent: 
I think, again I don‟t know if it‟s our clinic practice, but I think it‟s quite easy, 
infertility because, as I say, some couples have got a problem and they know that 
their problem is going to stop their treatment, they will just leave it, they will not 
pursue treatment.  So it‟s difficult to find couples who‟ve got a problem, it‟s a real 
problem, and we‟ll discuss for long.  So generally apart one or two cases a year, 
no more than one or two cases per year. (7-59) 
Dr Brown said: 
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We have a few single women who come for treatment and a few lesbian 
couples.  It‟s a number that I think is often looked at in sort of the press or 
whatever and is blown up out of proportion as being some big problem.  I 
mean most of the people that we see coming for infertility treatment are 
ordinary heterosexual couples.  You might say well, it‟s because the lesbian 
couples or the gay couples don‟t get treated or the single women won‟t get 
treatment, but in fact a lot of clinics will offer treatment to those people.  It‟s 
just that I think most of them actually don‟t actually pursue treatment.  Our 
view in our clinic is if you want treatment and you fit the current criteria then 
you get NHS treatment or you have to pay for it. (2-76) 
A further element of this view, that there were few troubling ethical issues in 
everyday practice, was that funding criteria precluded some ethical issues for NHS 
clinics.
138
 Dr Evens made this point about funding issues: 
And in relation to the fact that we‟re National Health Service, we don‟t pay for the 
treatment, it‟s the primary care trust that pays for the treatment, so we‟re going on 
their guidance as to what they feel is appropriate, so that‟s where that comes in.  
(5-16) 
Potentially „controversial‟ groups who might come forward for treatment (such as 
single women, same-sex couples, older women for example) would be precluded 
from receiving treatment by the funding criteria. Thus, in a NHS clinic certain cases 
would never present themselves for ethical debate.
139
 A further aspect of the 
implications of funding structures on ethical aspects of practice was that some 
difficulties arose that the informants saw as purely funding problems rather than 
ethical issues. Dr Francis made this point: 
Well, I think the difference with us, and there are lot of ethical issues with 
infertility, but our ethical issues are slightly different because we‟re NHS, so most 
of our ethical issues aren‟t actually about ethical issues, they‟re about funding. (6-
70)   
Dr Lovate, whose clinic also did a lot of NHS work, gave two examples where they 
would not treat a couple due to funding restrictions. First, women over 40 would not 
                                                 
138
 See Chapter Five for a more detailed explanation of funding for infertility treatment. 
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 Different PCTs had different funding criteria (see Chapter Five) and criteria would also change 
depending on how tight budgets were. For example Dr Tarn said that the age for accepting women for 
treatment has just been reduced from 39 to 38 by his PCT, solely to cut numbers of people eligible for 
IVF treatment. 
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be treated and second, couples who had already had children by infertility treatment 
would not be treated to try for a third child.  
Yes.  I mean is it a funding issue why you wouldn’t treat, or an ethical 
one, or would you see it as a combination? 
 
No, it‟s not an ethical one, it‟s funding, it‟s resources. (12-21) 
 
One such problem created by funding criteria that Dr Francis‟s unit faced (Clinic 1) 
was whether to give treatment to a couple who had a child but that child had very 
severe Downs Syndrome. Her local PCT did not fund treatment for those who 
already had a child under 16 living with them and therefore this couple were 
technically prohibited from getting treatment funded by the PCT. This was a matter 
that was discussed at this Clinic‟s CEC, not because the informants from that Clinic 
has any issues with offering treatment to that couple, but to see whether that couple 
could be construed to fall into the PCTs‟ funding criteria. That is, could such a child 
(with severe disabilities, who would be unlikely to live to majority) be discounted as 
a „child living with you‟ for the purposes of the funding criteria. The boundary 
between whether an issue is an ethical or a resource concern can be unclear and 
funding restraints often force us to prioritise on the basis of criteria such as need or 
who is most deserving and hence become ethical issues. However, for NHS clinics 
there were some groups who they could not treat purely on financial rather than 
ethical grounds. 
 
These two ways of seeing the role of ethics in infertility practice, that on the one 
hand practice raised many ethical issues and on the other there were few ethical 
issues, could be held by the same informant. For example, Dr Urban who said ethics 
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was a big part of IVF (21-29) also found it hard to give examples of ethical issues 
raised by her practice and said: 
Yes, for the clinicians. Because I feel personally we don‟t sort of get much 
involved in these difficult ethical issues. (21-11) 
 
Dr Grant also combined these two views, saying ethics and infertility were closely 
linked (7-69) and also that difficult cases were infrequent (7-59). 
In sum, the informants recognised that infertility practice was an area that raised 
many difficult ethical issues, but they also thought that, generally, in their everyday 
clinical practice they were not constantly beset by ethical difficulties. Difficult cases 
might arise once or twice a year, but generally their practice was routine and 
straightforward. 
 
SETTLED MORALITY 
This raises an interesting question. How can we explain why clinicians, working in 
what is arguably one of the most ethically controversial areas of medicine, report that 
on a daily basis they have few ethical issues to contend with? This apparent anomaly 
–  that there are few ethical issues in everyday infertility practice – can be explained 
by seeing it as an articulation of a „settled morality‟ rather than as the expression of 
the view that infertility practice did not raise any ethical issues.  This settled morality 
is the broad moral framework in which infertility practice is conducted (in the 
UK).
140
  
 
A settled morality can be contrasted with „controversial‟ morality. Hoffmaster 
outlines a version of this distinction, „morality is largely settled. Morality 
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encompasses the commonplace as well as the controversial, and it is only a 
preoccupation with the latter that creates the unwarranted impression that moral 
issues are, by their very nature, disputatious.‟ (Hoffmaster, 1990:244) In general 
terms, settled morality is something that most serious minded people would agree on, 
such a murdering children is morally wrong.  
 
The informants alluded to a notion of a settled morality when talking about obvious 
ethical decisions, or as one informant put it, „barn door‟ (2-15) decisions, where they 
thought that most people would agree with that decision. Dr Brown gave an example 
of this type of decision: 
But from a personal point of view, I know two people who I‟ve been involved 
with where we‟ve turned down treatment, and I would say that the bulk of the 
population, whatever that sort of means, but a broad body of people would have 
agreed with that decision.  It wasn‟t seen as sort of being vindictive at all in any 
way or … (2-16) 
Dr Iniman also referred to decisions to refuse treatment for a couple in these terms: 
It would have to be, it has to be something pretty barn door, such as a psychiatric 
history of the current admission for psychosis and difficulty in coping with day-
to-day life.(9-43) 
Dr Percy made a similar point: 
So in order to be able to refuse treatment when it‟s a clear-cut barn door case, I 
think we have to have some form of assessment. (16-8) 
 
When ethical issues are part of a settled morality they can be rendered invisible by 
the lack of discussion, so that it is easy not to think of them as ethical issues at all. Dr 
Marsh illustrates this point very well: 
And the framework helps when you are making difficult decisions, for common 
decisions probably just it‟s very straightforward you wouldn‟t bat an eyelid and 
think, “Oh, I‟ve made an ethical decision”, but you have. (13-38) 
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Here, decisions made within the settled morality, or „common decisions‟ as Dr 
Marsh puts it, are often not even seen as ethical ones. Issues in settled morality do 
not attract the intensive discussion that controversial moral issues do, but they are 
moral issues nevertheless. As Smith & Churchill say there are generally, „enough 
shared assumptions about our values and their expressions in action that we do not 
need to articulate the process explicitly.‟ (1986:7) 
 
A lack of appreciation of the distinction between settled and controversial morality 
has sometimes resulted in a confusion over what an ethical issue actually is and this 
is evident in some critiques of bioethics. For instance, Turner (2004) argues that 
bioethics ignores important problems such as global inequities in resource and this is 
because bioethicists do not see them as ethical problems.
141
 I would argue that it is 
not that such a problem is seen as not ethical, rather it is an issue over which there is 
broad agreement. It is generally agreed that it is wrong that people starve in poorer 
countries while those in the developed world consume the majority of the world‟s 
resources.
142
 Therefore, while there may be disagreement about the solution, there is 
no need to debate the rights and wrongs of it, it is part of settled morality.  
 
The notion of a settled morality can be seen as analogous to the discussions over 
what has been called the „agenda problem‟ for applied ethics (Cribb, 2005). Cribb 
uses Brock‟s formulation of this, „[t]he problem is what is to be taken as fixed or 
given for the purposes of setting or changing policy and what is to be taken as open 
for modification and so on the policy agenda.‟ (Brock, 1987:790) One way the 
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problem in the first place. 
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agenda is fixed in infertility practice is the necessity to act within the regulatory 
framework.  In this way, the regulatory context of infertility treatment sets 
parameters within which ethical debates in the clinic take place. Certain procedures, 
such as sex-selection for social reasons, are not allowed in the UK (HFEA, 2007) and 
therefore, in the everyday clinical practice it is not a matter of ethical contention.  
Thus, settled morality is partly informed by the regulatory structures under which 
such technologies operate and, in the case of NHS clinics, PCT funding criteria. Dr 
Orben made the point that IVF practice in the UK operates within tight boundaries. 
So you said you don’t find a lot of your everyday practice contentious, is 
that a fair statement? 
Well I don‟t, perhaps just because I‟ve been doing it, you know, it‟s bread 
and butter, I‟ve been doing it for almost since the first IVF successful 
pregnancy, that was more or less the time when I was getting involved in it.  
So, yes, one‟s watched the controversies and the difficulties that various 
sections of the community have had with various aspects as treatments have 
developed.  But within the UK we‟ve been pretty closely regulated, either 
voluntarily or compulsorily, over the years so that some of the excesses that 
hit the newspapers which are mostly about treatments that take place abroad, 
that‟s just not part of our practice. (15-15) 
 
Further, different clinics set their own agendas of ethical practice. So some clinics 
did not treat same-sex female couples (Clinics 1,4 and 3) because it was not felt to fit 
within that clinic‟s ethical framework. For example Dr Grant said: 
We haven‟t treated same sex couples yet, and the reason why is because there 
is a discrepancy on what people think, or some of my colleagues think 
different than what I think, and so there‟s not unanimous decision about it so 
we have not started treating these couples.  And we won‟t do it until we all 
agree on it. (7-41) 
So, in this clinic although they did not agree on whether it was ethically acceptable to 
treat same sex couples, they agreed not to treat them as a clinic policy.
143
 This was 
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mirrored in other clinics where agreements were reached as to what the clinic would 
do. This can be seen as a form of clinic „ethos‟ and informants talked about the 
„ethos‟ of their unit, that the unit shared a particular moral stance on an issue. For 
instance, Dr Case‟s clinic had come to joint decisions (reached consensus) over 
whether to treat single women and same-sex couples: 
Latterly in this clinic we have accepted treatment of single mothers.  That 
includes women whose partners have given consent for posthumous use of 
sperm, or posthumous use of embryos because they‟ve had a death or 
whatever.  And, subsequent to the acceptance of that situation, acceptance of 
the single mother who doesn‟t have a partner, and doesn‟t intend to have a 
partner, who might need donor sperm or even assisted reproduction using 
donor sperm.  In this clinic we haven‟t treated same sex couples. 
Is that a policy of your organisation or this particular clinic? 
That‟s a policy of this particular clinic, and the feeling of the staff in this 
particular clinic. And it was the feeling of the staff in this clinic that made us 
latecomers to treating single mothers as well. (3-8) 
Informants from Clinic 1 were very in favour of non-anonymous gamete donation 
and portrayed that as being part of the „ethos‟ of their clinic. Dr Evens said: 
Because we‟ve always, since 1980s, had this ethos that children have a right 
to know how they were conceived. (5-39) 
And: 
The scenario pretending it never happened has never sort of sat easily within 
our unit; it‟s not sort of been our ethos. (5-44) 
Dr Francis (also from clinic 1) reiterated this view: 
we‟re also quite unusual that we‟ve been a unit that‟s done an awful lot of known 
egg donation for years, and we‟ve had very little anonymous egg donation; nearly 
all our egg donation‟s known.  So I think we‟ve always felt very comfortable with 
that.  You know, quite a lot of units don‟t do known donation, whereas we‟ve 
always done it.(6-31) 
In this clinic there was a strong agreement on a particular ethical issue – that gamete 
donors should not be anonymous. Therefore, settled morality can be located at a very 
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localised level of the particular clinic. Other clinics, as is pointed out in quote 6-31, 
could think very differently. 
 
A further explanation for the view that their practice raised few ethical issues could 
be that the questioning of the informants was specifically directed at their everyday 
practice, rather than asking them what ethical issues in general they thought were 
troubling. Dr Orben implicitly makes a distinction between everyday issues and 
unusual ethical issues: 
Well, again it doesn‟t because a lot of it‟s at the margins, we‟re talking about 
pre-implantation diagnosis aren‟t we, and we‟re talking about having siblings 
in the hope that you‟re going to match for a bone marrow donor and those 
kind of things which, of course, make up a very small number of the total 
number of patients undergoing fertility treatments.  It doesn‟t really impact 
on our practice at all. (15-18) 
Dr Evens makes a similar point: 
I think the issues we‟re coming on to now, the more ethical issues that I think 
are more important are the genetics, and creating the perfect baby, and pre-
implantation genetic diagnosis and selection, or whatever.  I think those are 
huge ethical dilemmas, far more important than the issue of trying to assess 
who or who wouldn‟t be able to provide the appropriate parenting skills. (5-
122) 
 
Dr Francis gave the following examples of issues she thought could be ethically 
troubling but were outside current practice: 
Oh, you know, things that could potentially affect the germ line in an embryo, 
you know, I mean, god, it‟s like light years away but things like cloning and, 
yeah, things that you know and just being driven at all costs to produce the 
baby without thinking of the long-term affect on that child, you know, both 
emotionally but also physically, you know, changing the kind of genes that 
make up that child, which could potentially then be passed to future 
generations.  I think it‟s right that we‟re quite cautious really. (6-86)  
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Hence, it could be argued that everyday ethical issues could be those that are not, 
now, at the cutting edge of medical science, they arise out of „bread and butter‟ IVF 
practice. These everyday issues might be ones that are familiar and there is a 
reasonable level of broad agreement over how to approach them. There are a range of 
issues that are no longer debated and seen as „ethical issues‟ in everyday infertility 
practice, such as: the morality of the practice of IVF itself; creating and manipulating 
embryos outside the body; the practice of sperm donation itself; and creating a family 
with the assistance of reproductive technologies.
144
 Of course, these issues are still 
debated by some people „outside‟ infertility practice, and people would not work in 
that area if they fundamentally objected to such practices. However, now that 
infertility practice is based on a clear legal framework it could be said that the 
acceptability of reproductive technologies as a legitimate way to form a family has 
entered the settled morality of society in general. 
 
Ethical issues can change their positioning and move from controversial to settled or 
visa versa. There can be movement between controversial and settled morality, an 
issue can start of as part of controversial morality (as most aspects of reproductive 
technologies did)
 
and as it gains greater acceptance become part of the settled 
morality. The changing attitudes towards artificial insemination by donor (AID) and 
sperm donor anonymity is an interesting example of how the ethical issues raised by 
a technique change over time (see Appendix 1).  
 
Thus, what issues are seen as ethically controversial change over time, „what counts 
as an ethical problem in the first place…is socially constructed.‟ (Hedgecoe, 
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2004:126) Ethical issues are entities that arise out of a particular social context 
(Cribb, 2005)
145
 and what is a pressing ethical issue for one generation might not be 
seen as such by another. As Warnock said in her introduction to The Warnock 
Report: 
I do not believe that there is a neat way of marking off moral issues from all 
others; some people, at some times, may regard things as matters of moral right or 
wrong, which at another time or in another place are thought to be matters of 
taste, or indeed matters of no importance at all. (1985:viii) 
 
Some of the informants held this view that contentious ethical issues could change 
over time. 
 
 Dr Vance, for instance, said: 
I mean the whole thing‟s a moveable feast isn‟t it.  I suppose that‟s the other thing 
I‟ve learnt, I mean the ethics of today are not necessarily going to be the ethics of 
tomorrow.  You know, it is quite a bit about, it‟s got to be a shifting sands sort of 
thing.  (22-53) 
 
An example used by two informants, Dr Lovate and Dr Jenson, that illustrates the 
changing status of particular issues, is treating female same-sex couples. Both these 
informants argued that this was no longer an ethically contentious issue and therefore 
did not need to be the subject of ethical debate. Dr Jenson said: 
It‟s changing.  I suppose five-six years ago, same sex couples would have been 
sent to the ethics committee should we treat them.  I am now of the opinion, and 
have been for some time, that a same sex couple doesn‟t need to go to the ethics 
committee. (10-75) 
 
Dr Lovate argued: 
But if you want to know my personal views about that, I would have no hesitation 
in treating a lesbian couple…. But, society has changed and gay couples have 
come out, and I think a quarter of the population are gay and when a child goes to 
school I think that if the child has two mummies rather than a mummy and a 
daddy, I don‟t think it‟ll make a damn of difference to the child‟s acceptance at 
                                                 
145
 See also Haimes (2002) for a discussion of how ethical problems are „produced‟ by social factors. 
 147 
the school.  So I think in a way my views have changed because society has 
changed. (12-8)  
 
The view that there were few troubling ethical issues in everyday practice was an 
unexpected finding, as infertility treatment and reproductive technologies are 
generally seen to be areas where ethical issues arise with great frequency. Seeing the 
informants‟ responses as fitting into either a settled or controversial morality (see 
next section) elucidates something that was initially troubling during the data 
analysis: how can some informants hold both that there are (some/many) ethical 
issues raised by infertility practice and at the same time also find it difficult to think 
of issues that trouble or affect them? Issues that were highlighted can be seen as an 
expression of controversial morality (which was a less frequent occurrence), while 
finding it difficult to think of ethical issues can arguably be seen as an indirect 
articulation of a settled morality. 
 
In the last interview (with Dr Vance) I wanted to reflect back my understanding of 
this to an informant
146
 and solicit his view on this and how he understood this. 
I’ve found from my interviews that while people say there’s lots of 
ethical dilemmas in infertility, when it comes to their everyday practice 
they actually feel quite happy what they’re doing and they seem not to be 
vastly challenged ethically all the time.  
 
Well life would be a bit painful if it was wouldn‟t it really.  I mean what you 
tend to have is little crises every now and again, somebody comes up with 
something new you hadn‟t thought of, because you do tend to make sort of an 
ethical environment you work in and then everything fits in generally, and 
then every now and again somebody comes up with something you really 
hadn‟t thought of before. (22-55) 
 
Thus, it is this ethical environment that the informants work within that is their 
settled morality. The informants‟ view that there were few ethical issues raised by 
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their practice can be seen as an articulation of this settled morality, that they were not 
frequently troubled by ethical issues, is because much of their practice fell into the 
sphere of settled morality.  Further, this settled morality could sometimes been seen 
as an absence of ethical issues, rather than an articulation of ethical issues over which 
there was broad general agreement.
147
  
 
CONTROVERSIAL MORALITY 
 
The ethical issues that informants raised in discussion, controversial morality, will 
now be considered, to provide a backdrop to the kinds of problems and concerns the 
informants thought ethically troubling. As discussed, controversial issues came up 
less frequently. They were issues on which there was less agreement and where there 
was greater uncertainty over what to do. Controversial morality is more easily 
articulated than settled morality – a morality that can be rendered invisible. So by 
setting out what the informants thought to be controversial issues, it is possible – by 
default – to see what their settled morality looked like. 
 
In the interviews an open question was asked, „what issues do you see as ethically 
challenging in your everyday practice?‟148 This gave the informants a free range to 
answer the question in terms of their own priorities and concerns. Hurst, et al (2005) 
argue that allowing informants to articulate what they see as ethically relevant is an 
important way of exploring how ethical issues are actually resolved in practice. This 
eliciting of informants‟ own categories was one of the reasons why a qualitative 
methodology was chosen, rather than conducting a larger scale postal survey that 
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sought responses to pre-set categories and cases chosen by the researcher.
149
 Framing 
the question in this way by asking the informants about their everyday practice was 
designed to focus the discussion more on the routine and possibly mundane aspects 
of practice, rather than asking questions about what issues might be raised by 
reproductive technologies in general. This was intentional as one of the aims of the 
research was to get clinicians‟ responses to build up a picture of how everyday 
practice functioned and its ethical dimensions. The responses to this question (and 
other related questions and probes) are tabulated in Figure 2.
150
  
 
Every informant discussed in detail the ethical problem of trying to ensure welfare of 
the child produced by any infertility treatment (see footnote 13). This was an 
assessment that had to be undertaken when considering all patients for treatment, so 
was an issue that was likely to be frequently encountered. The non-anonymity of 
gamete donors was seen as unethical by 11 informants, largely due to the fall in 
donor numbers since the law was changed to only allow non-anonymous donors in 
2005 (HFEA, 2004). The ethical problems raised by egg sharing were issues over 
which there was little consensus. Some clinics (Clinics 1, 2 & 4) did not have such a 
scheme due to the problems they saw with the egg sharers giving fully, un-coerced 
informed consent. Treating female same-sex couples (SSC) was also an area where 
there was some disagreement and which has, in the past, been the source of great 
controversy (Donovan, 1993). Five of the informants were not happy about treating 
SSC and one informant (Dr Down) would take a request for treatment from this 
group to the CEC. The responses to the issues of egg sharing, donor anonymity and 
the treating of female same sex couples have been tabulated (see Table 2) to give a 
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sense of the concerns that the informants had over these issues. These three issues 
could be said to be clear examples of the issues over which there was little agreement 
amongst the informants.  
 
Some of the issues mentioned such as PGD, the treating of same-sex female couples 
and the treatment of post-menopausal women have received a lot of attention in the 
ethical literature. Others such as age difference between partners, whether to treat 
recipients with health problems and when to stop IVF cycles have received less 
consideration. As an example, it is interesting to contrast the debate over older versus 
post-menopausal mothers. Post-menopausal women require egg donation to achieve 
a pregnancy and therefore can be significantly older than women who can produce 
their own eggs (e.g. the 64 year old British woman who had a baby, although she was 
not treated in this country). Cases such as this have received a lot attention, 
particularly in the media. In contrast, amongst the informants in this study a more 
important concern was the issues raised by women, usually between 40-45, who 
came for IVF (without egg donation). The success rate for these women is so low 
that the informants thought it was unethical to offer them treatment. It was giving 
false hope and, as women in this age group would not receive NHS funding, 
involving them in futile expenditure. Dr Case, for example, summed up the dilemmas 
faced by this group of patients very well: 
The age limit‟s 45 in this clinic.  But, you know, after the age of 42 the chances of 
success are so remote that that in itself is an ethical issue, whether a patient should 
be given hope when there is very little hope.  Whether we should take money off 
them when we know the chances of success is relatively small, you know, and 
even when you discuss those issues and the couple still say we still want to take 
the small chance there is, whether it's right to say, to accept it. (3-62) 
 
Dr Lovate‟s clinic has also discussed whether they should treat this age group: 
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So, the decision was made because we get a lousy pregnancy rate in couples 
with unexplained infertility where the woman is 40 years or older, the policy 
of the clinic is that we don‟t treat those patients.(12-18)151 
 
He went on to explain why this policy had created a dilemma for his clinic: 
 
But what happens if - and this is exactly what happened - if a woman comes 
and she‟s met someone last year but she doesn‟t ovulate.  So her fertility has 
never been tested but she‟s never ovulated, she‟s only recently married, she 
doesn‟t ovulate, so she might be very fertile, there are lots of women of 40 
who are very fertile, so this is a situation where the dilemma was well, should 
we go against our policy and treat this particular patient because she might be 
pregnant, if you induce ovulation she might fall pregnant with the first 
ovulatory cycle.  Now, that issues was discussed six months ago and we 
didn‟t minute what we decided, so when the same issue came up a second 
time with another patient, half the people remembered one thing and the other 
half remembered something else. (12-20) 
  
 
Therefore, this issue is both less dramatic and news worthy but, nevertheless, an 
issue that troubled the informants more than the issue of post-menopausal women 
seeking egg donation. 
 
Categorising ethical issues 
 
There is a debate to be had over precisely how to categorise different cases and 
points into distinct „ethical issues‟. Although a commentary on how the categories 
were formulated is included in Appendix 7, there is clearly over-lap between 
different issues. When informants talked about particular cases they often raised a 
number of inter-related ethical issues and therefore these could have been categorised 
in a number of ways. For example, many cases could be reduced to welfare of the 
child considerations, but could also include concern for the health status of the 
person undergoing treatment and the impact of gamete donation on the couple. 
Further, such placing of issues into different categories could be viewed to be putting 
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pre-conceived and artificial categories onto the data (Strauss & Corbin,1998), as 
every issue in some senses presents its own unique ethical dimensions. As Hedgecoe 
notes applied ethics often, „assumes that social reality cleaves down neat 
philosophical lines, with theoretical categories matching those in social reality.‟ 
(2004:130) Hence, the listing of ethical issues does not provide an unproblematic 
reflection of what ethical issues the informants raised. However, in the ensuing 
discussions the kinds of issues and areas that the informants found troubling will 
come out in relief when the question of how they managed and resolved such 
tensions is discussed. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
This chapter has been an attempt to set out the endoxa, map the moral terrain in the 
form of a sociology of ethics to get a detailed perspective on how the informants saw 
the place of ethical issues in their practice. Not only this, the terrain was analysed 
using the tools of ethical theory (in Caplan‟s sense, see Chapter Three) to illuminate 
the way the informants‟ thought about ethical issues. This was done by developing a 
theory of „settled‟ morality that arose from the data. It was argued that the informants 
operated, largely, within an area that could be defined as a „settled morality‟. 
Subsequently, a broad overview of the issues that they found troubling was given, to 
provide a backdrop to later discussions. The next chapter will consider how the 
informants managed and resolved ethical issues and difficult cases in their practice.  
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TABLE 2 
 
VIEWS ON THE CONTESTED ETHICAL ISSUES 
 
 
 
Clinician Egg Sharing Treating same-sex female 
couples (SSC) 
Anonymous gamete 
donation 
1 - Dr Adams 
 
Not at moment Yes, some in unit disagree and opt 
out 
For anonymous donation 
2 – Dr Brown 
 
Doesn‟t do the donated gametes in 
that clinic 
Yes happy with it For anonymous donation 
3 – Dr Case Yes – but aware of the pitfalls No, very morally against 
 
In favour of anonymity – but in 
favour of telling the child 
4 – Dr Down 
 
No – very against as thinks women 
are being in effect forced into it 
called it an abomination 
In NHS hasn‟t treated, nothing 
against it in principle, but would take 
a request to the ethics committee 
Against anonymity – and would 
actively encourage recipients to tell 
the child. All members of Clinic 1 
were 
5 – Dr Evens 
 
Not keen Not keen, thought each request 
should be treated on a case by case 
basis (although mentioned research 
to say children did less well in such 
families) 
Against anonymity – very in favour 
of the child knowing and non-
anonymity.  
6 – Dr Francis 
 
Not keen As a NHS clinic didn‟t do it, but 
happy in principle 
Against anonymity – and would 
actively encourage recipients to tell 
the child 
7- Dr Grant 
 
Has no objection to egg sharing Happy to treat SSC Against anonymity – wouldn‟t treat 
if the recipients were not going to tell 
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the child 
8- Dr Havers 
 
* Did not treat SSC, clinic policy and 
happy with that 
For anonymity, but also favoured a 
double-track system (of allowing 
both anonymous and non-anonymous 
donation) 
9 – Dr Iniman Against, as sees it as a form of 
coercion 
 
Happy to treat, but would prioritise 
sub-fertile heterosexual couples first 
Against anonymity – in favour of 
disclosure to children 
10- Dr Jenson 
 
Has no objection to egg sharing – if 
managed appropriately 
 
Treats and is happy to  In favour of anonymity due to sperm 
shortages 
11 – Dr Kilm 
 
No objection to egg sharing Their unit does not do donor sperm 
privately and NHS doesn‟t fund SSC, 
and he is not in favour of treating 
them. 
For anonymity – doesn‟t see reason 
for knowing donor identity and 
concerned over the fall in numbers, 
change in the law is „appalling‟ 
12 –  Dr 
Lovate 
 
* Unit doesn‟t as NHS but would be 
happy to treat 
Against anonymity – thinks it 
important children know, if numbers 
can be kept up 
13 – Dr Marsh 
 
* * Against – but thinks that not having 
any system for ensuring child is told 
makes it meaningless 
14 – Dr 
Novack 
 
Clinic does not do egg sharing, that 
is a clinic policy that he endorses 
Treats SSC In principle against anonymity, in 
practice in favour due to fall in donor 
numbers  
15 – Dr Orben 
 
No objection to egg sharing Treats SSC Against anonymity – important 
things are out in the open 
16 – Dr Percy 
 
Clinic does not do egg sharing Thinks in this day and age ok to treat 
SSC 
For anonymity, thinks donors should 
be uninvolved, but should tell the 
child how they were conceived 
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17 – Dr Quest 
 
 
Not keen on egg sharing 
 
No objection to treating 
 
For anonymity, as fall in donors and 
no need for the child to know 
 
18 – Dr Robin 
 
Disagrees with egg sharing No objection to treating  For anonymity, does not see why the 
child should know, thinks it makes it 
all too complex 
19 – Dr Street Disagrees with egg sharing Her Unit treats SSC 
 
For anonymity but thinks couples 
should be open with the child 
 
20 – Mr Tarn 
 
Against egg sharing, sees it as selling 
eggs which is wrong 
Very uncomfortable about SSC, 
doesn‟t treat 
 
For anonymity thinks the law change 
is dreadful 
21 – Dr Urban 
 
* * Ambivalent  
22- Dr Vance 
 
Against egg sharing, sees it as selling 
eggs, but might do it in the future, 
due to changes in anonymity law 
Happy to treat  Against, felt very passionately that 
children should be able to find out 
the identity of their donor.  
 
* Any gaps in the Table indicate that the informant did not mention this issue in the interview. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
 
THE MAKING OF ETHICAL DECISIONS 
 
We try and discuss as much as possible if there are sticky cases between ourselves at our 
meetings that we hold weekly, or on a regular basis, to take things forward, see what other 
people feel about the same situation.  And yes, the decisions are never right or wrong, it‟s just 
probably best to get the group views, a consensus view of what everyone feels about the 
subject of a difficult case. Dr Marsh (13-3) 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
One of the main aims of this research project was to gain insight into the way 
clinicians actually make ethical decisions.
152
 The previous chapter discussed how 
the informants thought about the ethical issues that arose in their practice and 
what these troubling and difficult ethical issues were. This chapter will examine 
how the informants approached and dealt with controversial ethical issues in 
their practice. After seeing what happens in practice I go on to develop a theory 
of consensus based on the data and the ethical literature. 
 
First, I will argue that the attempt to formulate some form of consensus was a 
central aim of the informants‟ decision-making processes. Second, ways the 
clinicians managed disagreement in practice will be discussed, looking at what 
happened if agreement could not be reached. I then use my findings to refine a 
theory of consensus, which is more closely tailored to the specific situation. 
Finally, a deviant case to this analysis will be considered as a way of showing 
that the consensus model of decision-making was the dominant way that the 
informants conceptualised their approach to ethical decision-making. An 
evaluation and critique of this form of decision-making will be undertaken in the 
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next chapter, the purpose of the current chapter is to demonstrate how the 
clinicians actually made ethical decisions.  
 
HOW THEY MADE DECISIONS 
Traditionally many ethical theories have put the locus of decision-making on to the 
individual.
153
 This model of how ethical decisions are made is that of the 
autonomous individual thinking through a moral problem and reaching a decision 
they believe to be right. This study found that in infertility practice this was rarely 
the case. A predominant theme in the data was that ethical decisions were, largely, 
seen as the kind of decision that should be made by a group of people reaching some 
form of consensus. Twenty-one of the twenty-two informants said that they would 
not take a decision on a difficult case alone and would want to involve colleagues in 
the making of that decision. Ethical decisions were best taken by a group or number 
of colleagues, a single individual making such a decision would be seen as highly 
inappropriate – that was not how ethical decision-making was approached by the 
informants. 
 
The involvement of colleagues in difficult decisions did not generally take place in 
an ad hoc, informal way dependent on the individual doctor, but was part of a 
formalised system. Most infertility treatment is provided by relatively small clinics 
or units,
154
 and even the largest units in urban teaching hospitals may only have three 
or four consultants working in them. Every unit that was visited had a regular unit 
meeting where all members of staff (doctors, nurses, embryologists and in most cases 
the counsellors) would discuss any problematic cases. This was the first port of call 
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for most of the units to discuss ethically difficult cases. The majority of the units also 
had access to some form of CEC and used them for a number of reasons to support 
and aid their decision-making.
155
 Only one unit, Clinic 5, which had a CEC 
specifically set up for their unit, saw this committee as the main forum where ethical 
cases were discussed. Dr Brown said: 
I mean if I saw a patient in my clinic on Thursday who I thought there was an 
ethical issue round this patient being treated here, then I would take that to the 
Ethics Committee, I wouldn‟t go and ask my colleagues about it, because all 
you‟ll get is a number of, you‟ll get polarised views one way or the other. (2-
71) 
Dr Urban, who also worked in this unit, agreed with this and thought that ethical 
issues should be discussed in the CEC rather than the general clinic meeting. 
However, the CEC decisions were then discussed at the Unit meeting to make sure 
the rest of the team were happy with them. 
 
Most informants, however, thought that the clinic meeting was the most useful 
place to discuss ethical issues and generally this was where decisions were taken 
and cases resolved. Hence, these meetings were not just discussion forums – they 
were places where decisions were actually made. Dr Francis outlined how her 
unit approached decision-making and stressed that they would come to a unit 
decision about a particular case: 
We have a meeting every week, which isn‟t an ethical committee, it‟s our 
clinical meeting, anybody, that anybody feels, any patient that we feel is 
slightly, with whatever issue they go to that meeting, and we discuss it 
between us. Or, god, I‟m trying to think of things, people who we‟re not 
sure of, you know, about cohabitation, we basically bring it all together, 
and we would all decide.  Or if there‟s somebody that we thought oh 
actually shall we give them a go at IVF…. and we would very much 
come to a kind of unit decision really. (6-39) 
                                                 
155
 See Chapter Nine for a detailed discussion of the use of ethics committees. In this Chapter the 
underlying principles of their ethical decision-making will be considered incorporating both the 
informants use of unit meetings and CEC.  
 160 
Dr Orben made a similar point: 
We always take decisions collectively, but, as I say, we reach a consensus view as 
to the way forward. (15-6) 
Dr Quest: 
I think that in all ethical problems it‟s not good to make the decision alone, you 
need to have meetings, committees or whatever, but you need to have at least five 
or six different opinions. (17-33) 
 
Dr Marsh: 
We try and discuss as much as possible if there are sticky cases between 
ourselves at our meetings that we hold [weekly], or on a regular basis, to take 
things forward, see what other people feel about the same situation. (13-3)  
 
Dr Jenson: 
I think fertility and ethics, we are dealing with probably the most important part of 
medicine, in my view, or ethically important part of medicine and I don‟t think it 
can be approached by individuals, it has to be a group thing because we all have 
your prejudices, even though we like to think we‟re all good honest people, but 
there are things that I approve of and don‟t approve of, and only by taking into 
account a lot of people‟s feelings do we get it right.  (10-68) 
The decision to refuse treatment to a couple or individual was almost always taken 
by a unit or a CEC. For instance, Dr Adams said, „Yes, so nobody‟s refused 
treatment without going - well, refusing to treat is done by the Ethics Committee.‟ 
(1-76) Dr Jenson said if treatment were refused the letter would come from the unit 
rather than one individual. Dr Novack also made this point: 
If it‟s a positive response I won‟t belabour the thing, I just say sure, we‟ll 
treat you.  If it‟s a negative response I would usually say to them, and have 
this in writing, that your case was discussed at a meeting of our unit, present 
at which were - and I won‟t list the names but I‟ll say X number of doctors, 
nurses or whatever, and this is our decision, and you have a right to appeal if 
you like. (14-13)  
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Dr Jenson recognised that this might be seen as a way of hiding behind the 
group, but justified it on the following grounds: 
That may be hiding behind a faceless organisation saying the Unit says no, 
but I think it does show that you‟ve taken a lot of other people‟s opinions into 
account, rather than sending the patient to five different people you‟ve sat 
down together and a multi-disciplinary approach is important in fertility 
treatment. (10-37) 
 
It was not only doctors who were involved in making difficult or contentious 
decisions. There was a strong emphasis on the importance of involving other 
professions and disciplines so that decisions were not made solely by doctors but 
by members of a multi-disciplinary team.
156
 Twenty of the informants thought 
that getting the views of other professions (rather than just medics) was very 
important when making difficult decisions. Dr Percy made this point very 
clearly: 
I mean I certainly think the first port of call should always be the 
multidisciplinary team, and more and more medicine now is multidisciplinary 
which, you know, the opinion of our nurses and HCAs [health care assistants] 
to me is just as important as the consultant who‟s been here for a long 
time….So I think it is appropriate that we should seek opinions from other, 
you know, not just doctors talking to doctors, I think you‟ve got to involve 
other people.  And also, especially with things like fertility, obstetrics, nurses 
and midwives are independent practitioners and they‟re going to be involved 
in the care in just the same way as another doctor is, so they have a right to be 
able to say I‟m happy with this or I‟m not happy with it. (16-46) 
 
Counsellors were thought to be particularly important as they often had more 
contact with the patients and were able to shed light on areas that the doctors had 
not been able to uncover. Drs Grant, Jenson, and Evens specifically mentioned 
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the benefits of working in and as a team. Dr Grant indicated the benefits of 
having a widely discussed decision: 
Obviously we‟ve got lay157 people as well, and you learn from non-medical 
people how to approach a case, or why sometimes you as a doctor could be 
advised by certain things.  Other lay people in the committee could help you 
to look at things from a different perspective and different side.  And I believe 
personally in teamwork, and teamwork in this case is then all members of the 
team have something to say, have a say, and in the ethics committee it‟s not 
one person deciding but just a group reaching a conclusion. (7-25) 
Dr Jenson: 
 
so the counsellors‟ opinions are incredibly important, the embryologists and 
nurses.  The nurses who see patients on a day-to-day basis are incredibly 
important because they know far more than me.  Patients come in and see the 
man in the suit in best behaviour but actually will unload things to the nurses 
who they feel more at home with.  And that‟s what I like about this type of 
medicine is that you do have a group of people that you can sit down and 
bounce ideas off and you're not alone. (10-40) 
 
Dr Evens, in answering a question on how she made ethical decisions, said: 
Looking at case conferences in relation to a particular couple and trying to 
look at it from different angles, and obviously getting the background of 
social workers‟ views, counsellors‟ views, psychiatrists‟ views, physicians‟ 
views, across the board.(5-73) 
 
Dr Novack stressed that in his unit everyone felt they could play a part in decision-
making and that they worked in a very inclusive environment: 
We‟re actually quite a close-knit clinic even though we‟re a very big clinic. 
… We‟re quite a social clinic, we go out with the team a lot, so there‟s 
always somebody either going off on maternity leave or leave, coming and 
going, whatever, a big Christmas do, various do‟s throughout the year.  So 
we‟re on first name terms with everybody, there‟s a hierarchy but not an 
overt hierarchy, and I think the atmosphere amongst the staff is reasonably 
informal. (14-57) 
 
 
 
                                                 
157
 Dr Grant is referring here to lay people on his CEC. 
 163 
High levels of agreement 
The majority of informants gave accounts of the high levels of agreement between 
members of the team.
158
 Dr Orben, for instance, who had been working in the area of 
infertility for 24 years and said: 
But, as I say, we reach a consensus view as to the way forward. 
Has it ever happened that there’s been a difficulty in reaching that 
consensus? 
Very infrequently.  One or two cases in, and how long have we been doing it 
here?  Well, I think I started my infertility practice in, I came in „85 and I 
think within a year it was up and running.  So in 20 years of practice here, 
probably the number of cases where we‟ve had to really scratch our heads 
and think you could count on the fingers on one hand. (15-7) 
 
Dr Iniman said when talking about if she and her colleagues ever disagreed over 
particular cases: 
Well, it wouldn‟t be very frequent.  I can only think of one example, which 
was a transsexual couple, but I‟m struggling to remember the details actually. 
(9-53) 
 
Dr Robin, who had been working in her clinic for two years said: 
I mean within the past two years I don‟t think there‟s ever been a situation 
where we disagreed. (18-12) 
 
And Dr Novack, who was the head of this clinic, reiterated this view: 
Yes. I mean I don‟t know if we have - I‟m trying to think.  We don‟t tend to 
have major disagreements.  [Mobile phone interruption].  Sorry, how do we 
manage disagreements?  Well, we talk things through.  As I said, I don‟t think 
we have any really. (14-26) 
 
                                                 
158
 See Chapter Six for the discussion of settled morality that could account for these levels of 
agreement. 
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Dr Kilm made the point that practice is „probably fairly standard‟ across units,159 so 
the consensus could extend beyond the individual clinic to infertility practice in 
general: 
I don‟t imagine that there are such major significant differences between 
units. I‟d be surprised if there were.  Because I think that‟s the thing, that‟s 
probably because, that‟s probably the thing that comes out when you go to 
meetings and you all get together and you hear everyone has the same sorts of 
problems and they're dealing with the same sorts of issues, and they're 
probably more or less dealing with them in fairly similar ways. (11-51) 
When asked to account for this level of agreement, informants gave the following 
responses. Dr Grant thought there was a professional construction of common views: 
I think we tend to agree on most of the ethical issues… 
So, I mean you said most of the time you agree, why do you think you agree? 
Well we agree because I think we‟ve got, well I think the main reason why 
we agree is because in the UK the HFEA regulates the fertility treatment, and 
so we‟ve got some sort of standard guidelines.  The other reason, because I 
think we all are from the same background in terms of accepting patients for 
treatment and we all agree on the same principles.  (7-35) 
Here Dr Grant explicitly said that he thought that he and his colleagues shared the 
same principles and that this formed the basis for their high levels of agreement.
160
 
He went on to say, „And, as I say, what makes it easier is the fact that HFEA has got 
the standard of practice or a code of practice which we all look at.‟ (7-39) Dr Robin 
also talked about „HFEA ethics‟ as something that could be referred to and used to 
inform decisions (18-17). 
Informants also looked to colleagues and others in their profession to formulate their 
views.  
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 It must be noted, however, that as discussed in Chapter Six practice is not always the same across 
different units, i.e. some units did not treat same sex-couples. 
160
 See discussion in Chapter Eight on the values of the medical profession. 
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Dr Evens, in answering a question on how she made ethical decisions, said: 
Well, it‟s experience in actually looking at other people in the profession 
when you‟re going to meetings or to HFEA conferences or doing inspections 
at the HFEA, and seeing how things are managed, and actually looking at 
case conferences in relation to a particular couples. (5-73) 
This pointed to how she went about forming her own opinions on a particular case 
and how she looked to other units and opinions expressed at conferences to gauge the 
„general view‟ or approach to a particular issues. The informants used the clinic 
meetings and discussions to help them formulate their opinions and responses to 
particular cases and often their opinions could be influenced and changed by 
discussions at the meetings. Dr Grant made this point: 
Obviously, as often happens, you vote for it and see what the people think is 
the best thing.  But I must say that I‟ve never been involved in any case 
where there was not unanimity, so even people, or perhaps myself when 
you‟re not quite convinced about one aspect of what‟s going to happen or 
which kind of decision you have to make, perhaps thinking about it and 
listening to other people have made me change my mind. (7-26) 
 
 Dr Percy said: 
I think it‟s very useful.  I think it‟s very useful and I think, I mean I‟ve 
certainly found myself, I mean I think of myself as being quite broad minded 
but I‟m sometimes surprised when I‟m actually talking about things.  I think 
gosh, actually that‟s quite narrow minded, or I hadn‟t considered it in that 
viewpoint and, yes, now I see you say that, yes, actually maybe the decision I 
made was wrong and I would rather change my mind on that one.  So I find 
talking about things quite helpful.  I think it clarifies what the issues are, 
because I think very often with these cases, the issues are more than just what 
meets the eye. (16-42)  
 
Dr Quest put the point like this: 
Yes, yes.  But as I said, again, it‟s important to have this clinic or team meetings, 
because you can have different points of view. So in order to make the right 
decision you need to have all the points of view, to take all the views and make 
the right decision.  So it‟s - if you take the decision alone, I think most of the time 
you‟re going to fail.  You need to have all the points, you need to see the black, 
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the white, the pink, the green and the red, all the colours in order to make the right 
decision. (17-33) 
Informants looked to colleagues to check that their ethical views were „acceptable‟. 
Dr Tarn also stressed the importance of finding out the consensus on ethical 
problems:  
I think the basis of my ethical outlook is if I do have absolutely clear 
views on any one specific situation, I would certainly see what other 
people think about it before imparting my views.  My views are that on 
any one ethical problem, to see whether I was the odd one out or the odd 
one or within the group.  But within that, when you talk to people, some 
will disagree with what you say, but they might be the odd one out, it‟s 
others, you need to decide what is the reasonable and what is the normal 
ethical approach to this, or the sensible ethical approach to this particular 
issue, without being an extremist or maverick or a fascist or, you know. 
(20-32) 
Dr Percy also said: 
Because again, it‟s all about getting - I suppose really, most of the discussion 
is actually about making sure you‟ve got a sensible considered majority 
opinion, that a sensible considered majority of people think that we should 
not be treating or we should be treating.  I guess it‟s sort of safety in numbers 
and reassuring yourself that your line of thinking is not way out there and that 
this is acceptable.  I mean let‟s face it, most things we do in our society are 
based on laws and laws are passed by a majority.  That‟s sort of how we work 
in our society, so I think it‟s a good way of doing it.  (16-40) 
 
Thus, the clinic meetings and CECs were the ways the informants used not only to 
check and validate their opinions, but also as ways of developing and constructing 
their responses to a particular situation. As Dr Marsh put it, „And yes, the decisions 
are never right or wrong, it‟s just probably best to get the group views, a consensus 
view of what everyone feels about the subject of a difficult case.‟ (13-3) 
 
MANAGING DISAGREEMENT 
 
While the dominant theme in the way that the informants talked about making 
ethical decisions was that they generally managed to reach an agreement, that a 
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consensus could be formulated, some informants mentioned disagreements 
taking place in the unit meetings and thus a consensus could not be reached. For 
example, disagreement over a particular case was a reason why some informants 
said that they used their CEC. Dr Marsh gave this as a reason for using, what was 
in his clinic, a Clinical Ethics Group: 
There will be areas where we will disagree, and there will be a debate.  It‟s just in 
those, if there‟s a big disagreement then, obviously, our effects are very grave, 
you can seek help from the local ethical committees, or every institution has got 
its ethical committee, or you can discuss it with an ethicist just to tease out the 
…(13-10) 
In the same unit Dr Iniman also stated that if it was a „moot‟ decision they would 
take it to the ethics group (9-35).
161
 
 
The main „tactic‟ employed if a consensus of opinion could not be reached over a 
particular case was conscientious objection. This was used, often as a last resort, to 
manage disagreement. There is a conscientious objection clause in the 1990 Act. „No 
person who has a conscientious objection to participating in any activity governed by 
this Act shall be under any duty, however arising, to do so.‟ (Section 38 (1)). How 
far this extends and what activities can be covered by this clause is unclear (Morgan 
& Lee, 1990). Riley argues that it would not cover doctors refusing to treat particular 
individuals or patient groups on the grounds of personal prejudice (2007:88). 
However, the informants used conscientious objection to justify opting out of 
treating particular cases and individuals for reasons that might be construed as 
prejudicial.   
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 See Chapter Nine for a detailed discussion of the use of CECs. 
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Dr Iniman recounted one of few times she could remember having any 
disagreement with colleagues about a treatment decision: 
I can only think of one example, which was a transsexual couple, but I‟m 
struggling to remember the details actually.
162
  Anyway, I wasn‟t at all 
happy about it but some of my colleagues were.  So we kind of amicably 
decided that people who weren‟t happy didn‟t need to have any 
involvement in that particular couple‟s treatment.  I don‟t think it came 
through in the end, but that‟s the only example I can think of where my 
feelings differed from some of the other people within the department. 
So you can have a sort of opt, there is enough of you to opt out if 
there is a situation where … 
Yes. (9-55) 
Here the substance of the disagreement was not resolved, Dr Iniman did not 
change her mind nor was she persuaded of the morality of taking on that 
particular case. Rather, it was managed in practice by Dr Iniman opting out of 
treating that couple. Dr Iniman‟s unit was a relatively big one and it was possible 
for a doctor to opt out of a particular treatment if they were unhappy about it. In 
smaller units this opting out took a different form. Dr Case for instance felt very 
strongly that he did not agree with treating female same-sex couples, and 
discussed how they approached the decision over whether to treat such couples. 
I mean because presumably there’s small numbers of staff here, its a 
relatively small clinic?  Do you all sit round and discuss issues? 
It is relatively small.  Yes, we do discuss and we've asked each other, you 
know, how do you feel about treating in this situation and that situation, 
and we respect one another‟s views really.  If we were a larger clinic with 
a larger number of staff, where some might express an objection on 
conscience grounds or ethical grounds for a particular treatment situation 
you‟ve got another member of staff you can call on who would be happy.  
So you can absorb that sort of difference of opinion.  In a small clinic you 
can‟t really do that very well. (3-9) 
                                                 
162
 I have left out the details of this case, as Dr Iniman said it was a unique case and therefore any 
details might identify the couple. Further, the details of the case are not crucial for the point I am 
making here. 
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He went on to say that although the other clinician who worked in his unit was 
happy to treat same-sex couples, the unit had decided not to treat. The reasons 
for this were: first, such a small unit could not offer appropriate support to such a 
couple with effectively 50% of the clinical staff; and second, „but partly because 
they respect my position on it and they feel that we want to stay together as a 
clinic and work together with the same outlook.‟ (3-35) Here some sense of a 
unit ethos was invoked:
163
 that it is important to maintain a team approach to 
care. Despite feeling strongly about not treating same-sex couples Dr Case 
thought that, „if you feel uncomfortable about the situation in which we‟re being 
asked to treat it‟s better if they move on to another centre that would say yes and 
they feel okay about it.‟ (3-72) This was a common approach; Dr Jenson also 
made this point: 
if we say we don‟t feel comfortable about treating you and we will refer 
you on to A N Other and always giving people an option to try 
somewhere else. (10-36) 
This reflects the view that these kind of moral judgements are seen as personal 
ones. That is, the clinicians are not saying that the couple or person should not be 
treated at all, or that a particular procedure should never be carried out – they are 
saying that they do not want to do it themselves. This largely locates their 
morality as a personal one of what they will or won‟t do, rather than what should 
be done by the wider community of medics. This embodies the view that they do 
not have the „right‟ to impose that view on others (either their colleagues or 
patients).
164
 The use of conscientious objection as a tool for managing clinical 
disagreements could also be attributable to the informants‟ backgrounds in 
gynaecology, where there is perhaps the archetypal example of conscientious 
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 See Chapter Six for a discussion of the clinic ethos. 
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 This point will be developed Chapter Eight. 
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objection in not performing abortions. Conscientious objection gave a practical 
solution to intractable cases of disagreement. Dr Adams sums this point up when 
he said: 
Yes, it‟s a bit like abortionists isn‟t it.  Not all gynaecologists have to do 
abortions, so we don‟t force anybody to do anything they don‟t want to 
do. (1-50) 
 
It must be stressed that disagreement over ethical issues was not generally 
mentioned by the informants and although conscientious objection was seen as a 
way of managing disputes, in practice is was not something that happened 
regularly.
165
 Dr Novack, while mentioning conscientious objection as a possible 
way of managing different views in practice, said: 
And, of course, every member of the team, if they strongly disagree with 
a particular treatment plan, are not obliged to be involved, engaged in the 
treatment of that couple, so they have the right not to.  Although actually 
we‟ve never really had those sorts of issues.   
Right, but it’s.. 
Yes, we‟ve never had anybody say no, I‟m not going to be involved in the 
treatment of the couple. (14-24) 
Therefore, although conscientious objection was a possible option when agreement 
could not be reached, it was not one that, in practice, was often used.  
 
Conscientious objection was a tactic for managing disagreement in the clinic and for 
certain types of situations it was successful. If a doctor did not want to treat a certain 
group, as in the case of Dr Case, he could get his clinic to agree that they would not 
treat as a matter of clinic policy. In a way the whole clinic conscientiously objects. 
Dr Case‟s ethical view on treatment of same-sex couples was respected. In contrast, 
in a situation where a doctor was happy to treat a particular group and their 
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 See discussion above on „high levels of agreement‟. 
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colleagues disagreed there could be a situation where someone‟s views had to be 
subjugated. Dr Grant, who was happy to treat same-sex couples was not able, due to 
his clinic as a whole not wishing to treat, to treat that group, his views in this sense 
were not respect. However, Dr Grant he did not seen unduly concerned about this: 
But you’ll wait until your colleagues, until everyone in your unit agrees 
before doing it? 
Yes, I think, I believe in the teamwork and team decisions so we cannot take 
different decisions on different patients. 
If someone else in the unit wasn’t happy with treating couples like that, 
you would go along with that decision, you’d be happy to abide by that? 
Yes until, as I say, until a unanimous decision is taken, yes. (7-74) 
 
A similar situations happened with Dr Vance quoted below (22-57), however he was 
also happy to accept the majority view and move on. Thus, this way of managing 
disagreement allowed people to opt out of an activity if they felt sufficiently strongly 
but did not necessarily enable people to positively do something if they wished. 
 
GROUP DYNAMICS 
This portrayal of ethical decision-making being made by the group and on the 
general basis of consensus is possibly a representation of an ideal type of decision-
making. As discussed in Chapter Four, the data is seen as the informants‟ account of 
their practice, how they represent and account for their actions. As I did not do any 
observations in the clinics it is not possible to compare this to what „really‟ 
happened. However, interviewing informants from the same clinic enabled me to 
gain a sense of how that clinic made ethical decisions. The informants discussed how 
sometimes a decision might be reached that was not a consensus of the whole group. 
Group dynamics could mean that everyone‟s opinion was not always heard or taken 
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into account. Clinic meetings were not perfect democracies where all members 
debated freely and all views were equally respected.  Power relations within the 
clinics, therefore, played a role in how decisions were made. Dr Lovate said:  
To some extent, we do have senior people and junior people at the meeting 
and I think, at the end of the day, decisions are usually accepted if most of the 
senior people are in favour of a particular issue.‟ (12-16).  
 
Dr Novack also mentioned that clinic meetings were not perfect forums and some 
people might talk louder and be more dominant in discussion. 
It‟s an interesting one because team meetings, sometimes it could be a 
question of who speaks the loudest, and we do have one or two sort of quite 
vocal self-assured young embryologists, for example, who may not 
necessarily have lived life broadly or have a feeling of the ways of the world, 
and are not necessarily seeing patients in clinics in the way that I do day to 
day, and the clinicians and nurses and, of course, counsellors are dealing with 
all sorts of scenarios.  And you can have people who are little bit quiet who 
don‟t say anything. (14-23). 
 
The structure of medical responsibility also meant that the final decision would 
always have to be taken by a particular consultant and this point came out very 
forcibly when interviewing sub-speciality trainees at Clinic Four (Drs Quest, Robin, 
and Street). These doctors said that as trainees they would not take any decisions 
themselves. However, their clinic meetings were a place where a process of dialogue 
took place, a process of consensus making, and the consultant would take the 
decision on the basis of that discussion. As the head of Clinic 4 said, „it‟s a pseudo-
democracy because more often than not, actually, on talking things through we reach 
a consensus.‟ (14-23) So, although the consultant made the actual decision, that 
decision would be taken on the basis of the deliberations that took place in the 
meeting and with the agreement of the team. Dr Jenson sums up this point when he 
said: 
But I know that an inclusive unit where everybody‟s opinion is equal is a much 
happier unit than one where somebody saying you do as I say because I'm in 
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charge.  Although I don‟t like management by a committee.  Eventually the buck 
has to stop with somebody, but if people feel included in the decision-making 
process it works a lot better, and that‟s simple management I think. (10-47) 
 
Therefore, as far as possible there was an emphasis on group rather than individual 
decisions. The informants, generally, saw their ethical decision-making as something 
that was best tackled by a group. The informants couched their decision-making in 
terms of reaching a group decision (consensus) and the corresponding group 
responsibility for that decision. In this way it is clear that the locus of decision-
making was seen as the unit rather than the individual. 
 
THEORIES OF CONSENSUS  
Having considered how the informants made and approached ethical decisions, a 
definition of consensus can be formulated – one that is based on how the informants, 
implicitly, defined their notion of consensus decision-making and drawing on the 
ethical literature in this area. This is using the data to develop ethical theory, as 
discussed in Chapter Three, a close attention to actual practice can aid in refining and 
developing ethical theory and principles. Philosophical discussions can help clarify 
meanings, terminology and advance important distinctions between different forms 
of consensus decision-making. The data can not only show how in practice consensus 
decision-making was seen by the informants but also elucidate these philosophical 
distinctions, to see if they are meaningful in practice and point out other facets and 
aspects that may be lacking in the theory. Hence, this theory of consensus is 
developed not solely by considering the philosophical literature on the subject but 
also by examining how the notion is used and formulated in practice. 
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The role consensus plays in moral deliberations has increasingly become a topic of 
discussion for bioethicists, with John Rawl‟s A Theory of Justice bringing the 
concept of consensus into general debate (Hester, 2002). There have been various 
edited collections on the role of consensus in bioethics (Ten Have & Sass, 1998. 
Bayertz, 1994) and special editions of journals (Journal of Medicine & Philosophy, 
1991. Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics, 2002). Moreno has noted that, 
„appeals to consensus are so common, and the relations embodied in consensus so 
ubiquitous, that we have become largely inured to them.‟ (1995:3) However, there is 
no consensus over definitions of consensus (Engelhardt, 1994. Trotter, 2002). I shall 
first outline the debate in the bioethics literature about definitions of consensus and 
then advance a definition that is based on the literature and the way the informants in 
this study made their ethical decisions. Whether this is an ethically acceptable way of 
making such decisions will be discussed in the next chapter. 
 
Consensus as a process 
A key issue in the philosophical debate over definitions of consensus decision-
making is whether consensus is seen as a process (Moreno, 1995. Jennings, 1991. 
Spicker, 1998) or as a resting state of opinion (Caws, 1991. Trotter, 2002). For the 
latter position consensus is reached when a decision is made that all agree with and 
the focus is on the decision reached, the product of the deliberations. Caws argues 
that consensus involves, „something more than acquiescence or compromise,‟ 
therefore consensus should involve, „agreement of opinion on the part of all 
concerned.‟ (1991:378) The focus for these accounts is agreement over the 
substantive ethical issue, the product of the deliberation. 
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In the process accounts, rather than everyone having to agree to a substantive ethical 
conclusion, a resting state of opinion, lack of serious dissent is enough to call 
something a consensus (Moreno, 1995). This account of consensus attends just as 
much to the process of decision-making as the product of that deliberation. Process 
and outcome are seen as part and parcel of the same entity. Moreno argues that 
making a distinction between the process (the way the decision was made) and the 
product (the actual decision) is unwarranted and such a distinction, „is no longer 
taken to be decisive in contemporary philosophy….At least in the realm of actual 
social practices,...it is patent that the admission of intellectual arguments as sound is 
itself an unavoidably social process.‟ (1995:44) Therefore, in Moreno‟s account the 
process of decision-making, the way the decision was made, is inextricably linked to 
whether the decision is thought to be acceptable. For instance, in public life decisions 
are often defended on the grounds that they were made in an unbiased way
166
 and if 
the way that the decision was made was thought to be corrupted in some way then, 
„this is widely taken as a prima facie reason to think that the result of that process is 
likely to erroneous in some way.‟ (Moreno, 1995:44)  
 
This notion of consensus as a process has been criticised,
167
 the main issue is that it is 
contended that there is a difference between procedural and substantive consensus 
and what is at the heart of debates over consensus is the means and possibilities of 
getting a consensus over substantive issues.
168
 Caws makes much of the distinction 
between procedural and substantive consensus, arguing that the latter is what is 
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 See also Trotter (2002). 
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 There is a large literature on consensual rationality and how groups make decisions that cannot be 
considered here. See Caws (1991) for a broad overview of the debate. 
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important and this is what marks a „genuine‟ form of consensus. „If the process is to 
have any chance of converging there should form the beginning be some degree of 
substantive consensus as well. (1991:382)  
 
This account of the importance of a process of consensus decision-making was 
something that was mirrored in the data. The informants were, arguably, concerned 
about the process rather than the product, the outcome of the deliberations. They did 
not argue that what they had decided was incontrovertibly „right‟, but that they had 
followed an appropriate process of decision-making. Moreno makes this point, „[t]he 
point of ethical deliberation is not to reach consensus but to attain a desirable end, an 
end that settles controversy without further disagreement.‟ (Moreno, 1988:428) For 
the informants a consistent, transparent and, generally, uniform process was the key 
to making „good‟ and „acceptable‟ ethical decisions.169 The informants did not claim 
that the decisions they made were „right‟ in the sense of invoking some objective 
notion of what a good decision should be based on,
170
 they saw their decisions as the 
best that could be done in the circumstances. In this sense they were not focussed on 
the end product, the actual decision itself; rather, the focus was on the process used 
to reach that decision. This can be seen in the data when the informants wanted to 
check their ethical opinions were in line with others and used meetings to formulate 
and refine their opinions. In this sense their ethical decisions were often formed by 
the process of consensus rather than them bringing preconceived ethical stances to 
the table. 
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 See Slowther, et al who quote a chairman of a CEC who stresses the importance of procedural 
aspects in ethical debate, „We didn‟t get ethics training, lets be clear about that, what we got was a 
procedure a community of inquiry.‟ (2001:41) 
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 Such a notion could be an ethical theory, applying certain principles or even adopting a particular 
religious doctrine. 
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It is this process that, using Moreno‟s analysis, can be seen to legitimise the decision 
for the informants. The process and the product of decision-making are inextricably 
linked. It is the due process, the taking of the decision out of the hands of one 
clinician and making it a clinic or CEC decision that gave such decisions their 
legitimacy. Thus, the informants sought consensus over what to do (in a particular 
situation) rather than a consensus on underlying ethical principles or theories that 
might justify the action.
171
  
 
Consensus and compromise 
This raises the issue of whether the informants reached a consensus or a compromise 
and the distinction between these two terms has also been extensively discussed in 
the literature. In some cases, it could be argued, that it would be more accurate to say 
the clinicians reached a compromise over how to act rather than an actual consensus 
on an issue. For instance, Dr Vance gave the example of a case where he did not 
agree with the majority decision and therefore had to compromise and go along with 
that decision.   
But I‟ll tell you one that recently happened that shocked me.  We had a 
woman who wanted to use donor eggs and she was, I think she was 54, and I 
couldn‟t get my lot to do it at all for love nor money.  I thought they were 
mean and surly actually.   
 
Right.  And did you do it then? 
 
They said no.   
 
So you went with them? 
 
Oh I had no choice.  I can‟t make them do anything.  I can only be 
convincing. (22-57) 
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national commission. The participants could agree on specific policies, but not the principles that 
guided them.  
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The main focus for the informants was not on whether everyone could reach 
agreement on an ethical issue, but rather on the ability to make a decision that all the 
team could either support or that could be managed in practice. Dr Marsh said: 
So it does help when you have a consensus opinion that at least it‟s a 
democratic kind of decision and you are giving the couple a chance, based on 
not what you feel but based on what the majority feel.  Based on the fact that 
although you might not be giving them the treatment yourself because you 
have some reservations, your colleague would, so in that situation it‟s 
acceptable because there‟s no point just transferring to a colleague just for the 
sake of getting it ethically right.  If the majority feel okay about it probably 
you‟ll go ahead.  (13-6) 
Here Dr Marsh argues that, in effect, a compromise would be reached not by 
convincing the other person of the rightness of your views, but by a practical 
acceptance of the other‟s view. Dr Kilm, for instance said when asked: 
How do you manage disagreement with your colleagues, has there ever been a 
case of you disagreeing with colleagues over anything? 
 
Not desperately, no.  The medics are usually fairly good, they sort of disagree or 
argue and they just move on.  Life‟s too short really isn‟t it? (11-48) 
 
He went on to say: 
So I think it‟s just appreciating other people who may have different views from 
their own and, to a certain degree, they have to be respected even if you don‟t, you 
just have to agree to disagree. (11-46) 
 
Here a distinction can be made between agreeing with the substantive ethical 
decision and agreeing with the practical course of action. For instance, in Dr Grant‟s 
case, discussed above, he thought that offering treatment to same-sex couples was 
ethically acceptable. However, others in his unit did not, so there was a unit 
agreement that such couples would not be treated. The aim was to reach a consensus 
(or joint decision) over what to do, rather than try and reach a consensus over what 
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was ethically right. So for Dr Kilm (quoted above 11-46), Dr Grant and Dr Marsh 
they and their colleagues did not actually have to agree on the substantive ethical 
issues they just had to agree over what should be done in practice. The resolution of 
the disagreement was a practical solution in which a course of action was proposed 
that could be generally accepted. This is, in effect, a consensus over a compromise. 
This type of compromise was a group decision on how to solve a practical problem. 
This compromise did not involve changing anyone‟s ethical views, it just involved an 
agreement over what to do and in certain situation the informants (as exemplified by 
Dr Marsh in quote 13-6) would accept and act on another‟s ethical decision even 
when they disagreed with it.
172
 Thus, it was the process of this group decision-
making on ethical issues that was more important to the informants than whether 
they reached a genuine agreement on a substantive ethical issue.  
 
There is much made in the literature of the distinction between consensus and 
compromise and it is often argued that consensus involves, „something more than 
acquiescence or compromise.‟ (Caws,1991:379). Moreno argues that the distinction 
between consensus and compromise, „is critical in social practice‟ (1995:46). 
Therefore, it could be argued that the informants did not actually reach a consensus 
over what to do – rather they compromised so that they could agree what to do in 
practice. Some clinicians had to put aside their ethical views in order that practical 
decisions could be made. Whose views get accepted and who has to compromise 
                                                 
172
 In certain cases, for others they used conscientious objection (see above). 
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could arguably become a „political‟ issue (Engelhardt,2002) and clinic politics could 
be the defining factor rather than ethical acceptability.
173
 
 
However, although there is a useful distinction to be made between the two concepts. 
In this study, the issue was what course of action to take, not how can we reach 
agreement over ethical matters and further, informants thought that it was not their 
place to pronounce what was right or wrong.
174
 Therefore, I would argue that their 
acceptance of other‟s practical solutions to the issue at hand can be seen as a form of 
consensus. Further, there was a mechanism for clinicians to use if they felt that they 
could not „go along‟ with a decision – when even this form of consensus could not be 
reached, there was the final recourse to conscientious objection as a means of 
managing disagreement in practice. 
 
On the basis of the data from this study, consensus can be defined along the lines of 
Moreno‟s conception, as a lack of serious dissent, a group process that comes to a 
decision that all the group can support and implement. This might not be agreement 
over substantive ethical issues, but an agreement over what to do, what course of 
action to take. For Moreno‟s process orientated account of consensus, „the empirical 
background of consensus expressed in terms of actual social practices is all the more 
important.‟ (1995:103) This study is an attempt to elucidate the actual decision-
making practices of the informants to adjudicate their acceptability. 
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 See Chapter Eight for a discussion of this critique of consensus decision-making. 
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 See the discussion of impartiality in Chapter Eight on the informants‟ views on the unacceptability 
of imposing their own ethical views on their patients. 
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A DEVIANT CASE 
The predominant way the informants talked about making ethical decisions was as a 
group process designed to produce a consensus on the way forward. However, one 
informant, Dr Lovate did not give an account of consensus decision-making that 
conformed to this analysis and his account can be seen as a negative instance of the 
general hypothesis. 
The use of negative instances or deviant cases has been argued to be an important 
tool for improving the interpretation of qualitative research accounts (Silverman, 
1993; Becker, 1998; Seale, 1999).
175
 The methodology in this section draws on 
Seale‟s study „Living alone towards the end of life.‟ (1996) This study interviewed 
friends, relatives and others who knew people who had lived alone in the last year of 
their lives. Seale argues that the majority of his informants were concerned to 
demonstrate their moral identities to the interviewer by justifying their behaviour and 
actions, but there were five informants who gave accounts that did not conform to 
this analysis. Seale argues that the consideration of these deviant cases could be 
instructive:  
I felt these apparently deviant cases, where speakers appeared to locate 
themselves outside the ideal of accompaniment, were satisfactorily explained as 
aberrations. The speakers in each instance successfully demonstrated their moral 
adequacy by alternative means. In doing this, they showed an orientation towards 
the event as deviant from normal behaviour, requiring explanation, so 
strengthening the general case that accompaniment of dying people is perceived as 
a generally desirable norm. (1999:80) 
Therefore, these deviant cases give additional support for his theory of moral 
adequacy (Seale, 1999:78). 
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 See Chapter Four for a detailed consideration of this method of aiding the validity of qualitative 
research. 
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Dr Lovate was the twelfth doctor interviewed and it was just over halfway in the data 
collection. The analysis of the data that I had conducted before this interview had not 
given the process of consensus in making ethical decisions any pre-eminence and it 
was the subsequent analysis of his transcript that prompted thinking in these terms. 
Dr Lovate did not see the process of consensual decision-making as a useful way of 
making ethical decisions and this highlighted that the other informants had used it in 
this way. By drawing attention to the problems he thought were created by his 
colleagues using a consensual decision-making processes, he threw the other 
accounts into relief. His account suggested that consensual decision-making was the 
„dominant model‟ of ethical decision-making used in the infertility clinic. 
 
Dr Lovate thought that decisions about how to treat and manage a patient should be 
taken by the individual doctor dealing with them. When asked about how he made 
ethical decisions Dr Lovate gave the following account: 
I‟m interested in the patients.  I‟m sorry, the patient is my patient and I…I‟m a 
damned good doctor, I know that I‟m a good doctor, I know that I give my 
patients more than what‟s called of me….So, I know that I have the patient‟s 
interest at heart, and just knowing that gives me strength to do what I want to do.  
But I‟m shackled, you know, I can‟t….And part of the reason I‟m pleased that I‟m 
in the twilight of my career is that I‟m so bound down and my practice is inhibited 
by the rules that I have to keep by.  And the thing that really upsets me is that I 
don‟t believe it‟s in the interest of the patient.  I think a lot of what‟s happening 
now is not in the interest of the patient, because it takes the initiative, you know, 
one‟s not allowed to have initiative any more because there are guidelines, you‟ve 
got to stick by the guidelines.  And I think that the patient loses out, and that‟s 
really what upsets me.  So, when you say moral and ethical issues, I always spend 
a lot of time discussing with the patient what I intend doing.  I‟m one of the few 
doctors who on my private consent form in my private practice, when it comes to 
induction of ovulation I have these are the potential complications, and the sixth 
one is death.  And I actually write on there that patients have died from this 
treatment, so I tell them everything….So I spend a lot of time explaining in great 
detail to the patient what I intend doing, what the potential complications are, and 
if the patient hears that, and then I get consent, you know, written consent, then I 
would like to treat the patient the way I think that that particular patient 
expects.(12-31)   
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His more individual approach to patient care was reflected in his unhappiness with 
the increasing amount of guidelines in infertility practice. „You see, I find that I 
would prefer to have no policy at all.  I‟d rather we had no policy and that we raised 
all these issues and discussed it on a personal individual basis, because - but, of 
course, if you do that then you can be accused of favouritism or, you know, you like 
this couple so you‟re allowing them to have a third.‟ (12-25) Although he recognised 
that having no policies might lead to a clinician being accused of partiality, he 
thought that each case should be decided purely on its merits. Guidelines, for Dr 
Lovate, interfered with his preferred way of making ethical decisions which was, for 
him, a focus on the particular patient by an individual doctor without outside 
interference. He thought decisions were best taken by the individual doctor not a unit 
meeting. 
 
Dr Lovate gave an example to illustrate these points. The amount of super-ovulatory 
drugs to administer and then how many embryos to transfer back are currently 
contentious areas in infertility practice.
176
 Dr Lovate said, „I mean I am much more 
aggressive in my treatment of infertile patients in that I feel that it‟s important to get 
a pregnancy even at the expense of it being a multiple pregnancy.‟ (12-28)  
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 See HFEA (2007) consultation document on single embryo transfer and Ledger (2007) for a 
consideration of lower doses in IVF treatment. 
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His unit, Clinic 2, had a policy on the prescribing levels for drugs: 
I mean for years I used to do battle.  Vicky
177
 is our, a senior nurse who, 
because if patients need ovulation induction or super-ovulation, the nurses 
actually do it, it‟s a nurse-led clinic, and I for years have said, “Look, when it 
comes to my patients, I want them to have three ampoules or two ampoules”, 
but that went against the grain because what about the policy of the clinic, 
and how can Dr Lovate  have a - so we used to have wild discussions in these 
meetings.  But it was always settled amicably and I lost.   But I thought it was 
important to give my views, and there was no blood or anything like that, so 
its….(12-29) 
 
Thus, for Dr Lovate having to abide by clinic policies and protocols interfered with 
his ethical decision-making – this should be done on the basis of acting in the best 
interests of one‟s patient, without recourse to outside influences.  
 
Dr Lovate‟s deviant account can be argued to strengthen the analysis of consensual 
ethical decision-making. Dr Lovate, by drawing attention to his battles with 
colleagues over patient management and his views on general guidelines, positions 
himself as going against the grain of the prevailing ethos. In the end, he still had to 
abide by the clinics‟ policies and the decisions it made on the basis of a general 
consensus. So he still participated in the process of consensus decision-making, he 
just did not see it as a beneficial way of making such decision. Therefore, this 
account reinforces the analysis that making ethical decisions on the basis of 
consensus was, generally, seen as the most appropriate and useful way of 
approaching them in the infertility clinic. 
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 This is a pseudonym. 
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CONCLUSION 
This chapter has examined how the informants made and approached ethical 
decision-making in their everyday practice. I have agued that they used group 
processes to try and reach a consensus over how to handle difficult cases. The 
cases that were discussed in clinic meetings and CEC were those that were part 
of a controversial morality, where there was no generally agreed opinion on how 
to proceed. In these cases the informants had to find a way of managing such 
cases in practice. For the informants consensus decision-making gave them a 
consistent, transparent and, generally, uniform process that was the key to 
making „good‟ and „acceptable‟ ethical decisions. It is this process that could be 
seen to legitimise the decision. The process and the product of decision-making 
were inextricably linked for the informants. It was the due process, the taking of 
the decision out of the hands of one clinician and making it a clinic or CEC 
decision that gave such decisions their legitimacy. Thus, having explained how 
the informants made ethical decisions, it was possible to develop a theory of 
consensus by both examining how the notion was used and formulated in 
practice and considering the philosophical literature on the subject. 
 
By focussing on the way that ethical decisions are actually made in practice, it is held 
that the process of decision-making is of importance as well as the actual decision 
itself. One of Moreno‟s key claims in Deciding Together (1995) is that, led by his 
formulation of naturalism, it is imperative to study social process of consensus 
formulation to see if these specific manifestations of consensus are morally 
acceptable. Therefore, social science and psychological research are needed to 
establish how well an actual consensus process functions, it is not a matter that can 
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be settled by abstract argument alone. This chapter is an attempt to do this, by 
examining a particular setting where consensus is used to make ethical decisions. As 
the social production of decisions becomes more important for bioethics alongside a 
concern for the actual decision itself and if we are to be confident in our ethical 
decisions, we need to have some understanding of the procedures that were used to 
make them. This can open up new arenas of inquiry for bioethics: the social 
production of decision-making.  
 
The next chapter will look critically at consensus decision-making and consider 
whether it is a defensible way of making ethical decisions in the infertility clinic. 
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CHAPTER EIGHT 
 
EVALUATING CONSENSUS DECISION-MAKING 
 
Many forms of Government have been tried and will be tried in this world of sin and woe. 
No one pretends that democracy is perfect or all-wise. Indeed, it has been said that 
democracy is the worst form of government except for all those other forms that have been 
tried from time to time. Winston Churchill, 1947. 
 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Having discussed how the clinicians in this study approached and made ethical 
decisions, it is now relevant to ask whether this is a good way of making such 
decisions. This chapter will examine the criticisms that have been levied at the use of 
consensus as a way of making ethical decisions. The concern in this chapter is to 
consider whether critiques of consensus decision-making are pertinent in the 
infertility clinic. From the perspective developed in this thesis, this judgment cannot 
be made abstractly it would depend on the context and the interaction between theory 
and practice. It will be concluded that, in this particular setting, consensus decision-
making can be defended as an adequate way of making ethical decisions.  
 
As stated before, generally ethical theories have treated the individual as the moral 
agent, who is responsible for his or her own decisions. Moral authority rests with the 
individual. But an account that locates moral authority with the group and seeks to 
base ethical decisions on the deliberations and outcomes of a group process and 
consensus confounds this traditional view of ethical agency. Seeing moral authority 
in this way is more often found in the realms of political philosophy where concern is 
focussed on the legitimacy of large group decisions and warrants for government.  
Correspondingly, there has been much debate and criticism over consensus as a basis 
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for the authority of political systems (Rawls, 1993.Trotter, 2006. Kukathas & Pettit, 
1990) and of those who seek to construct a consensus to provide the basis for 
bioethical policy making (Engelhardt, 1996 & 2002. Turner, 2003a). However, there 
has been relatively little attention paid to the utility of consensus as a way of making 
small group decisions (Moreno, 1994,1995). 
 
CRITICISMS OF CONSENSUS 
 
The two main criticisms that have been levied against consensus decision-making in 
bioethics are:
178
 first, that it can mask dissent, that it can be coercive – views outside 
the consensus are either suppressed or ignored; and second, consensus is actually not 
possible as there is a profound plurality of moral values and therefore a real 
consensus could never be brokered. These criticisms are related, as the greater the 
moral pluralism the more likely that there will be dissent and dissent of a more 
pernicious nature – making the issue of masking dissent more acute. The bulk of the 
chapter will be concerned with addressing the second criticism, as this strikes at the 
heart of the debate over the utility of consensus as a form of ethical decision-making. 
 
Masking dissent 
The concern that a process of consensual decision-making for bioethical issues can 
suppress, mask or not take into account dissenting views is a common one (Trotter, 
2002. Engelhardt, 2002). This criticism captures an important worry about consensus 
decision-making over moral matters, that the majority view might come to dominate 
without any further moral justification. Just because the majority believe that 
something is morally acceptable does not, automatically, make it morally right. For 
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 These criticisms are usually directed at committee decision-making such as CECs or government 
policy committees such as those often used in the US. 
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instance, if a particular society held that killing people from different ethnic groups 
was morally acceptable and this view was held by the majority of the population, we 
would not wish to simply endorse it solely on the grounds that it was the consensus 
of the majority. Thus, a common objection to the use of consensus as a decision-
making tool is that it can revert to a form of crude utilitarianism, wherein majority 
opinion will hold sway with no other moral justification offered.
179
 As Moreno notes, 
the moral tradition of Western culture has been to deny that consensus on moral 
issues has any particular validity (1995:5).
180
 
 
A number of arguments can be put forward as to why, in this study, the criticism that 
consensus decision-making can mask dissent does not have any great purchase. First, 
there were, generally, high levels of agreement reported among the informants. The 
informants considered that disagreement over what to do in particular cases was the 
exception rather than the norm. Hence, it appeared that there were not many 
conflicting views to be masked – there was not a high level of dissent in the first 
place. The informants operated, largely, within a settled morality in which there was 
agreement about many courses of action.
181
 Second, when there was dissent this was 
not masked. In cases where a workable solution could not be found (i.e. a 
compromise) the informants could use conscientious objection to enable the dissenter 
to opt out of being involved in the treatment. Thus, no one was forced to act in a way 
they felt was unethical, no one‟s moral values were subjugated by the majority.182 
However, there were some situations where it could be argued that dissent was 
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 See debates over this in Smart & Williams (1973). 
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 See also Ten Have & Sass (1998) who discuss how consensus formation has not been a topic of 
concern in western philosophy. 
181
 This is not to say that there was never any disagreement but that, generally, in their practice a 
consensus could be reached. See Chapter Seven for an elaboration of this. 
182
 This point was discussed in Chapter Seven. 
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masked. If a doctor was happy to treat (see discussion of this in Chapter Seven) and 
the rest of the clinic was not then the doctor, in effect, was not able to treat. Two 
informants mentioned this, but neither of them felt that this was a profound limitation 
on their ability to practise in the way that they wished to.  
 
Thus, the problem of masking of dissent was not an important issue in the infertility 
clinic as the informants were able, generally in their practice, to formulate a 
consensus on what they should do and to take the decisions „as a group‟. Of course 
this group decision may not reflect everyone‟s views and certain groups will have 
power imbalances and hierarchies that can affect decision-making.
183
 Nevertheless 
there was an attempt to involve everyone in the decision and reach a decision 
through a deliberative process.  
 
Moral pluralism and consensus 
 
At the heart of the debate over the usefulness of consensus as a way of making 
ethical decisions is the worry that due to moral pluralism people will never be able to 
reach a consensus over ethical issues. This problem will now be considered and will 
be the main focus of this chapter.  
 
Moral pluralism is often seen as a feature of modern life (Rawls, 1993. Parker, 
2000), that is often referred to in debates over bioethics method (Strong, 1999) and 
there is a large and diverse literature on the subject from a variety of perspectives. 
For clarity I shall focus on Engelhardt‟s discussion of moral pluralism as he relates 
this to the possibilities of getting a consensus over ethical issues. Engelhardt‟s (1996) 
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 See Chapter Seven, for a discussion of this. 
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account of moral pluralism and the issues it raises for modern society and the project 
of bioethics has been very influential. In essence he argues that the secularisation of 
western societies has had a profound effect on the ability of a society to institute any 
widespread moral advice or policies. 
The Enlightenment hope of secular bioethics has gone aground on the postmodern 
recognition of competing moral narratives and accounts, among which choice in a 
principled fashion has not proved possible without begging the question of which 
moral vision should give guidance. The question has then become whose moral 
consensus should be recognized as the moral consensus to guide policy. (2002:10) 
 
Thus, for Engelhardt, as there is no general moral vision or position any consensus 
will only be partial to those who uphold the underlying position. Those who hold 
another position will be left out of this consensus and what comes to be the 
prevailing consensus is largely a matter of power and politics rather than morals. 
Consensus as a way of making ethical decisions fails because:  
in the search for consensus in bioethics, such a morally normative account is 
sought as the basis for clinical and public policy without acknowledging that 
the consensus first depends on first granting the canonical character of an 
initial moral vision or point of departure. (Engelhardt, 2002:12) 
 
Hence, consensus needs to be based on a „moral vision‟ and as that vision is what is 
lacking in the first place, consensus cannot add anything useful to decision-making. 
For Engelhardt it is this lack of a shared „moral vision‟ that makes moral decision-
making difficult and contentious. 
 
Moreno advances a position in his book on the use of consensus in bioethical 
decision-making, Deciding Together (1995), that can provide a response to 
Engelhardt‟s concerns over the possibility of moral consensus.  Moreno‟s overriding 
thesis is that consensus is a central part of bioethical decision-making, an important 
part of the social practice of bioethics. He gives an account of the use of consensus 
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decision-making processes in national ethics commissions and hospital ethics 
committees in the US. While consensus procedures may seem to be obviously 
relevant in such forums, he also argues that these procedures are used in clinical 
settings (as this study has found)
184and small group processes. „Moral consensus is a 
natural feature of human affairs, that manifests itself in and emerges from social 
practices, and that human experience contains both the conditions that undermine the 
quality of a moral consensus and the resources that enable us to improve it.‟ 
(1995:124) 
 
In answer to Engelhardt‟s problem of a lack of a common moral vision that besets 
consensus decision-making, Moreno contends that there is enough common ground 
in society to allow the formulation of a consensus. Moreno argues that, „the moral 
authority of consensus in bioethics must be understood within the framework of 
liberal political philosophy to which our society subscribes.‟ (1995:143) Hence, the 
„moral vision‟ arises out of a generally accepted political liberalism and these 
consensus processes need to be scrutinised to see if they, „sufficiently respect 
individual self-determination and other principles that are the objects of a society‟s 
settled over-lapping consensus.‟ (Moreno, 1995:106)  Thus, „[u]nder such 
circumstances the validation of moral consensus may turn on the extent to which 
principles that are the objects of an overlapping consensus have been honored in the 
process.‟ (1995:103) 
 
In Moreno‟s view bioethical consensus is justified by „honouring‟ principles that 
arise out of a political liberalism and that such principles are upheld by our 
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 See The Conclusion for a discussion of other studies on the use of consensus in medical decision-
making. 
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society.
185
 Moreno uses Rawls‟ term „over-lapping consensus‟, that members of a 
pluralistic society will agree on some values, but will not all agree on the same 
ones.
186
  For Moreno, as long as the group broadly upholds liberal values, such as 
respect of personal autonomy, and accords, „with the general conditions that govern 
the conduct of this kind of process‟ (1995:63) then the group has as much moral 
authority as is possible in a liberal society. Thus, according to Moreno, this is the 
„moral vision, in Engelhardt‟s sense, on which moral consensus can be based.187 
 
If the acceptability of consensus decision-making is judged by whether it attends to 
principles that are part of the general moral framework of a community, the question 
becomes, is the consensus formed by the informants in this study based on any such 
foundations? Is there some sort of more general „moral vision‟188 that can be used to 
justify their decisions? It will be argued that there is a form of a common moral 
vision amongst the informants that is based on their membership of their profession 
and the regulatory context in which they practice. Therefore, decisions can be made 
and judged on the basis of this „moral vision‟ and this „moral vision‟ is defendable in 
a wider societal context. The informants shared a commitment to the underlying 
value of impartiality and their decision-making processes were designed to facilitate 
this. The aim of making impartial decisions was what underpinned their moral 
vision, what all the informants agreed on and what gave their moral outlook 
coherence. The relationship of the informants‟ „moral vision‟ to wider society will  
be considered, examining theories that hold that doctors‟ morality is largely internal 
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 Also see Strong (1999) who argues that as a society we share enough moral values to make 
agreement possible. 
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 A concept that has been widely criticised, see Jennings (1991) and Kukathas & Pettit (1990). 
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 Moreno also bolsters his claims by positing that there is a „shared moral sense‟ based on the work 
of Hume and data from moral psychology. This will not be considered due to space and  it is not 
central to the argument that is being advanced here. 
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 The term „moral vision‟ will be used as a short hand for, „a general moral framework‟. 
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to their practice. In contrast, a theory of doctors‟ moral vision will be put forward 
(based on the data and literature), a form of a medical professionalism account, that 
sees the link with a wider societal morality as central to doctors‟ ethical functioning.  
 
IMPARTIALITY 
The previous chapter established that the informants attempted to make ethical 
decisions on the basis of group consensus. The overriding goal of this process of 
consensus decision-making was to make impartial, and therefore acceptable, 
ethical decisions. The informants‟ thought that a „good‟ ethical decision was a 
decision that could be seen to be impartial. The process of consensus decision-
making led, in the informants‟ view, to a more impartial decision. By taking the 
decision out of the hands of one person and locating it with the group, decisions 
were less likely to be made on the basis of personal prejudice. For the 
informants, it was the impartiality of process that conferred ethical legitimacy on 
the decision. The informants might not share the same views on particular ethical 
issues (such as treating single women) but they all agreed that there was an 
appropriate way to make ethical decisions and were, generally, prepared to abide 
by the outcome of that process. Impartiality can be seen as a shared value that all 
the informants subscribed to and one that can be justified within a broader 
societal moral framework. In this section how they constructed this concept in 
practice and how consensual decision-making contributed to the impartiality of 
decisions will be examined.  
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Definitions of Impartiality  
Impartiality is often seen as one of the features that characterises moral theories and 
their dictates.
189
 Rachels sees moral impartiality in the following way, „the 
requirement for impartiality, is at bottom nothing more than a proscription against 
arbitrariness in dealing with people differently from another when there is no good 
reason to do so.‟ (1986:10) Gert puts forward the following definition of moral 
impartiality. He argues that an impartial choice is one in which a particular type of 
consideration does not influence the decision so: „A is impartial in respect R with 
regard to group G if and only if A‟s actions in respect R are not influenced at all by 
which member(s) of G benefit or are harmed by these actions.‟ (Gert, 1995:104) 
Impartiality for Gert is a property of a particular decision made by a particular person 
that affects a particular group (or person).  
It is of course possible to criticise any formulation of impartiality as an impossibility 
in reality.
190
  Young argues: „The ideal of impartiality is an idealist fiction. It is 
impossible to adopt an unsituated point of view, and if a point of view is situated, it 
cannot stand apart from and understand all points of view.‟ (1990:104) However, it is 
not claimed here that the informants were exemplifying some sort of unsituated form 
of impartiality. Rather, the concern is to elucidate precisely how they attempted to 
accomplish, what they saw as impartiality in their particular social setting. Thus, this 
addresses Young‟s concern that, „it is impossible to reason about substantive moral 
issues without understanding their substance, which always presupposes some 
particular social and historical context.‟ (1990:104)  
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 For an excellent overview of the place of impartiality in mainstream moral theory see Jollimore 
(2006). 
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 The claims that ethical theories represent some form of impartiality have also been criticised by 
theorists who advance an ethic of care, see for example: Gilligan (1982), Noddings (1984). 
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Therefore, in order to analyse whether decisions are impartial (or not), there is no 
blanket, abstract definition of impartiality as such that can be appealed to. Rather, 
what is needed is some specification
191
 of what would constitute impartiality in a 
particular situation, what are the relevant conditions in that particular situation for 
saying that action is impartial. 
For the informants, impartiality consisted of: the non-imposition of their own views 
on their patients; detachment of the decision-maker from the situation; and a robust 
process of decision-making. How the concept of impartiality is actually used and 
therefore specified in practice by the informants will now be elucidated.   
 
Ethical decision-making and impartiality 
 
The attempt to make decisions impartially, and therefore more acceptably, was the 
ethical imperative that guided the informants‟ actions in this area. When asked to talk 
about „how do you make ethical decisions?‟ the informants gave a variety of 
responses to this, elements that they thought were important when making ethical 
decision. Twenty of the informants were explicit about the need to avoid 
discrimination, bias, prejudice or any other form of unequal treatment. Ten of the 
informants specifically used terms such as bias, prejudice, and discrimination when 
talking about things to guard against when making decisions. Two informants used 
the word „impartial‟ to refer to the way decisions should be made. Other informants 
discussed issues that were seen as representing notions of impartiality. Table 3 
details the different categories of response that have been put under the rubric of 
impartiality. 
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There were two main ways that informants talked about being impartial. First, that it 
was wrong to impose one‟s own views on a patient (or indeed colleagues). Second, 
decisions were „better‟ if the person taking them was detached from the case or 
situation. These will be dealt with in turn. 
 
The imposition of views 
A common view was that it was unwarranted to impose one‟s own beliefs (ethical or 
religious) on to patients. Dr Havers provided an example of this. He had trained in 
Italy and was a practicing Catholic and was concerned that his own religious views 
might compromise his impartiality when dealing with patients: 
Well, it made me feel more comfortable that I was making the right decision 
because, you see, I come from another country, which is Italy, Southern Italy, 
Catholic country, so my culture, although I am a very open minded person is 
always inside me.  So any time I have a patient in front of me with a bit of, where 
I can see an ethical problem, I always ask to myself whether it is a real ethical 
problem or it‟s coming from my personal background. (8-87) 
Dr Jenson put the point like this, that it was important to guard against one‟s personal 
prejudices: 
I think fertility and ethics, we are dealing with probably the most important 
part of medicine, in my view, or ethically important part of medicine and I 
don‟t think it can be approached by individuals, it has to be a group thing 
because we all have your prejudices, even though we like to think we‟re all 
good honest people, but there are things that I approve of and don‟t approve 
of, and only by taking into account a lot of people‟s feelings do we get it 
right. (10-68) 
The likelihood of such an imposition of one‟s own personal moral beliefs on to the 
patient was thought to be increased if the clinician had very strong moral beliefs.  
 
Dr Iniman put the point like this: 
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I don‟t think that it is good to have clinicians who do have very strong religious 
beliefs, because it makes it very difficult for their patients.  I‟m thinking back now 
to the days where I was involved in terminations.  I mean I think people can opt 
out of course, they must have the absolute right to opt out, but trying to put your 
own beliefs on patients is inappropriate. (9-69) 
 
Dr Kilm made a similar point when he said: 
I suppose it‟s whether the person that is making the judgement is reasonably 
open-minded and has a broad enough education that they are able to appreciate 
different views rather than them having only sort of been brought up in a 
blinkered existence but, you know, they've got a very narrow-minded view on 
things that only fits in with say one religious type or what have you and 
everything has to fit into that, and if it doesn‟t well then they are going to get into 
trouble at some stage.(11-46) 
Dr Kilm thought that an open-minded doctor was less likely to push their views onto 
others, have less of an axe to grind and was therefore less likely to „get into trouble.‟ 
By being broad minded and not wedded to a particular viewpoint decisions could be 
negotiated in practice with all view points considered equally. This equal 
consideration of views (based on an open mindedness that is willing to change or 
take on board other‟s views)192 was seen to make decisions more impartial. This 
attitude of the informants fits in well with recent guidance published by the GMC, 
Personal Beliefs and Medical Practice, they state: „You must not unfairly 
discriminate against patients by allowing your personal views to affect adversely 
your professional relationship with them or the treatment you provide or arrange.‟ 
(GMC, 2008) 
 
Detachment 
A further aspect of impartiality for the informants was that a better decision could be 
made if the decision taker was in someway detached from the situation. This 
                                                 
192
 This could be seen as a form of „reasonableness‟, see discussions of Rawls‟ notion of public reason 
below in this Chapter. 
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„detachment‟ could mean various things. Dr Francis, for example, when she talked 
about what ethics training could contribute to clinical practice, exemplified how she 
was using (specifying) the concept of impartiality.  
I think if you have formal training, actually, it may make you think about it in 
a slightly more clinical and detached way, because I think the problem with 
ethics is you kind of think it‟s so much influenced by the way you were 
brought up and what you like, that it‟s very easy to think well of course that‟s 
okay, rather than thinking well actually, you know, I wouldn‟t offer it to 
somebody because I think oh I might as well do that.  I would think well I 
know that these papers say that this, this and this, and maybe it would make 
you look at things in a slightly more detached way. (6-51) 
Ethics training could help the doctor to be more detached from the situation and this 
was something Dr Francis clearly thought was valuable. Ethics training could help 
doctors to transcend their own views and ideas, and training could in someway 
broaden the mind so to speak, by the reading of academic papers that might point out 
other ways of looking at things. Dr Iniman also saw this as an important part of the 
benefits of ethics training for doctors: 
Oh no, I think it [ethics training] does, and again it takes away from personal 
bias to having a framework, a sort of structure on which you can pin the 
arguments that help you to make a decision. (9-96) 
Dr Kilm put the point like this: 
It‟s worth them having some kind of training, it‟s worth them having 
considered some of the things and maybe make up their own mind, realise 
what their own views are and hopefully realise or recognise that other people 
may have different views to their own and sometimes you have to put those 
views to one side, because we all get involved in things that maybe we prefer 
not to be involved in but it‟s just part of the job. (11-63) 
 
So detachment in this sense was being detached from one‟s own viewpoint (a point 
that links into the one above), the ability to recognise there are other points of view. 
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Some informants thought that it was important for the doctor to remain detached 
from the patients in order to make a better assessment. Dr Evens put it like this: 
Because the other thing you‟ve got to very mindful of too is not to be 
influenced by Miss Nice or Mr and Mrs Nice or Mr and Miss Nice to say 
what a lovely couple, wouldn‟t they make lovely parents, we don‟t know 
they‟re going to make lovely parents. (5-106) 
 
Dr Iniman thought that doctors with their experience were more likely to be able to 
remain detached from the situation: 
I‟m going to say something that you might not agree with at all now, but I 
think that if a non-clinician meets the patient they are much more likely to be 
swayed.  And clinicians are always swayed because part of the basic tenure to 
doing medicine is you‟re doing the best you can for the person in front of 
you.  But over the years you learn how to amalgamate that with looking at the 
wider perspective and what might really be in their long-term best interests 
and helping them to go through the implications.  And also we‟ve got back 
up, particularly in fertility medicine, with counsellors who will deal with 
implications counselling, and we‟re really fortunate in that.  I‟ve got pretty 
limited experience to base this on but I think that it‟s difficult for, it‟s harder 
for somebody coming in from a different background to hear the patient‟s 
story and remain unmoved. (9-37) 
 
A second form of this detachment was that in some situations it was better for 
someone (or some body) to make the decision that did not know the patients, who 
was detached from the day-to-day management of the case. This was a common 
reason for advocating the use of CECs.  
 
Dr Evens made this point: 
we‟ll take it to the ethical committee, and take it forward from there, to ask a sort 
of a wider group of people who are not connected with the actual delivery of 
service what their views are. (5-58) 
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Dr Francis said: 
Well, I think it‟s people who aren‟t involved, people who actually haven‟t 
seen the patient so they‟re not kind of swayed by „we like them or we don‟t 
like them‟. (6-44) 
 
 Dr Brown and Dr Case also highlighted the fact that the CEC could help make 
decisions because they would be detached from the actual case and be able to see it 
in a more dispassionate way. 
Well, that you‟re given advice by people who aren‟t necessarily doctors or 
scientists, or interested specifically in that, and they can look at it from 
outside, they haven‟t got a vested interest in saying yes or no. (2-28) 
 
But now we use Anytown, which is the nearest sister clinic, we use their 
ethics committee set up, and in fact they do their ethical discussions in-house, 
but they‟re a much bigger team and so one part of the team can pass a 
problem to another group and they can discuss it in isolation.  And so we 
send over to them and they‟re discussing it as independently of the situation; 
that‟s much more practical. (3-44) 
 
The informants saw this process of decision-making as more defensible. In the 
current healthcare environment this model of decision-making could also be seen as 
useful to clinicians as it was thought to give them a form of protection. By having 
procedures for making decisions that were designed to ensure the impartiality of the 
decision this enabled them to claim that the decision was (more) impartial and 
therefore less likely to be subject to criticism. Dr Jenson cast the element of 
protection in the following way: 
And I think you are stronger as a group.  That may be hiding behind a 
faceless organisation saying the Unit says no, but I think it does show that 
you‟ve taken a lot of other people‟s opinions into account, rather than sending 
the patient to five different people you‟ve sat down together and a multi-
disciplinary approach is important in fertility treatment. (10-38) 
 Dr Tarn gave this account of his clinic‟s meetings: 
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We have regular meetings, you know.  Some of us call them business 
meetings, some of them call them clinical meetings, I don‟t know what they 
are really, but a monthly get together.  And if there are problem cases we 
discuss them with the nurses, the consultants, the receptionist, so it‟s openly 
aired and discussed really. 
 
So do you find that a useful forum? 
 
Yes, that‟s useful in two ways.  There is an element of self protection for 
doctors as well now, you know, so I protect my back as well by doing that, 
say look this wasn‟t my decision, this was a joint decision, after case 
discussion at the meeting.  So it benefits both sides, I think, the patients, it 
gets the staff more involved and it protects the final person who will be 
signing the letter. (20-11) 
 
This type of decision-making was perceived to be better all round, Dr Tarn stated, for 
example, that he thought it also benefited the patients as well, by showing that they 
had procedures and mechanisms for making ethical decisions that distanced the 
individual clinician from the decision, a way of demonstrating that they make 
reasonable and adequate decisions. 
CEC were also thought to offer clinicians some form of protection. Dr Havers said: 
The cases are being rejected all the time.  But it‟s good for us because, that 
was my feeling in these specific cases, but they back us up, which is 
important.  You feel also a bit more, having support from an ethical 
committee in making such a decision, it‟s an important thing.  Even, I mean 
first of all ethically for the patient and for the couples, so are you sure that 
you‟re doing the right thing for society as well, but also medical and legally, 
just to make sure that you cannot be liable for anything, for making a decision 
that can be taken to the court or the human rights or something like that. (8-
29) 
Dr Brown reiterated this point: 
And you get the support of a body that says yes or no, which if you will 
shares the responsibility.  It takes the responsibility off you to a great extent, 
which you could argue is a bit of a cop-out but I think that that‟s reasonable if 
you, you know, if you are deciding something really quite important about a 
patient. (2-29) 
With all these mechanisms for ensuring impartiality: CEC, clinic meetings and the 
involvement of other professions, the informants were, arguably, concerned about the 
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impartiality of the process rather than the impartiality of the product, the outcome of 
the deliberations. For them a consistent, transparent and, generally, uniform process 
was the key to making „good‟ and „acceptable‟ ethical decisions. As Dr Orben said: 
So for me for a decision to be ethical it means that it‟s open, that it has been 
carefully considered and that the decision has been taken usually by more 
than one person, and preferably by people who don‟t stand in any way to gain 
from the decision being made. (15-44) 
 
MORAL VISIONS OF MEDICINE 
It could be contended by critics of consensus decision-making, such as Engelhardt, 
that the informants‟ shared value of impartiality that guided their decision-making, 
was just a „moral vision‟ held by doctors. Engelhardt would argue that there are 
moral communities who share values (such as particular religious groups) and he 
calls these „moral friends.‟ Whereas, moral strangers who do not share the same 
values, „will not see the world in the same way.‟ (Engelhardt & Wildes, 1994:136) 
Therefore, doctors are a community of „moral friends‟ and members of  a wider 
society are potential „moral strangers.‟ To a wider society that does not hold this 
„moral vision‟, such decision-making would not have any moral validity – doctors‟ 
consensus decision-making would only be a consensus amongst themselves. This is 
the view that medicine has its own particular morality, an „internal morality of 
medicine‟, that is distinctive to the external morality of the wider society (Veatch & 
Miller, 2001). 
 
For my defence of consensus decision-making to be successful, I want to argue that 
there are important links between the informants‟ „moral vision‟ and the wider 
society‟s. I shall first outline and critique theories of an internal morality of medicine 
 204 
and then develop my own account. This close attention to actual practice can aid in 
refining and developing ethical theory and principles. 
 
The Internal Morality of Medicine 
The debate over whether there is an internal morality of medicine was stimulated by 
MacIntyre‟s concept of „practice‟ and the claim that practices had virtues that are 
„internal‟ to them (Veatch, 2001). A practice for MacIntyre is, „a coherent and 
complex form of socially established cooperative human activity through which 
goods internal to that form of activity are realized in the course of trying to achieve 
those standards of excellence which are appropriate to, and partially definitive of, 
that form of activity.‟ (MacIntyre, 1981:175) A practice has its own goals or telos 
and internal goods are generated by successfully engaging in the practice, by 
realising and pursuing its unique telos.  
 
This notion of a unique good or telos of an activity has been applied, by some 
authors, to the „practice‟ of medicine. The accounts that build on this idea of a unique 
telos of medicine have been termed essentialist and have two central tenets. First, 
that medicine has an essential character, ends or goals that are distinctive to it, for 
instance, the healing aim of medicine is a distinctive goal. Second, from such 
conclusions about the nature of medicine and a reflection on the ends and goals it is 
possible to decide what should be done, to construct a medical ethic for the 
profession. Kass (1975) was one of the first authors to advance this approach and 
took an Aristotelian view that medicine had a particular end of producing health and 
the morality of medicine depended on the advancement of this end. Pellegrino built 
on this account and is one of the main exponents of this view of the internal morality 
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of medicine. He argues that the ethics of the medical profession has its source in the 
nature of the profession,
193
 in what is distinctive about the medical profession and the 
good for which it aims. Medics have generic obligations as healers and aim at health 
as a good (Pellegrino, 2001).  
 
This kind of essentialist account has been heavily criticised (Veatch, 2001). One 
criticism points to the difficulty in stipulating what such a telos of medicine is. If it is 
construed too broadly then it fails to differentiate medicine from other activities, if 
too narrowly then much of what is considered modern medicine (such as cosmetic 
surgery and even infertility treatment) might fall outside what should properly be 
seen to be medical activity. A further problem for such essentialist accounts is that 
even if it was possible to formulate a defendable version of what the ends or telos 
should be, there are still problems of how to derive what should be done, what 
follows from these ends of medicine. Simply establishing the ends of an enterprise 
does not necessarily tell you how to achieve those ends in an unproblematic way. 
 
However, the most important criticism of this approach for my purposes is that 
medical morality cannot be solely internal to medicine as a practice. Veatch (2001) 
argues that ultimately any decision over what ends of medicine should be pursued are 
matters to be decided externally from medicine itself and concludes that there is no 
utility in a concept of the internal morality of medicine.
194
 For Veatch, (using the 
example of the debate over doctors participating in capital punishment): „the question 
of whether a physician‟s behaviour is morally appropriate when he or she 
participates in an execution is surely not settled by the balancing of two competing 
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 Pellegrino also include other „healing‟ professions in this analysis. So nursing, clinical psychology 
and dentistry would all be classed as professions with a distinctive telos. 
194
 See discussion of Veatch‟s criticisms later in this Chapter. 
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goals of medicine. Surely it is settled by resolving the more fundamental societal 
moral question – the morality of capital punishment itself.‟ (2001:634) 
 
In response to such problems with an internal morality of medicine, Brody & Miller 
(1998. Miller & Brody, 2001) have advanced a version of internalism that seeks to 
overcome the difficulties encountered by the essentialist accounts. They put forward 
what has been called an evolutionary account that sees the gradual evolution of an 
internal ethic of medicine in concert with wider society. Arras sums up this 
evolutionary approach as follows:  
Miller and Brody propose a theory of professional medical goals and duties 
conditioned by the evolving demands of history and (external) social/cultural 
influences. They thus want to argue that there is indeed a core ethic developed on 
the basis of reflection on medicine‟s specific goals and duties, but that this core 
ethic develops historically as a result of a dialectic or conversation between the 
medical profession and the larger society. (2001a:648)  
 
For them, there is an important interaction between medical values and societal 
norms that, together, form a medical morality. In light of this criticism of internal 
moralities of medicine, that it ignores the relationship between the morality of the 
medical profession and the morality of the wider society, I want to advance an 
account of a medical morality or a „moral vision‟ that builds on this notion of the 
relationship between medicine and the wider society in which it is practised. 
 
THE VALUES OF MEDICAL PROFESSIONALISM 
 
The account of medical professionalism that I want to advance is broadly based on a 
view that there are specific moral responsibilities and obligations required of doctors 
qua their membership of the profession of medicine. This account has two elements: 
first, it is a form of a „practical precondition account‟, that says there are specific 
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ethical precepts that all doctors have to broadly share to be able to practice. This 
gives the medical profession a degree of moral cohesion, a moral vision, upon which 
a consensus can be based. Second, this moral vision has to be part of and in close 
relationship with the wider morality of the society in which doctors practice. 
 
The first question for this account is, what norms are binding on doctors by virtue of 
their membership of their profession? (Ladd, 1983) What are the norms without 
which medicine, in Arras‟ words, „would cease to be a going concern.‟ (2001:646) 
Arras gives the example of confidentiality, as a norm that makes the trust 
relationship between the doctor and the patient possible.
195
 This type of account does 
not need a developed thesis about the goals and essential telos of medicine, rather: „It 
simply asserts that, whatever we think about medicine‟s „true‟ purposes, the 
enterprise of medicine as a practical activity won‟t be able to get off the ground 
without scrupulous adherence to the duty of confidentiality.‟ (Arras, 2001:646) 
 
Rhodes (2002) has put forward a theory of medical professionalism, which she calls 
a contractarian constructivist account and I will build on this to formulate my 
process-orientated account of medical professionalism. The importance of her 
version for my purposes is the link she makes between the cohesive medical 
professionalism that is fostered by medical training and the ability of practitioners to 
make decisions on the basis of consensus.  
Medical ethics education
196
 is…primarily concerned with inculcating medical 
professionalism. This involves helping students to understand the justification and 
                                                 
195
 Talcott Parsons (1951), for example, also saw doctors as having specific duties and roles that arise 
from their professional status. These were: applying a high level of skill and knowledge to the 
problem of illness; acting for the welfare of the patient, rather than self-interest; being objective, 
emotionally detached and non-judgemental; and being guided by the rules of professional practice. 
196
 For the account advanced in this chapter it is not pertinent whether such values are inculcated by 
specific ethics training or within general medical training and in practice. 
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content of their special responsibilities as physicians, to accept their professional 
responsibilities as important and overriding, to understand principles of medical 
ethics that are relevant to clinical practice, to learn to apply them and use them in 
case discussions, to learn how to reach a consensus with peers on difficult cases, 
and to learn how to tolerate reasonable differences in views and unavoidable 
uncertainty. (2002:496) 
 
Rhodes uses John Rawls‟ theory197 to explain this distinctive form of professional 
morality. She argues that in medicine the concept of political liberalism and the 
success of public reason are often more apparent than in political deliberation. This 
notion of public reason is central to Rhodes and Rawls‟ account. Rawls argues that 
there must be a capacity for reason and reasonableness in order for people to 
participate in the hypothetical construction of political justice,
198
 „all ways of 
reasoning…must acknowledge certain common elements: the concept of judgment, 
principles of inference, and rules of evidence…and include standards of correctness 
and criteria of justification.‟ (Rawls, quoted in Rhodes, 2002:500) This idea that 
there can be a common standard of „reason‟ is coupled with Rawls‟ recognition that 
there are some elements in society that have a distinctive character and autonomy 
and therefore act from their own principles. Rhodes argues that while Rawls may not 
have had medicine in mind, „medicine is clearly a part of society that is ethically 
autonomous.‟ (2002:499) 
 
Building on these two elements Rhodes attempts to construct the principles that 
should govern the social institution of medicine, as Rawls outlined the principles that 
                                                 
197
 Rhodes draws on Rawls‟ later work Political Liberalism (1993) to ground her account and the 
quotes from Rawls will be the ones that Rhodes has used to substantiate her account. 
198
 It should be noted here that Rawls separates his claims about political liberalism from his theory of 
justice.  Further, in order to advance this account of medical professionalism one does not have to 
accept the Rawlsian foundations, as in this context it could be argued that we are not taking about 
hypothetical formulations of principles but actual ethical professional codes that doctors adhere to in 
their professional practice. It is enough to say that there is a social practice (medicine) that has 
professional ethical codes that doctors have to follow on moral and indeed legal grounds and these 
have arisen out of the social context that medicine operates in. 
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should govern political institutions. These principles, for Rhodes, are drawn from, 
„the distinctive character and autonomy of the profession [of medicine].‟ 
(2002:500)
199
 The principles that Rhodes outlines are not, as she says, unique or 
distinctive; they are found in many different sets of ethical codes for doctors. She 
argues that, „there is genuine consensus on the core content of the professional 
responsibilities of physicians.‟ (2002:505) and  gives the example of the consistency 
of the principles she lists to those found in „The Medical Professionalism Project‟ 
(2002).
200
  
 
The two foundational principles for Rhodes are: first, the fiduciary responsibility of 
doctors, that they should act for the good of their patients; and second, „physicians 
and the institutions and profession of medicine must seek trust and make themselves 
deserving of trust. (2002:501)
 201
 From these foundational principles come basic 
principles, one of which is non-judgmental regard, no one would want to be denied 
treatment simply because the doctor did not like them. This can be seen as broadly 
analogous to the imperative of impartiality that the informants in this current study 
saw as an important criterion for making acceptable ethical decisions. Hence, for 
Rhodes, these principles arise out of the distinctive character of medicine and put 
moral duties on to doctors qua their being doctors. These duties are different from 
the kind of moral duties that the person in the street might have, „because of its 
distinctive position in society, medicine has its own ethical principles that are in 
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 See Bosk (1979) who argues that medical training is above all an ethical training where doctors 
inculcate the ethical values of their profession. 
200
 Such values are also consistent with those outlined in the Royal College of Physicians‟ Report on 
medical professionalism (RCP, 2005). 
201
 From these two foundational principles, the principals of caring, confidentiality, non-judgmental 
regard, non-sexual regard and respect for the patient‟s values follow. 
 210 
some notable respects different from the rules of ordinary morality, and they have a 
distinctive rationale.‟ (Rhodes, 2002:499)  
 
For Rhodes, Rawl‟s public reason characterises medical decision-making. When 
discussing cases or difficult decisions, „the discussions are limited to sharing facts 
and employing the principles of medical ethics that are supported by public reason…. 
Because the discussants…all start with a common view of what counts as a fact and 
what counts as relevant reasons, consensus…emerges.‟ (2002:503) Rhodes takes 
Rawls‟ idea of a reasonable citizen, who has the virtues of fair-mindedness and will 
put their own prejudices and personal views aside to make „fair‟ and „reasonable‟ 
decisions, and applies this to medical decisions. Doctors act as reasonable „citizens‟ 
and put aside their own views and act, „on the basis of mutually recognizable reasons 
and evidence.‟ (Rawls, quoted in Rhodes, 2002:502) She argues that in medical 
decision-making personal views do not hold sway and, „consensus flowing from 
public reason is the rule and professionalism points the way.‟ (2002:503)  
 
Medical professionalism and process 
 
The account of medical professionalism I want to advance builds on Rhodes and the 
data from my study. An important precondition for operating „ethically‟ in modern 
medical practice would not only be to adhere to a set of ethical precepts laid out in 
professional codes, but to be willing to follow a particular decision-making process. 
This decision-making process is procedural, in that it involves clinics and CECs 
meetings and builds on a particular conception of public reason. This conception of 
public reason as found in the data from this study has similarities with Rhodes‟ 
account of Rawls. The informants did try to put aside their own moral views when 
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making decisions and had a set of „mutually recognizable reasons and evidence‟ on 
which to base decisions. The clinicians did, by dint of their membership of the 
profession of medicine, have a consensus over the procedural aspects of ethical 
decision-making. The main concern over consensus decision-making was that it was 
not possible to get substantive consensus – consensus over actual issues. My account 
places more emphasis on the consensus over procedures for decision-making rather 
than consensus over particular ethical values or principles. The informants were able 
to make consensus-based decisions even when consensus over the substantive issues 
could not be reached. If the distinction between substantive and procedural 
consensus is broken down, then it can be argued that procedural elements incorporate 
substantive ones, procedural standards have substantive implications (Moreno, 
1995). That is, in following certain type of procedure certain ethical values and 
principles are being upheld. This is exemplified in this study where the procedure of 
decision-making was thought to confer a substantive value on the decision – 
impartiality.  
 
Kuhse puts forward the argument that consensus by groups, such as national ethics 
committees designed to make ethics policy is, in practice, the best way of deciding 
complex ethical matters. Her argument is that such committees will make policies, 
„not by presenting us with „the truth‟, but rather presenting society with rational 
arguments.‟ (1994) For Kuhse, „discourse will often reveal that we tend to 
overestimate moral disagreement. Ethics is not an arbitrary series of different things 
to different people, and even the most difficult ethical issues are amenable to reason 
and discussion.‟ (1994:91-92)202 Therefore, it is the procedural aspects of a rational 
                                                 
202
 See Jennings (1991) who also makes this point. 
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dialogue and discourse that gives committee decisions their authoritative force. 
Despite arguing for such a procedural form of ethical decision-making she recognises 
that the authoritative force of committees will be tentative and fallible and does not 
wish to overstate their efficacy, but concludes that they are, „the best we can do.‟ 
(1994:95) 
 
Thus, my account focuses on an adherence to a particular process of ethical decision-
making and this process leads to and incorporates particular ethical values that 
doctors share by dint of their membership of their profession.  
 
Objections  
Veatch argues that there is no cohesive medical „moral vision‟ as I have postulated. 
In order to strengthen my position I want to consider his objections. Veatch (2001) 
argues that as there are so many different medical roles, „they therefore have 
different moralities.‟ (2001:629) Thus, medical morality is determined solely by the 
doctor‟s moral views and not by any aspect of medical practice itself. This is a 
common criticism of medical professionalism theories. Wurm-Schaar and Fato, in an 
edition of The American Journal of Bioethics devoted to a discussion of medical 
professionalism argue, „the medical profession itself appears to lack consensus 
regarding its core values…is fragmented into various sub-speciality organizations 
with their own codes of ethics and conduct.‟ (2004:w1) There have been various 
rejoinders to this (see Brody & Miller, 1998. Miller & Brody, 2001)
203
 but I want to 
advance one counter argument to this „many medicines‟ thesis. 
                                                 
203
 They argue that if Veatch‟s contention is true, that there are many different medicines all with a 
different morality, „by virtue of what are all these disparate practices…seen as practices of medicine.‟ 
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This study did not find that the informants all had identical moral frameworks 
(although it did find an area of „settled morality‟ in which they practised and a 
general adherence to the value of impartiality) what it did find was that they were 
united by their adherence to the process of decision-making. This process was 
thought to aid, facilitate, bring about a more impartial decision – a decision that was 
not based on the individual moral views of a particular doctor. Consensus decision-
making can be seen as a means of achieving a particular ethical goal, the goal in this 
case being a decision that can be argued to be impartial and therefore less likely to be 
subject to reproach. Thus, the informants could be said to have a shared vision of 
what acceptable ethical decision-making should be and what that process was aiming 
to achieve – impartial, trustworthy decisions. Of course, as I only studied one 
speciality my data cannot conclusively rebut the „many medicines‟ objection. 
However the focus on process rather than substantive ethical agreement points to the 
possibility of this being a more widely held and unifying position. 
 
It could be further countered that this medical professionalism account of medical 
morality is idealising this form of medical decision-making. To argue that in order 
for doctors to make acceptable ethical decisions they have to conform to some 
abstract notion of Rawlsian public reason would be doomed in practice. People are 
not always reasonable and it is difficult to put aside one‟s own feelings and moral 
views when dealing with patients. However, from this research project it is possible 
to see that there are processes of ethical decision-making that participants agreed on 
and followed with the explicit aim of making „acceptable‟ ethical decisions. The 
                                                                                                                                          
(2001:590). For them, Veatch‟s position reinstates the dichotomy between medicine as pure technique 
and medicine as a moral practice – a dichotomy, they argue, that needs to be broken down in order for 
medical ethics to be a meaningful discipline. 
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standards of these processes might not reach the exacting ones that Rawls envisaged 
and at times may not have been completely impartial or indeed justifiable, but they 
are, broadly, the best one can do. This is, in essence, the justification for the form of 
consensus decision-making the informants used – it is the best we can do in actual 
practice. In abstract discussions there may be higher standards for ethical decision-
making (for instance applying a theory such as Kant‟s in a rigorous fashion) but in 
practice a weaker standard might be all that can realistically be achieved. 
 
THE MEDICAL PROFESSIONALISM ACCOUNT AND SOCIETAL NORMS 
As stated earlier it now needs to be demonstrated that this medical professionalism 
account is a conception of a „moral vision‟ that could be shared by the wider 
community in which clinicians practice. While medics might agree on the form of 
internal morality that governs their decision-making and see it as the basis for 
making consensual decisions, other people, such as patients for example, might not 
adhere to this form of morality. This moral vision might not be generally accepted in 
wider society. If this is the case, then without a more widely accepted moral vision, it 
could be argued that doctors‟ decision-making has lost its warrant and we are back 
where we started with the criticism of consensus based on inescapable moral 
pluralism. Historically patient groups have been at variance with the medical 
professions‟ approach to many issues and this has been well documented. Examples 
of the medical profession being out of step with a wider morality range from patient 
dissatisfaction with childbirth practices in the 1970s to the practices of organ 
retention in many hospitals that came to light at Alder Hey.
204
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 See Lupton (2003:122-127) for a discussion of patients‟ resistance to medical dominance. 
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These claims do some have purchase. It would be overstating the case to say 
everyone in society held the same moral beliefs and therefore it is possible that the 
medical profession may become inculcated into a particular ethical viewpoint that is 
not generally shared. However, there are three counter-arguments to this point that 
can be raised. First, medical decision-making is no longer the sole preserve of the 
doctors. Other disciplines, patient groups, committees made up of lay members for 
example, all now contribute to both decision-making and the construction of the 
morality of the medical profession (or at least there are moves to try and bring this 
about!). The values and processes of medical professionalism could be said to 
include not just doctors but all health care professionals. The medical profession are 
now publicly scrutinised and their decisions and professional ethics are matters for 
general debate. Therefore, it can be argued that professional ethics have to be in step 
with a more general consensus and consequently are less likely to impose an alien 
morality on wider society.
205
 Further, infertility treatment is highly regulated and the 
process of this regulation involves public consultations, parliament and the 
involvement of interested parties – hence this area of medicine does not operate in an 
ethical vacuum.
206
 
 
Second, the link between medical values to those of the wider society can be 
demonstrated by the example of impartiality. It was argued that this was a value that 
the majority of the informants viewed as an important ethical principle in their 
practice. Impartiality can also be seen as a value that has gained precedence in the 
wider moral framework of British society. Although it is difficult, if not impossible, 
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 For instance, Alder Hey provides an example of public disquiet and scrutiny of a medical practice. 
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 An example of this is the removal of donor anonymity – the professional bodies were against this, 
but nevertheless it was still removed and hence in some senses this was imposed by external bodies on 
medical practice. 
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to pin down the zeitgeist of an age, examples of impartiality as a guiding principle in 
some recent legislation will suffice as examples of its current employment. The 
Sexuality Discrimination Act 1975 has been extended under The Equality Act 2006 
to require public bodies to actively promote gender equality. Sexual Orientation 
Regulations 2002 make it illegal to discriminate on the grounds of sexuality; the 
Employment Equality (Age) Regulations 2006 make it illegal to discriminate on the 
basis of age in employment; and the Disability Discrimination Act 2005 does the 
same for disability.
207
 All these pieces of legislation seek to make employment 
practice more impartial and less susceptible to discriminatory practices. 
 
Finally, it can also be argued that this kind of medical morality is dependent on a 
wider societal acceptance as, at root, it is about the medical profession being 
trustworthy in the eyes of the community it practices in. Therefore, the morality of 
medicine both reflects and is reflected in the morality of the wider community. 
Medicine was traditionally seen as a moral profession in the work of Everett Hughes 
for example. The medical profession was seen as having a set of moral values that it 
adhered to and this was what gave it its status and prestige (Parsons, 1951). It was 
largely seen as an altruistic and moral enterprise. Doctors were granted their 
privileged status on the grounds that they would be moral in their everyday 
undertakings (Cruess & Cruess, 2000). However, this notion of medical 
professionalism began to be heavily criticised in the 1960s and 1970s. It was argued 
that any notion of professional ethics was a cynical ploy, doctors‟ supposed altruism 
was really a mask for their own self-interest (Friedson, 1970. Krause, 1996. Starr, 
1982).  
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However, since the 1990s there has been a change in the tenor of the sociological 
literature and medical professionalism began to be reunited with the notion that 
medicine has certain values (such as altruism) that are central to its functioning in 
society. Freidson, for instance, in a latter work (1994) argued that medical 
professionalism serves an important social function in ensuring that the professions 
maintain high standards of work and trustworthiness. Freidson argued that there were 
now „three logics‟ for viewing the distribution and organisation of health care: 
1. by market forces – where health care is traded like any other commodity 
2. by large social organisations – insurance companies or the NHS, 
bureaucracies that seek to manage health care 
3. by the professions themselves with a commitment to the standard of their 
work and a public service ethos (Freidson, 2001) 
In his view it is this third way of organising healthcare that is preferable. We need to 
bolster medical professionalism in order to best ensure a more ethical and publicly 
trustworthy health service. 
 
Sullivan exemplifies this trend in arguing that medicine cannot function unless the 
public has trust in it as an institution, „the root of the public‟s trust is the confidence 
that physicians will put patients‟ welfare ahead of all other considerations….It is the 
function of medicine as a profession to safeguard and promote this trust in the 
society at large.‟(2000:675) In a report published in 2005, the Royal College of 
Physicians defined medical professionalism as follows, „[m]edical professionalism 
signifies a set of values, behaviours and relationships that underpins the trust that the 
public has in doctors.‟ (2005:14); and argued that, „these values, which underpin the 
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science and practice of medicine, form the basis of a moral contract between the 
medical profession and society.‟ (2005:15) Professionalism becomes associated with 
ethical values of practice and those values are ones that encourage and facilitate 
public trust in the medical profession. Therefore, these values need to be shared by 
the wider society. 
 
It can be argued that this medical professionalism account, which is an articulation of 
values without which „medicine would cease to be a going concern‟, are values that 
necessarily link the medical profession with the wider community. The criticism of 
consensus decision-making, that due to moral pluralism any consensus reached was 
simply a view of particular communities at a particular time and hence did not have 
any moral authority, can be met by claiming that this medical professionalism 
account is linked to a wider morality by the need for the medical profession to be 
trustworthy. Medicine could not be „a going concern‟ if it did not have the public‟s 
trust. 
 
CONCLUSION 
This Chapter has both sought to specify the principle of impartiality that underpinned 
the informants‟ consensus decision-making process and to determine if this is an 
acceptable way of making ethical decisions. Consensus decision-making on ethical 
issues has been defended as an acceptable way of making ethical decisions in the 
infertility clinic. However, this form of decision-making is not perfect and, as 
discussed, there are a number of problems with it. There could be a tendency for it to 
lead to conservatism; for instance some clinics‟ reluctance to treat same-sex couples 
because not everyone agrees. Thus the more „reactionary elements‟ may direct clinic 
 219 
policy. It may be seen as a means of hiding behind the majority and allowing the 
clinic to make unpopular decisions rather than the individual. Finally, not everyone‟s 
views and position will be able to be taken into account, sometimes an individual‟s 
views will be subjugated and group dynamics will play a role in who gets heard. 
 
However, returning to Churchill‟s opening quote, it can be said that the form of 
decision-making used by the informants is not perfect. It may be the worst form of 
decision-making except for all the other forms that have been tried. Often in the 
ethical literature ethical decision-making is given impossibly high, abstract standards 
to meet in order for it to be deemed acceptable and in practice few ways of making 
ethical decisions can meet these stringent criteria. Here, it has been argued that 
consensus decision-making is, in practice, a reasonable and effective way to make 
ethical decisions. In the words of one informant, although this process may have its 
flaws, „But what‟s better?‟ (16-46) 
 
Despite being the „best we can do in practice‟ this form of decision-making can be 
improved upon and strengthened. In the next chapter how this could be done will be 
discussed by examining their use of CECs.  
 
 220 
TABLE 3 
CONSTRUCTIONS OF IMPARTIALITY 
 
 
Elements that contributed to ‘good’ ethical decisions Which doctors Quotes 
Decision should be fair 
- equals should be treated equally 
- should act justly 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Resource allocation in the NHS was often categorised as 
unfair 
 
Dr Down 
Dr Evens 
Dr Francis 
Dr Jenson 
Dr Kilm 
Dr Marsh 
Dr Percy 
Dr Tarn 
 
 
Dr Evens  
Dr Francis 
Dr Down 
Dr Jenson 
Dr Kilm 
Dr Marsh 
Dr Tarn 
 
„Well it‟s unfair, it‟s that you wouldn‟t, whether he is a 
drug dealer or not but if its outside and a couple can 
achieve a pregnancy naturally no-one says to them you 
cannot have children because you are going to be 
unsuitable parents.  But here we maybe saying that 
because they are coming for fertility treatment I think 
everybody should be treated the same.‟(Dr Down, 4-40) 
 
 
„So say from Anytown you can have one cycle of IVF but 
you get it straightaway; if you live in Newtown, you have 
to wait three years but then you get three attempts. 
Right so it varies from? 
Yeah, which is very unfair.‟ (Dr Francis, 6-8) 
Lack of bias 
 
Dr Grant 
Dr Iniman 
Dr Robin 
Dr Percy 
Dr Orben 
Dr Jenson 
„particularly if the person who is directly involved with 
the management of the couple, it‟s very easy for them to 
be biased and give ground in one particular aspect of the 
couple, whereas a fresh pair of eyes might look at it at a 
different angle, and I do value that, yes.  It‟s quite useful 
and, like I said, somebody else might come with a 
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different attitude.‟ (Dr Robin, 18-14) 
 
Better to be detached or not involved in the situation Dr Francis 
Dr Brown 
Dr Evens 
Dr Case 
Dr Havers 
Dr Orben 
Dr Urban 
 
„we‟ll take it to the ethical committee, and take it forward 
from there, to ask a sort of a wider group of people who 
are not connected with the actual delivery of service what 
their views are.‟ (Dr Evens, 5-58) 
Should not discriminate 
- or be prejudiced 
- no unwarranted differential treatment 
 
Dr Adams 
Dr Brown 
Dr Down 
Dr Evens 
 
„The Ethics Committee felt that we were discriminating 
against single women and lesbians, and that we should 
treat them, so we do now.‟ (Dr Adams, 1-48) 
Guidelines can help prevent bias Dr Adams 
Dr Jenson 
Dr Percy 
„If we are seen to be discriminating on a random basis, 
you know, I may have a different view to my colleague 
next door who‟s seeing another couple.  As long as there 
is a policy across the board as to how we‟re going to 
manage people.‟ (Dr Jenson, 10-74) 
 
Ethics committees can promote impartiality 
- should not have a vested interest 
 
 
Dr Brown 
Dr Case 
Dr Orben 
Dr Francis 
„Well, that you‟re given advice by people who aren‟t 
necessarily doctors or scientists, or interested specifically 
in that, and they can look at it from outside, they haven‟t 
got a vested interest in saying yes or no.‟ (Dr Brown, 2-
28) 
 
Should not impose one‟s own beliefs on the patient Dr Kilm 
Dr Iniman 
„So I think it‟s just appreciating other people who may 
have different views from their own and, to a certain 
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Dr Percy degree, they have to be respected even if you don‟t, you 
just have to agree to disagree.‟ (Dr Kilm, 11-47) 
Ethics training can help prevent bias Dr Francis 
Dr Iniman 
Dr Francis 
„Oh no, I think it does, and again it takes away from 
personal bias to having a framework, a sort of structure on 
which you can pin the arguments that help you to make a 
decision.‟ (Dr Iniman, 9-76) 
 
Guidelines can be unfair Dr Lovate 
Dr Marsh 
„but if you have a unit and there are lots of people on the 
unit, and the people coming in and out of the unit, you do 
have to have a policy and to some extent you just have to 
stick to the policy, realising that in certain situations it‟s 
unfair, it‟s …‟ (Dr Lovate, 12-26) 
 
Try to not be influenced by one‟s own culture Dr Havers 
Dr Percy 
Dr Novack 
„So I think that if we‟ve got a national regulatory body 
they could be helpful with that sort of issue, sort of 
helping clarify what‟s nationally acceptable within those 
particular [ethnic] communities.‟ (Dr Percy, 16-90) 
 
Decisions should be impartial 
- not influenced by financial considerations 
 
Dr Case 
Dr Havers 
„To be impartial because I think the freedom of people is 
very important.  People have to have the freedom on 
making a choice but within certain limits.‟ (Dr Havers, 8-
25) 
 
Consistency in decision-making 
 
Dr Percy 
Dr Lovate 
„You have to be consistent, I think that‟s very important.‟ 
(Dr Percy, 16-7) 
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CHAPTER NINE 
ETHICS SUPPORT IN THE INFERTILITY CLINIC 
 
INTRODUCTION 
In this chapter I want to draw out the practical implications of this study. I will do 
this by building on the previous analysis of how the informants made and approached 
ethical decisions and discuss how ethical decision-making can be supported in the 
infertility clinic. I shall first draw together the data on how the informants thought 
about the use of CECs. Some of these points have been covered in Chapter Seven, 
where the general themes of how they made decisions on the basis of a form of 
consensus were elaborated. However, the purpose here is to give a picture of the 
specific reasons why they sought to use CECs as opposed to the other forum of 
decision-making, the clinic meeting. Then, recommendations for how this CEC 
support could be strengthened will be made, examining the debate over the use of 
CECs in the literature and the drawing out the implications of my findings.  
 
CEC are a relatively recent feature of medical practice in the UK and are more 
established in the US where, since the early 1980s, it has been recommended that 
hospitals have a CEC as a way of addressing ethical issues raised by patient care 
(Slowther & Hope, 2000). CECs have also developed in Europe, again more slowly 
than they have in the US (Slowther et al, 2004).
208
 The functions of CEC are various, 
Slowther et al, (2004a) summarise these as falling within three areas: providing 
ethics input into Trust policy and guidelines; organising ethics education within a 
Trust; and providing advice to clinicians about individual cases. Such committees 
had generally operated in isolation until the formation of the UK Clinical Ethics 
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Network.
209
 This network aimed to offer general support to CECs and facilitate the 
sharing of good practice between committees (Slowther et al, 2004 & 2004a). 
 
CECs differ from research ethics committees in that their decisions do not have any 
legally binding status, Trusts are under no obligation to have such committees and 
their operation is not governed by government regulation. Recommendations about 
the use and formulation of CECs have never been included in the HFEA Code of 
Practice. The current guidance states that, „the HFEA encourages licensed clinics to 
make use of ethics committees [to aid the person responsible in their decision-
making]‟ (HFEA, 2000:1) In 2005 when the House of Commons Science and 
Technology Committee reviewed the HFE Act 1990 they heard evidence on the role 
and use of CECs in infertility units. Slowther and Hope from the ETHOX Centre in 
Oxford, who have conducted much of the current research on CECs in the UK, 
commented: „Ethics support at unit level is valuable despite the existence of a 
national statutory body [the HFEA].‟ (HC, 2005:150) As a result of this, and other 
evidence (for example Doyal, 2005), the Committee recommended that, „there are 
merits in the creation of a nationally coordinated network of clinical ethics 
committees to parallel the arrangement for local research ethics committees.‟ (HC, 
2005:186) In response the government said, although it recognised the need for such 
committees, it would not wish to establish national guidelines and regulations for 
CECs, „[we are] not convinced that attempting to direct centrally the conduct and 
decisions of local clinical ethics committees in the manner recommended is an 
appropriate role for central government.‟ (DH, 2005: Recommendation 84). 
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Consequently, there is no mention of CECs for infertility units in the HFE Bill that is 
currently going through parliament.  
 
This lack of central organisation is reflected in the patchy provision of CECs in the 
UK; for instance in 2001, only 20 Trusts had a formal CEC (Slowther et al, 2001a). 
However, by 2004 68 CECs were registered with the UK Clinical Ethics Network 
(Slowther et al, 2004a). The purpose of this chapter is: to examine how these recent 
developments in the use of CECs have impacted on infertility practice; what the 
arrangements are for such committees are; if these committees provide a useful 
function in the infertility setting; and, if they do, how this form of ethics support can 
be developed.  
 
THE USE OF CECs IN INFERTILITY CLINICS 
 
The type of CEC in the clinics visited for this study are summarised in Table 4. 
Three of the units had designated CECs for their units, which only considered cases 
and issues concerning infertility treatments. Some units used the hospital CEC and 
one unit had access to a clinical ethics group rather than a formalised committee. As 
discussed in Chapter Seven, Clinic 5 (that had its own designated CECs) was the 
only unit that saw the CEC as the principle place where ethical decisions were made. 
Dr Brown said: 
The clinic has an Ethics Committee. So if we have an ethical issue about 
whether or not we should be treating somebody, then it is referred to the 
ethics committee, which comprises some outside people and some in-house 
medical people. (2-12)  
 
And Dr Urban: 
 
Any ethical issues are discussed in a separate ethics meeting. (21-5) 
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Therefore, most units mainly relied on their clinic meetings as the place to make 
ethical decisions and CECs did not really feature as strongly as might have been 
expected in ethical decision-making.
210
  
 
TABLE 4 
STRUCTURE OF CLINICAL ETHICS COMMITTEES 
 
 
 
Clinic Structure of clinical ethics committee 
Clinic 1 
 Dr Down 
 Dr Evens 
 Dr Francis 
 Dr Grant 
 
Had a designated one for their unit, organised by the hospital 
trust. Used to ratify any guideline and policy changes and 
discuss difficult cases. 
Clinic 2 
 Dr Havers 
 Dr Iniman 
 Dr Lovate 
 Dr Marsh 
 Dr Percy 
 
Did not have a one organised by the hospital but had an 
informal Clinical Ethics Group organised by consultants and 
interested parties. 
Clinic 3 
 Dr Kilm 
 Dr Orben 
 
Did have one but as it was used so infrequently it has now 
been disbanded.  
Clinic 4 
 Dr Novack 
 Dr Quest 
 Dr Robin 
 Dr Street 
 
There is a hospital wide clinical ethics committee 
Clinic 5 
 Dr Adams 
 Dr Brown 
 Dr Urban 
 
Had a designated one for their unit, organised by the hospital 
trust in which all ethical cases and discussions took place 
Dr Case 
 
 
Could use a central one that served a number of private units 
 
Dr Jenson There is a hospital wide clinical ethics committee 
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Dr Tarn 
 
 
There is a hospital wide clinical ethics committee 
 
Dr Vance 
 
Have a committee designated for their unit, organised by the 
Trust. 
 
 
 
The role and use of CECs was a frequently discussed topic in the interviews with the 
informants when they were asked how they approached ethical decision-making. 
They were asked if they used CECs and what they thought that such committees 
contributed to such decision-making. I shall first examine why the informants said 
that they used CEC and in what circumstances; and then consider what benefits they 
thought these committees conferred on ethical decision-making. Subsequently, the 
limitations of CECs will be discussed, examining the problems that the informants 
raised with the use of CECs.  
 
Why the informants used CECs 
CEC were used for a variety of reasons, the predominant ones were: if there was 
disagreement in the unit; for complex cases; and for setting guidelines or cases that 
might set a precedent. I shall consider these in turn. 
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Disagreement 
Disagreement over issues involved in a particular case was one reason why some 
informants said that they used their CEC. Dr Marsh explicitly states this as a reason 
for using, what is in his clinic, a Clinical Ethics Group: 
There will be areas where we will disagree, and there will be a debate.  It‟s just in 
those, if there‟s a big disagreement then, obviously, our effects are very grave, 
you can seek help from the local ethical committees, or every institution has got 
its ethical committee, or you can discuss it with an ethicist just to tease out the 
…(13-10) 
In the same unit Dr Iniman also stated that if it was „moot‟ decision they would take 
it to the ethics group (9-35). Dr Vance who worked in one of the larger units in the 
country said, when asked how his unit made decisions on difficult cases said: 
I mean you take your concerns to the meetings, and everybody discusses it 
and we try to come to a consensus opinion.  There‟s about 20 of us, nurses, 
counsellors, doctors, not much in the way of admin staff, they tend not to 
want to stay behind at night, they don‟t get paid so much.  And we try to get a 
consensus.  Sometimes we just grind to a halt, we can‟t decide.   
 
What do you do then? 
 
Well then we just stop for a week or two and have another go later, and then 
if we still can‟t make it we then take it to the ethics committee…(22-21) 
Dr Percy also made this point: 
So if, as a unit, we were completely split or if we made a majority decision 
but a few people said look, very strongly, I think this is the wrong decision, 
as I say, we‟ve not had that situation but knowing how everybody feels here I 
think we‟d probably all say fine, we‟ll take it to the ethics group and abide by 
them. (16-39) 
 
Disagreement might be seen as a common reason for taking a case to a CEC, for 
instance Larcher et al (1997) found that the lack of a forum to resolve disagreements 
and tensions within units was a reason advanced for using CECs. Watson (2005), in 
his clinic‟s guidelines for ethical decision-making, recommended considering 
 229 
consulting a CEC if consensus could not be reached. However, this was only 
mentioned by four of my informants (Dr Marsh, Iniman, Percy and Vance).  
 
Complex cases 
 
Dr Novack summed up the use he made of the CEC when contrasting two cases he 
had to deal with. The first case was of an Asian couple that wanted to use a friend of 
theirs as an egg donor because of the lack of Asian donors. The issue was that the 
donor was 40, which was older than the normal guidelines for donors. He says: 
That couple I won‟t take to the ethics committee because I don‟t think it‟s 
complex enough. That couple, I mean I could take the decision myself, but 
what I would tend to do and what I plan to do is discuss it in one of our clinic 
meetings. (14-11)  
Whereas another case raised, to his mind, more complex issues and therefore should 
be taken to the CEC: 
Yes.  I‟ve got another one here actually that your microphone‟s on … of a 
girl who has got a Mosaic Turner Syndrome, so she will go through an early 
menopause at some stage, but at the moment she‟s producing eggs.  The 
technology for freezing the eggs isn‟t that good at the moment and she‟s 
requested having embryos created with a donor sperm for her use in the 
future, but at a time when she may be married with somebody who may not 
be comfortable with those embryos with an unknown donor‟s sperm.  But it 
may be her only chance to create embryos.  So that‟s maybe, again it raises 
ethical issues and, again, looking at it simplistically, it seems like a 
reasonable request.  But I‟m going to put that to the ethics committee because 
I think it‟s something that just needs a little bit more thought because there 
are, again, a few layers, there‟s a number of potential scenarios for the future.  
So, is it right to create embryos that may never be used. (14-22) 
This points to a view that the CEC might be a better place to engage in a more 
involved discussion than the clinic meeting. The need to discuss complex cases in 
CEC is also illustrated by this example given by Dr Evens, she says: 
Ethically, we have major dilemmas to say that, when we don‟t treat, sorry, if 
we only treat childless couples, if we treat a [couple who have a child with 
Downs], how can we then say, are we just ignoring the fact that the abnormal 
child exists.  That‟s a huge ethical dilemma.  So that was debated long and 
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hard in our ethics committee.  And in the end we came up with, it might 
sound a bit like a cop out, but it was decided that if the couple had a child that 
was not going to reach the age of majority, then they should perhaps be 
considered for treatment on the basis of saying that the, by opting for fertility 
treatment it was going to minimise the likelihood of having a similar issue.  
But that kind of issue is huge. (5-55) 
The issue of whether to treat those who all ready had a child if that child was in 
someway disabled was seen as an important and complex issue and one that they 
debated at the CEC. Dr Grant also made this point: 
We have meetings with our counsellors, and we tend to discuss the ethical 
problems at this meeting.  We‟ve also got an ethics committee, where some 
of the more difficult cases are discussed. (7-21) 
Therefore, issues that were seen as requiring more discussion, that were more 
complex than usual, were seen as reasons to take cases to CECs. A further reason for 
taking cases to CECs was that they fell outside the clinic‟s guidelines. Dr Marsh said, 
but there have been previously cases where we‟ve had to say, for example, freeze 
tissue in pre-pubertal girls for, ovarian tissue for preserving fertility, you know, 
those kind of things might be taken to ethical committees just to think about 
because these are not established practices.(13-11) 
Dr Down said: 
 
We take that sort of thing which falls outside our guidelines to the ethical 
committee.  If we have any serious reservations about someone‟s ability to 
provide some effective parenting, we may discuss it with the ethical 
committee. If new situations arise which have got ethical connotations like 
should we do pre-implantations genetic diagnosis?  What I am saying is, if 
there is a new situation where there was an ethical dimension as to how we 
handle the eggs or the embryos, we would ask them for that. (4-13) 
 
Guidelines and Precedence 
CECs were also used for setting the guidance itself and such general policies were 
often seen as most appropriately made by a CEC than just by the Unit.  
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Dr Evens said: 
I suppose one of the issues that has changed in our guidelines, is that we used 
to say that our guidelines should mirror those of adoption, and then obviously 
there‟s been the change where we have a male age limit, and last year the 
male age limit was removed after discussion in ethical committees that we 
have, to say that well, does it matter? (5-48) 
Dr Adams illustrated how his CEC had formulated guidance on a particular issue: 
And the Ethics Committee in the hospital decided that we would also apply 
the same to the self-funding patients, so as a Trust we did not treat lesbian 
couples or single women.  We didn‟t feel quite so badly because there was a 
hospital in Anytown that does.  With the Human Rights Act, we revisited the 
question in the Ethics Committee.  The Ethics Committee felt that we were 
discriminating against single women and lesbians, and that we should treat 
them, so we do now.(1-48) 
Dr Grant also talked about using the CEC to formulate unit policy on age limits for 
male partners (7-27). In the literature CECs have also been advanced as the 
appropriate place to write and develop ethical guidelines for clinical practice (see 
Doyal, 2001. Sokol, 2005).   
CECs were also used if it was thought that the decision might set a precedent for 
future cases. Dr Iniman outlines how the decision-making process for a difficult case 
might be approached. In this case a couple had wanted to use the husband‟s father‟s 
sperm, as the husband was unable to produce any himself. 
So what happened with the couple who wanted to use the father‟s 
sperm? 
That‟s only a referral this week, so we‟ve got some in-house discussion, 
which is also a practical thing, which of course he will be too old to fit the 
regulations for a sperm donor.  Well looking at the husband‟s age, I think it‟s 
very unlikely his father would be of the age to be a sperm donor.  So we‟ll 
have the departmental meeting next week, and either the unit lead clinician 
will write on behalf of us, putting all these comments, or if it‟s a moot 
decision then we‟ll go up to the Clinical Ethics.  We might take it to them 
anyway actually, even if we can clearly make an in-house decision on it, we 
might take it to them because it‟s such an interesting point and there might be 
similar future referrals. (9-35) 
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It was felt that as there might be cases like this in the future then CEC opinion might 
be useful for the clinicians to base act as a precedent for other cases.  
 
How CECs helped in the making of ethical decisions 
 
The informants had mixed views on the usefulness of CECs and Table 5 summarises 
their perspectives. The informants highlighted a number of benefits of using CEC: 
wider discussion of decisions; decisions made by those who were detached from the 
case or situation; transparency of decision-making; and protection for the clinicians. 
 
Wider discussion 
 
The main benefit that the informants thought could be gained by using CECs was the 
opportunity to discuss issues and cases more widely, to get a range of opinions from 
a broader spectrum of people and therefore to have a more balanced and considered 
decision. Dr Urban summed these points up when she said: 
Yes, but it‟s sort of, these meetings are for that reason that you listen to 
everybody‟s views, and it‟s very good in that three of four lay persons are 
there that have nothing to do with that. They don‟t know how we work, and 
getting their views.  So I think you come out of your infertility, take the hat 
off and then you listen to them.  And I think that helps a lot, you know, you 
listen to other people‟s views.  End of the day, yes, it‟s the consultant 
decision whether treatment‟s provided, but these ethics meetings are there to 
guide us in the right direction.  (21-21) 
 
Dr Down said: 
Well, their decisions aren‟t binding on us but we value their wisdom in 
discussing the problem, getting other peoples points of view on it.  So, it‟s 
like a, very much a intelligent sounding board for the decisions that we make. 
(4-14) 
And: 
What, whatever sort of training, life experience they‟ve got they‟ll bring to it.  
It ranges from professors of ethics and medical ethics down to people of 
different religious faiths. So it‟s a microcosm of the community. (4-16) 
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Dr Francis, Grant and Novack also reiterated this view: 
But it‟s people from all different sort of backgrounds really who I feel give a 
more balanced view.  Because we can, you know, we just get a bit too 
focused or a bit too kind of narrow really because we do it day in and day out.  
So I think it is good to have that, even if they come up with decisions we 
don‟t want.  (6-45)  
Dr Grant: 
Obviously we‟ve got lay people as well, and you learn from non-medical 
people how to approach a case, or why sometimes you as a doctor could be 
advised by certain things.  Other lay people in the committee could help you 
to look at things from a different perspective and different side. (7-23) 
 
Dr Novack: 
As a sounding board, but they can just advise sort of generically, because 
they‟re sensible people who are versed in clinical ethical dilemmas I suppose.  
You don‟t necessarily have to have, require an expert views in reproductive 
medicine.  They just have to be able to think things through. (14-9) 
Dr Orben thought that CECs contributed this type of common perspective: 
What do they bring?  Well, you hope they bring common sense and a view of 
what‟s representative and what‟s acceptable to society.  I suppose because we 
are so close to it and do it all the time, you view things differently from the 
man on the street, I guess, and so you want to test that out with normal people 
instead of strange people I suppose. (15-23) 
Dr Percy and Vance also thought that CECs could help keep clinicians‟ decisions in 
line with „everyday‟ thinking: 
I suppose really, most of the discussion is actually about making sure you‟ve 
got a sensible considered majority opinion, that a sensible considered 
majority of people think that we should not be treating or we should be 
treating.  I guess it‟s sort of safety in numbers and reassuring yourself that 
your line of thinking is not way out there and that this is acceptable. (16-39) 
 
Have I thought, could I manage without an ethics committee?  I have 
actually.  There have been times I‟ve thought well quite clearly this is 
wasting their time, you know.  But I do find it, I do get some reassurance 
from it really.  I mean if you‟re going out on a completely wild limb they 
would point that out.  You know, if somebody‟s like completely lost the plot.  
But, you know. (22-34) 
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CECs were, for the informants, forums where you get a wider range of opinions and 
a greater sense of perspective on an issue. Therefore, CECs are usually multi-
disciplinary bodies and can therefore improve decision-making by bringing together 
the views and standpoints of a diversity of specialisms and people (Larcher et al, 
1997. Slowther et al, 2001a). 
 
Detachment 
 
As discussed in Chapter Eight, another particular feature of CECs that informants 
valued was that such committees were not involved in the case, did not know the 
participants and this enabled the decision to be made more impartiality. When talking 
about how detachment was useful in making ethical decisions, Dr Francis 
commented, 
Which links into what the ethical committee does, because they‟ve not met the 
patient, they‟re not, so they can look at it in a slightly more as a problem to solve 
rather than just to kind of get the action because we‟re there at the time.(6-50) 
Dr Evens and Dr Brown agreed with this: 
 
It allows us to bounce ideas off the wall, discussing it, i.e. meetings, and then 
we‟ll take it to the ethical committee, and take it forward from there, to ask a 
sort of a wider group of people who are not connected with the actual 
delivery of service what their views are. (5-57)  
 
so you may have a religious sort of person and you may have lawyers and 
you may just have, you know, I shouldn‟t say academics but people from 
completely unrelated disciplines just to look dispassionately at a situation. (2-
14) 
In aiding the making of decisions that could be said to be more impartial, Dr Percy 
argued that CECs could aid the transparency of decision-making: 
And I think it‟s often helpful to talk to people from different clinical 
backgrounds as well. You can get very focused in your own, and I think it‟s 
often quite helpful to have to spell out actually how do we make this sort of 
decision and why is this one particularly difficult? (16-84) 
 
Dr Vance also made this point: 
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It‟s politics really, hospital politics.  Because if you do something that people in-
house are unhappy about it could leak out and that could get a bit sour.  If you 
take it to the ethics committee it‟s in the open, and if they disagree, I mean 
nothing‟s binding about what the ethics committee say but at least you haven‟t 
kept it in-house, you haven‟t done it secretly.  That‟s the important thing. (22-28) 
   
 
Protection 
 
Finally, informants drew attention to the protection from censure that a CEC might 
give them. Dr Brown said: 
Oh, yes, very helpful because when you genuinely do have a problem or you 
think there‟s an issue, I mean it gives you guidance.  It also gives you some 
protection in the final decision, hopefully, which is going to be in line with 
the Ethics Committee in that it is a number of people, if you will.  It‟s 
decision by cabinet rather than one person‟s „well my view is this shouldn‟t 
be done, full stop‟. (2-20) 
Dr Havers said: 
You feel also a bit more, having support from an ethical committee in making 
such a decision, it‟s an important thing. (8-29) 
 
These benefits of CECs all reinforced the form of decision-making the clinicians 
thought was appropriate for ethical issues. The CEC extended their consensus 
decision-making by giving them a wider group of people to discuss issues with – 
more opinions and disciplines to contribute to the debate. CECs also performed an 
important function in helping the informants make impartial decisions, by involving 
those who did not have any relationship with the patients or cases, those who were 
„detached‟ from the situation and could, therefore, make more impartial decisions. 
 
Limitations of CECs 
 
Not often used 
One of the main points that came out of the discussion of CECs was that they were 
not used very often, clinicians did not often present cases to the CEC for discussion. 
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This is something that has been reported in other studies, (Racine, 2007. Hurst et al, 
2005. Slowther et al, 2001a). In Clinic 4, for instance, there was a hospital CEC that 
was used by the head of the unit, Dr Novack. However, none of the three sub-
speciality trainees at this unit (Drs Quest, Robin and Street) knew there was such a 
hospital based CEC and when asked about it, Drs Quest and Robin said: 
No, most of the time we don‟t have a committee like that. Sometimes they 
have a committee but it‟s just the consultants and the senior nurses in order to 
discuss a couple of cases, but I never heard about the ethical committee for 
specific cases.  If we have a very complex case the meeting is between the 
consultants, us, the doctor who saw the couple, sometimes maybe the GP or, 
and the senior nurses, that will discuss a case. (17-15) 
 
Ethics committee?  Apart from research local ethics committee.  No.  Not that 
I‟m aware of, no. (18-13) 
 
This indicated that the CEC was not used very often in this clinic and did not have a 
very high profile. A number of CECs had folded up due to lack of use, Dr Case said: 
We had an ethics committee supporting this, you know, a separate ethics 
committee constitute as an ethics committee supporting this clinic, but for a 
long time they hadn‟t been used, no cases being put through to them. (3-42) 
Dr Kilm‟s committee had also disbanded: 
Well, I think it‟s sort of, for what use it was, it sort of folded up.  Because it 
was used very, very infrequently it sort of stopped, we just stopped using it, I 
think it just.  So if there is a problem, I guess now we would  probably just 
discuss it as a group and then take it from there. (11-25) 
 
A number of informants said that they had rarely used their CECs.  
Dr Tarn said: 
Yes I‟ve used them, and I think they have been helpful, and in fact I have 
been to one of the meetings to present a case - that must be about 18 months 
ago now, I can‟t remember.  But I think yes, I think they have been helpful.  
But I think that‟s only back to the wall, certainly from my point of view, from 
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the fertility point of view, we were able to resolve most of those issues 
internally I think. (20-16) 
 
Dr Percy: 
So we haven‟t actually, I haven‟t personally had to take a case to the ethics but we 
do have it, and I think that it is always reassuring to know that it is there. (16-41) 
Dr Orben said his unit did not often use the hospital CEC: 
 
So the ethics committee, how do you use that? 
Very infrequently is the answer…. but, gosh, if we do that once a year I‟d be 
surprised really.  It doesn‟t happen very often. (15-22) 
Dr Novack said the reason he did not use the hospital‟s CEC much was due to the 
lack of regular meetings and this meant that the committee could not be responsive 
enough: 
But not that often because they‟re busy and the cases are complex and it takes 
a lot of time, and all these people do it voluntarily. (14-10) 
However, Dr Urban and Vance, who both had designated CECs for their Units, 
mentioned that meetings sometimes had to be cancelled due to lack of items for 
discussion: 
I‟ve attended to so far two.  One there was no case to be discussed, (21-7) 
It‟s only once a quarter, and they quite often have been cancelled.  The last 
one was cancelled because there was nothing to talk about. (22-37) 
 
An explanation for why they did not often use CECs could be (as discussed in 
previous chapters): first, that largely the clinicians operated within a „settled 
morality‟ in which the majority of their practice did not present greater ethical 
difficulties (see Chapter Six); and second, that frequently their first port of call was 
the clinic meeting in which to raise difficult cases and it was in this forum that many 
of the cases could be resolved. Hurst et al, noted a similar finding, „ethics 
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consultation appears to be perceived as a last resort rather than as the primary source 
of help in cases of ethical difficulty.‟ (2005:13) 
 
Other limitations of CECs  
There were also a number of issues that some informants raised concerning the 
limitations of CECs. Dr Jenson thought that often CECs were not representative and 
therefore this meant that they were not the best place to make such decisions: 
As society changes so should our views, and I think this is where the ethics 
committee‟s make-up has to be, is very important and there‟s certain ethics 
committees that I‟ve been involved with I don‟t think are particularly 
representative because the vast majority of people who would give up the time to 
sit on ethics committees are probably white middle class people who have their 
own strict view, and may not be representative. (10-30) 
He also raised the issue of what cases should be taken to an CEC? 
But the numbers of cases that we‟re referring to the ethics committee are 
becoming less and less. Even egg donation of, inter-familial egg donation used to 
go to the ethics committee.  Why?  Go and see the counsellor and gradually you 
will think of what should we be sending, and I think it comes down to exceptional 
cases and then having an ethics committee meets once a month for the exceptional 
cases.  Is it worthwhile? (10-34) 
He went on to say: 
So ethics committees I think are less involved than they used to be, certainly 
in my experience here. (10-33) 
Dr Orben  pointed to lack of experience of their hospital CEC when talking about 
how often he used the committee:  
Very infrequently is the answer, and it‟s had different forms over the years and we 
used to use the hospital one but they were so sort of knocked sideways when we 
asked them anything that now we tend to leave it to the PCT who seem to have a 
better formed group that‟s, because they are more used to taking decisions about 
funding transplants or, I don‟t know, some other rare treatments, and so we tend 
to use them now to make those decisions and they seem better able to do it than 
our in-house ones, the one that used to discuss research projects and things like 
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that, and they really struggled very hard to come to a conclusion with anything we 
would ask them to do.  So, as I say, now it‟s the PCT.  (15-41) 
 
In Clinic 2 they had a Clinical Ethics Group rather than a committee as such, that 
was run by „keen consultants‟ and a philosopher from the university. Dr Iniman 
raised the problem of the ambiguous status of the clinical ethics support in her clinic.  
But in practice I think that it‟s been of fairly limited help because it‟s not got a 
very clear place in the structure of the hospital unit, it doesn‟t have any place with 
the PCT, for example, so I‟ve got to go also through all those layers.  So, for 
example, to do a procedure on a child, it wasn‟t just taking things to the Clinical 
Ethics Committee, I went to the Clinical Director, I went to the hospital 
committee that deals with new technologies.  You know, there was more 
complexities. (9-99) 
 
Dr Havers from the same clinic said: 
We have some hospital committees here, but the committee declined the case; 
they said that they can only advise on medical issues but not on these kind of 
issues.  And they declined the case actually, so they let us down.  And we had 
to use a bit of commonsense. (8-20) 
 
Here he felt that he did not have access to adequate ethics support, the committee „let 
them down‟ and the team were left to their own devices. 
 
THE DEBATE OVER THE USE OF CECs 
 
Having examined the informants‟ views and perspectives on CECs, I now want to 
consider how my data impacts on the wider debate over the use of CECs. There 
appears to be a need for the medical profession to have more support for their ethical 
decision-making (RCP, 2005a). If this point is accepted the question becomes, „what 
is the best way of providing this support?‟ This question raises both practical and 
ethical issues: a solution needs to be both practically workable and ethically 
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advantageous and it is balancing these two goals, goals that are sometimes in tension, 
that is the difficult task. 
 
The need for ethics support 
 
The Royal College of Physicians (RCP) established a working party in 2004 to 
consider what kind of ethics support would be most valuable for clinicians at a local 
level. This working party arose out of a, „perceived need to ensure that decisions are 
ethically as well as clinically defensible.‟ (RCP, 2005a:ix) This greater focus on the 
ethical aspects of medical practice has been well documented (Parker, 2004. Watson, 
2005)
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 and a number of reasons have been given for this trend: the general shift 
from medical paternalism; high profile incidents such as Alder Hey and Bristol; 
advances in medical technology; a general shift to the greater accountability of 
professions; and a demand that decisions are made on „evidence‟ or for good reasons. 
The medical profession is now much more closely scrutinised by the media, the 
public and by internal mechanisms such as professional development reviews and 
institutional audit (Kerr, 2008). This shift in both the organisational delivery of 
health care and the increasing focus on ethical issues raised by medical practice has 
resulted in a number of developments, one of which has been a greater demand for 
some form of ethics support for health care professionals. 
 
The RCP Working Party conducted a survey of specialist registrars to investigate 
their experiences and opinions on ethics support and training, and found that:  
Ongoing support from senior colleagues and peers is used and valued, but in 
addition to this trainees would value having access to clinical ethics support from 
a wide range of sources. The preferred model is through senior colleagues, 
clinicians with an interest in ethics or clinical ethicists or CECs. (2005a:34) 
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 See also Fleetwood et al (1989) for a consideration of why CECs developed in the US.  
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On this basis of this survey and their deliberations, the Working Party concluded 
that: „Wherever health care is provided we believe, on the basis of current trends, and 
our findings, that there will be a need for formal ethics support which is both timely 
and informed. This can no longer be left to chance or allowed to depend on the 
enthusiasm of individuals.‟ (2005a:37) One of the main ways the Working Party 
envisage this support being provided is by CECs.
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 This view has also been 
reiterated by other bodies, for instance, The Nuffield Report on ethical decisions in 
fetal and neonatal medicine also recommended that, „there is scope for a greater 
number of UK neonatal intensive care units…to benefit from general and specific 
advice of a local clinical ethics committee.‟ (NCOB, 2006) 
 
The study of CECs in the UK carried out by Slowther and colleagues also found that 
many clinicians and managers believed that some form of ethics support was 
desirable and a CEC was favoured by 62% of respondents, 26% favoured an ethicist 
and 12% suggested some other form of support (Slowther et al, 2001a:i4) This need 
for ethics support is born out by the increase in the formation of  CECs in the last 20 
years in the UK (Slowther et al, 2001. Slowther et al, 2004a).
213
 This increase can be 
explained partly by local reasons, a particularly problematic case or a group of 
clinicians wanting to have a forum to discuss ethical issues in more detail. Other 
reasons are related to more general changes in modern medicine as noted above.  
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 The other ways of providing ethics support recommended are: the availability of a clinical ethicist 
and an increase in undergraduate and postgraduate ethics education. 
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 See the UK Clinical Ethics Network website, www.ethics-network.org.uk for an up to date list of 
CECs known to them. 
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My study also found that most of the informants (with the exception of Drs Jenson 
and Kilm) found some form of ethics support very useful and this support was in the 
first instance colleagues at clinic meetings and then, if the need arose, they would use 
a CEC to resolve a problematic case.  
 
How to meet this demand? 
As discussed, one of the main suggestions for how ethics support could be provided 
was the use of a CEC. I shall confine my discussion to this aspect of ethics support as 
none of the informants had access to a clinical ethicist and many of the benefits they 
saw in using CECs when consulting on a particular case, that of extending their 
consensus, would not be met by consulting with one individual. Dr Grant, for 
instance, said: 
and in the ethics committee it‟s not one person deciding but just a group 
reaching a conclusion. (7-70) 
This is clearly seeing the CEC as an extension of the process of consensus decision-
making that was elaborated in Chapter Seven. The informants thought that ethical 
decisions should be taken as a group and therefore the use of a CEC was extending 
this group decision-making further. Therefore, although in many circumstances a 
clinical ethicist could have been useful, they would not have been able to take the 
place of a CEC, rather they could have to act in concert with the committee.
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The key question is how to organise CECs so that they can be useful and offer 
genuine ethics support to clinicians rather than simply be an increase in bureaucracy 
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 There is a debate over whether there should be an ethicist on a CEC (RCP, 2005a. Slowther et al, 
2001a. Slowther et al, 2004). 
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(Slowther et al, 2001a). My data on how the informants thought about CECs can be 
useful in pointing to ways that such committees could be organised, what possible 
limitations they might have and how these can be overcome. 
 
What kind of model of CEC? 
In my study the units visited had three main ways their CEC or ethics support was 
organised (see Table 4).
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1. There were those units without a CEC at all (Clinic 3 and Dr Case‟s unit), 
they relied on either taking difficult cases to their PCT (Clinic 3) or using a 
central ethics committee that served a number of private units in their region. 
2. There were those units (Clinics 4, Drs Jenson and Tarn) who used the general 
hospital CEC to take any cases they wanted to discuss. Unit 2 had an Ethics 
Group, which was not a formal CEC and had a rather ad hoc structure. 
3. There were three units (Clinics 1, 5 and Dr Vance) who had a designated 
CEC for their infertility unit, this was a committee organised by the Trust that 
only dealt with issues from the infertility unit. 
Those in clinics with the first form of organisation were not overly concerned that 
they did not have access to a CEC based at their place of work. The CEC in both 
Clinic 3 and Dr Case‟s unit had disbanded due to lack of use and Dr Orben (15-41) 
talked about how, when his unit did have a CEC, they were unable to reach 
conclusions on cases, so were therefore not very helpful. 
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 See Slowther et al,(2004) for a discussion of discussion of different models of CECs and ethics 
support (Section A9). 
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Those clinics with the second form of organisation raised a number of problems with 
this arrangement. Clinic 4, who used the hospital CEC, had a very low awareness of 
the existence of such a committee and that ethical cases could be taken there. Drs 
Quest, Robin and Street did not know that there was such a committee and it 
appeared to be mainly used by the head of the unit if a case was sufficiently complex 
to merit extended discussion. Hence, the relationship between a general hospital CEC 
and the unit might not be sufficiently close to enable it to be a valuable resource for 
the clinic. Clinic 2, which was served by a clinical ethics group, not a formal CEC, 
found the ad hoc nature of this support troubling. Dr Iniman (9-99) commented that 
as this group did not have a place in the hospital structure, she had to consult and 
approach a number of other bodies and committees to get help with a case. This 
arrangement was unsatisfactory both for getting an adequate resolution and in the 
time it took. Dr Havers, from the same unit, also mentioned times when he had not 
been able to get any support and this concerned him. 
 
Clinicians from the clinics that had designated CECs (1, 5 and Dr Vance) appeared to 
be more aware of their existence (which is not surprising) and used them more 
frequently. Although Dr Urban from Clinic 5 and Dr Vance both mentioned that 
meetings had to be cancelled due to the lack of anything to discuss, the CEC did 
appear to provide a useful resource for the clinics. Those clinicians from Clinic 1, 
that had a long established CEC, that they had formed themselves and subsequently 
asked the Trust to take over, reported many long discussions over cases and policies 
in their CEC and did not report the cancellation of meetings due to lack of material to 
discuss. 
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These three models of CECs offer a useful opportunity to compare and contrast 
different forms of committee. I would argue that having a CEC designated for a unit 
is the best way of organising this form of ethics support for infertility clinicians. The 
advantages of having a designated committee are: 
1. Greater awareness of its existence and therefore a greater likelihood of it 
being used. 
2. A very clear structure as to where ethically troubling cases should go, thereby 
avoiding the ambiguity that clinicians in Clinic 2 had over where to take 
cases. 
3. Time to adequately discuss issues, a disbenefit of using a general hospital 
CEC being that they were very busy and therefore might not have the time to 
discuss all cases.
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4. Guidelines and clinic policies could be debated in more detail than might be 
possible at a general hospital CEC. 
5. The committee could build up an expertise in the area of reproductive 
technologies and be of more help than a general committee called upon to 
service all specialities. The committee could act as a check and balance on 
the decisions made in the unit, ensuring the consensus was subjected to 
discussion and justification. 
6. The committee could organise and be responsible for ethics training and 
dissemination of information to the clinicians in the unit. 
There are also disadvantages of such a designated CEC: 
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 This was the perception of Dr Novack, whether it is the case that hospital based committees are 
very busy will depend on the committee. Some hospital CECs do have spare capacity. 
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1. Amount of use, as mentioned, it was often said that CECs of any kind were 
not frequently used, and meetings of those with designated clinics were 
sometimes cancelled. 
a. However, discussing individual cases is only one the function of CEC, 
(Slowther et al, 2004a) and if the CECs also took on a role in 
providing education and ethics information for clinicians then 
meetings would not have to rely solely on case presentations. 
Awareness of the ethical issues raised by infertility treatment is 
something the HFEA recommend that both the „person responsible‟ in 
the unit and those working in the unit have (HFEA, 2007). Hence, 
CECs could provide a valuable educational role. Here a clinical 
ethicist could be useful in advising and supporting the committee in 
its educational role. 
2. Those who did not have any form of committee (as in the first way of 
organising ethics support) were not overly concerned, so some clinicians do 
not perceive this lack of ethics support as disadvantageous. 
a. However, one problem mentioned by Dr Orben, that the committee 
had been little help, might be overcome by a designated committee 
that could build up a better level of expertise. 
3.  Some units were very small and it would be difficult to have a designated 
committee for this type of unit. 
a. This is an important practical problem and a solution would be a CEC 
that would serve a number of units (similar to the model in Dr Case‟s 
clinic); this would at least ensure that there was some forum to take 
problematic cases. 
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Thus, I would argue that, if possible, a CEC that was a designated committee for the 
infertility units would be the most advantageous way of organising CECs in the 
infertility setting. 
 
Issues in CECs 
There are a number of practical problems that any CEC needs to confront. The 
membership of such committees is often contentious. One important benefit that the 
informants thought CECs brought to ethical decision-making was hearing opinions 
from a wider range of people, people from other professions and clinical disciplines 
and lay people. Therefore, as the RCP report recommends, such committees should 
be „genuinely multi-disciplinary‟ (2005a:38). However, there have been concerns 
expressed about whether such committees have the appropriate level of expertise and 
training for members is clearly an important priority (see Williamson, 2008). 
 
The role of such committees also needs to be clarified as some of the informants 
argued that CECs could provide „protection‟ for them when making a difficult 
decision – but exactly what this protection might consist of is, in practice, uncertain. 
The legal status of CECs decisions is sometimes unclear to the clinicians and this is a 
matter that needs to be clarified (RCP, 2005a. McLean, 2007). The HFEA is clear 
that the responsibility for any decision is that of the „person responsible‟ and 
therefore CECs would only give guidance and advice, they do not have any legal 
standing as a decision-making body (HFEA, 2000). Educating clinicians about the 
role of CECs is also important. 
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One underlying issue concerning CECs is what gives them any moral authority? 
Blake notes that this is an important question otherwise a CEC is, „a contradiction in 
health care: a collection of health care professionals with no moral authority engaged 
in the practice of ethics.‟ (1992:298) His solution to this problem is that the CEC 
becomes a representation of the moral community of the hospital that has, „the 
responsibility for and the representation of those values and practices that define the 
health care institutions as a moral community.‟ (1992:297)217 As argued in the 
previous chapter, the clinicians do have a shared moral vision that is both 
constitutive of their profession and linked to a wider morality that enables them to 
function as trusted professionals. Therefore, it could be argued that CECs should aim 
to use and build on these values and it is this that gives them their moral authority.  
 
CONCLUSION 
From my data it is possible to see why the informants used CECs (to manage 
disagreement, for complex cases and to set guidelines or precedents); why they found 
them useful (wider discussion, detachment of decision-makers and protection); and 
the limitations of such CECs (lack of use, not representative and ambiguity in 
structure). CECs can provide a useful function in providing ethics support to 
clinicians and this is a role that could be developed and expanded to give a much 
greater level of support. The role of the CEC could be extended to include ethics 
education and fostering a greater awareness of ethical dimensions of practice. This 
increasing awareness can give the CEC a role akin to a Greek Chorus (King, 1996). 
The objective of the CEC is not necessarily to make quick decisions or indeed the 
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 See Reiser (1994) for a discussion of the values inherent in health care institutions and how closer 
attention should be paid to ensuring that these values cultivate a „humane ethos‟. 
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„right‟ ethical decision. Rather it is to act as the place where difficulties, uncertainties 
and ambivalence can be aired and this reflection can be used to aid the ethical 
decision-making process for future cases (Gillon, 1997). It is this facilitation of the 
process of ethical decision-making, so important to the informants, that can be 
strengthened by CECs (Fleetwood et al, 1989. Slowther  et al, 2001a).  
 
The CEC can also act a form of „checking‟ mechanism on the clinicians‟ consensus 
decision-making. The CEC extends the consensus and provides a forum for that 
consensus to be debate and subjected to further scrutiny: are the decisions being 
made ethical defensible? Does the consensus produce robust results? These are all 
questions that a CEC could debate away from the pressures of immediate clinical 
practice. 
 
As many authors note (McLean, 2007. RCP, 2005a) more research is needed on the 
efficacy of CECs, but from my study, while recognising the limitation that it did not 
survey a large number of doctors, there appears to be a need for such committees and 
the challenge is to develop these in ethically and practically useful ways. 
This chapter has examined how the informants thought about CECs and, from this 
data and the debate in the ethical and medical literature, made some suggestions as to 
how such support should be organised and how it can be improved. This qualitative 
data can provide an invaluable insight into why clinicians used CECs, why they 
found them useful and the limitations of such committees. Uncovering these deeper 
perspectives on CECs can provide another strand in the evidential base on the utility 
of CECs in medical practice. 
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TABLE 5 
VIEWS ON ETHICS COMMITTEES 
 
 
Doctor Clinic Ethics committee (CEC) 
 
Clinic meetings (CM) What found most 
useful 
1 - Dr 
Adams 
 
5 Would not refuse treatment without going to CEC, was 
happy to abide by the CEC‟s judgements. 
Not used to discuss or make 
ethical decisions 
CEC was where any 
ethical cases went 
2 – Dr 
Brown 
 
5 Found it useful. He would not ask colleagues in a clinic 
meeting. 
 
„Oh, yes, very helpful because when you genuinely do have a problem 
or you think there‟s an issue, I mean it gives you guidance.‟ (2-20)  
 
Not used to discuss or make 
ethical decisions 
CEC was where any 
ethical cases went 
3 – Dr 
Case 
 
 The one for their unit had folded and they have access to a 
regional one, he did not use it very often. 
Clinic meetings where most 
decisions made 
CM 
4 – Dr 
Down 
 
1 Did use their CEC for difficult cases, but would discuss in 
clinic meetings first. Found it helpful 
 
„Well, their decisions aren‟t binding on us but we value their wisdom 
in discussing the problem, getting other peoples points of view on it.  
So, it‟s like a, very much a intelligent sounding board for the decisions 
that we make.‟ (4-41) 
 
Also used clinic meetings Both 
5 – Dr 
Evens 
 
1 Did use one for difficult cases but would discuss in clinic 
meetings first. Found it helpful. 
 
Also used clinic meetings Both 
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„It allows us to bounce ideas off the wall, discussing it, ie meetings, 
and then we‟ll take it to the ethical committee, and take it forward from 
there, to ask a sort of a wider group of people who are not connected 
with the actual delivery of service what their views are.‟ (5-57)   
 
6 – Dr 
Francis 
 
1 Did use one for difficult cases but would discuss in clinic 
meetings first, found it useful. 
 
„But it‟s people from all different sort of backgrounds really who I feel 
give a more balanced view.  Because we can, you know, we just get a 
bit too focused or a bit too kind of narrow really because we do it day 
in and day out.  So I think it is good to have that, even if they come up 
with decisions we don‟t want. „(6-45) 
 
Also used clinic meetings Both 
7- Dr 
Grant 
 
1 Did use one for difficult cases but would discuss in clinic 
meetings first, found it useful. 
 
„I think because there is a variety of people, and not only medical, or 
not only professional people sitting around the table, so not just 
fertility physician or fertility expert.  So other people that are known as 
being lay people, they provide insightful comments and suggestions, 
and different occasions have been quite important for the decision 
making process. „ (7-51) 
 
Also used clinic meetings Both 
8- Dr 
Havers 
 
2 Found variable coverage, would use it more if more 
available. 
 
„But it‟s good for us because, that was my feeling in these specific 
cases, but they back us up, which is important.  You feel also a bit 
more, having support from an ethical committee in making such a 
decision, it‟s an important thing.‟ (8-29)  
Used clinic meetings as 
sounding boards 
CM 
9 – Dr 2 Not that helpful, but bring different opinions. As too Uses these as well, if can‟t Both, but mainly CM 
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Iniman 
 
informal and no clear better if like LRECs. 
„I don‟t think they do help that much actually, but what they bring is a 
different perspective.  Though some of them are coming from a 
background of philosophy and ethics, the way that they argue the case 
is very different.‟ (9-31)  
„But in practice I think that it‟s been of fairly limited help because it‟s 
not got a very clear place in the structure of the hospital unit, it doesn‟t 
have any place with the PCT, for example, so I‟ve got to go also 
through all those layers.‟ (9-33) 
 
agree go to the Ethics group 
or if seen as interesting 
10- Dr 
Jenson 
 
 Thought they were not representative, only for exceptional 
cases and is that worthwhile to have a committee just for 
that. 
 
„Most ethics committees are chaired by a vicar and their make-up is 
retired teachers and things like that.‟ (10-32) 
„So ethics committees I think are less involved than they used to be, 
certainly in my experience here.‟ (10-33) 
 
Used these more now CM 
11 – Dr 
Kilm 
 
3 Their CEC folded due to lack of use, didn‟t find it useful. 
 
„I'm not actually that happy and maybe ask for some more information, 
or you may suggest that maybe an ethics group makes the decision on 
your behalf, takes that responsibility away from you, but I don‟t think 
that it‟s a particularly good way of doing it.‟ (11-16) 
 
Discuss issues in these 
meetings 
CM 
12 – Dr 
Lovate 
 
2 Hardly ever used the Ethics Group Discusses things at the CM 
main forum 
CM 
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13 – Dr 
Marsh 
 
 
2 
 
Nothing had gone there in his time, but can see the utility 
of a group decision. 
 
„It‟s just in those, if there‟s a big disagreement then, obviously, our 
effects are very grave, you can seek help from the local ethical 
committees.‟ (13-10) 
 
 
Discusses things at the CM 
 
CM 
14 – Dr 
Novack 
 
4 Due to practicalities doesn‟t use it that often. Only take 
complex cases. 
Mainly discusses things in 
the CM 
Both 
15 – Dr 
Orben 
 
3 Uses it very infrequently, approaches PCTs for help more 
as have better procedures 
Discusses things with 
colleagues mostly 
Colleagues 
16 – Dr 
Percy 
 
2 Found CEC useful, hasn‟t taken a case personally. If in the 
unit they are split or feel strongly take it to the ethics 
group. 
 
„And I think to my mind if you‟ve got an ethics committee there, you 
have a group of self-selected people who have an interest and are 
motivated, you can say that‟s good, you can say that‟s bad but I don‟t 
think it‟s going to get better, that is the accepted forum for discussing 
that sort of thing.‟  (16-43) 
 
Also uses CM, they are the 
first port of call 
Both 
17 – Dr 
Quest 
 
4 In year and half been there never seen something go to the 
CEC 
This is where any ethical 
issues are discussed 
CM 
18 – Dr 
Robin 
 
4 Not seen anything go the CEC This is where any ethical 
issues are discussed 
CM 
19 – Dr 4 Not seen anything go to the CEC This is where any ethical CM 
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Street   issues are discussed 
20 – Mr 
Tarn 
 
 Used it twice in last two years, found it helpful. 
 
„But I think yes, I think they have been helpful.  But I think that‟s only 
back to the wall, certainly from my point of view, from the fertility 
point of view, we were able to resolve most of those issues internally I 
think.‟ (20-16) 
 
Most issues resolved in CM CM 
21 – Dr 
Urban 
 
 Has found their CEC useful. 
 
„I do find it is very useful and I think you learn quite a lot from it, and 
you get a perspective of those people who are not involved with the 
couple‟s treatment.‟(21-6) 
 
Ethical issues went to EC not 
so much CM 
CEC 
22- Dr 
Vance 
 
 Yes sometimes. 
 
„I find it reassuring I suppose.  But it is quite a lot about politics, yes.  I 
mean the people on ethics committee are a spectrum of the public.  
They‟re not trained in ethics, and the discussions are often not very 
philosophical really, not very ethical.  It‟s quite a lot about them 
having a feeling for public opinion.‟ (22-34) 
 
Would discuss ethical issues 
in CM and then take them to 
the CEC if disagreement of a 
complex issue 
Both 
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CONCLUSION 
 
 
This thesis was an examination of a particular area of medicine and how that 
speciality approached and made ethical decisions in everyday practice. It was also 
about bioethics, arguing for and demonstrating how a particular way of doing 
bioethics could contribute to a greater understanding of ethics in practice. This 
understanding was then used to evaluate that practice and make suggestions as to 
how ethical decision-making in the infertility clinic could be improved and 
supported. In this conclusion I will discuss the key findings of the study and then 
examine their possible wider applicability. 
 
OVERVIEW 
My interest in studying how infertility clinicians made ethical decisions arose out of 
a general interest in reproductive technologies and the ethical issues and dilemmas 
this area raised. Although subject to very tight and comprehensive legislation, there 
is still a large area of infertility practice that is left to the individual clinician or clinic 
to organise. Furthermore, the interpretations and use of guidelines can vary between 
different infertility clinics. My interest was to explore how infertility clinicians made 
and approached ethical decisions within this regulatory framework. How do the 
clinicians working in this area see the dilemmas? How do they approach them and 
what tools do they use to solve them? And, importantly, are these tools adequate? 
Are they morally defensible? These are areas that have not been subject to sufficient 
scrutiny and, I thought, worth addressing. 
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THE METHODOLOGY 
To consider these questions I adopted a methodology that was based on an 
Aristotelian conception of the relationship between theory and practice as a way of 
both analysing the data and developing ethical theory. An important element of my 
approach is that a close attention to actual practice can result in refining and 
developing our ethical theories and principles. The practice can inform theory just as 
theory can inform the practice – the two are symbiotically related. From this 
engagement with practice the ways that such theories need to be extended and 
developed can be determined. 
 
This approach had four key interlinked elements. First, a consideration of the endoxa. 
This aspect is akin to a sociology of bioethics where a close attention to what 
happens in practice and the circumstances of the ethical problem can be combined 
with the bioethical literature to get a fuller understanding of the issues. Second, 
ethical theories and principles were used as tools for elucidating and analysing the 
data. Third, these principles and concepts were specified by seeing how they were 
used in practice. Specifying principles provides one account of the ways in which 
they can be made less abstract and the meaning they have in that particular context 
illuminated. Finally, ethical principles and theories were used to draw normative 
conclusions about the ethical acceptability of the practice under study. 
 
THE RESULTS 
Settled Morality 
The first part of the project was to find out how the infertility clinicians thought 
about and approached ethical issues that arose in their practice. This is in essence 
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setting out the endoxa in the Aristotelian sense, investigating the way the dilemma is 
played out in all its facets, providing a more detailed description of the issue than is 
commonly found in (some) ethical discussions. This enabled the circumstances and 
particularities of the situation to be adequately described, to get a picture of what 
ethical issues troubled the clinicians in everyday practice and what role ethical issues 
played.  
 
A fascinating, apparent, contradiction arose. Although the clinicians described their 
practice as being fraught with ethical difficulties, they also reported not being 
constantly troubled by ethical issues in their everyday practice. This apparent 
contradiction can be usefully understood from the perspective of a „settled‟ morality. 
In all clinics it was found there was a wide area of common agreement on many 
ethical questions. This „settled‟ morality provided a framework in which they could 
go about their everyday clinical duties. It also provided the basis for their ethical 
decision-making process – a process that was based on reaching a group consensus to 
resolve ethical questions. 
 
Consensus 
 
A commonly held model of ethical decision-making is that it is individuals who 
make decisions. This study found this did not apply in the infertility clinic. In this 
study it was found that the informants made ethical decisions on the basis of group 
consensus. Much ethical store was put on the process of decision-making. The 
emphasis was not necessarily on getting a consensus over substantive ethical issues 
but on reaching a decision over what to do and this decision was validated by the 
process itself. This process fulfilled an ethical function in ensuring (or aiding) the 
making of a „good‟ decision.  
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Impartiality 
 
The central feature of this process was the ability to make decisions that the 
informants saw as impartial. By seeing how they defined impartiality, what elements 
it comprised of and how they used it in practice, the concept of impartiality could be 
given content. In this way, the concept of impartiality was given a richness that a 
purely abstract formulation lacks and this enables us to see if that is an adequate or 
acceptable formulation of that principle. Thus, the concept of impartiality was 
specified and a definition of impartiality could be formulated that was meaningful in 
this context. 
 
The doctors employed a conception of impartiality that was very important for their 
ethical decision-making. This was a key ethical principle for the informants. Ethical 
decisions should be made impartially without bias or prejudice or undue influence. 
The procedural and substantive elements of ethical decision-making became merged 
– the two were not separable. Thus, the informants‟ form of consensus decision-
making focussed on the importance of the process of how decisions were made and 
how this procedural aspect conferred the substantive ethical principle of impartiality. 
This shows that theories of ethical decision-making should not only take into 
consideration the principles on which such decisions are based but also the way 
decisions are made. This procedural aspect, an attention to how the decision is made, 
becomes an important part of the ethical assessment of that decision. This study 
shows that this is an important feature of ethical decision-making that is sometimes 
overlooked.  
 
 259 
Normative Judgements 
This raises the question as to whether this form of ethical decision-making is 
defensible? Is it something that should be supported?  
 
One of the main ways in which such a consensus decision-making process can be 
morally justified is that there is firm moral basis that underpins it, a „moral vision‟ 
that doctors, by dint of being members of the medical profession, adhere to – an 
important aspect of medical professionalism. This medical professionalism is geared 
to gaining and keeping the trust of the wider society and informed by the values of 
that society. The medical profession no longer operates in isolation. It is now 
scrutinised and judged by the laity and medical professionalism has to be part and 
parcel of a wider societal morality.  It is, I believe, this underlying moral vision, 
shared with a wider society that primarily justifies doctors‟ consensus ethical 
decision-making. This is not to say this decision-making is perfect. It clearly has its 
flaws, as previously outlined. The question, in practice, is what is better? 
 
Practical Conclusions 
 
From this focus on the process of decision-making it was possible to make a number 
of suggestions as to how this process could be supported and improved in practice. 
The study showed how CECs can make a valuable contribution to this. CECs can be 
a useful way of supporting ethical decision-making in the infertility clinic. They can 
be used to extend the consensus, by involving more and varied people in the 
decision-making process. It can also provide a forum for that consensus to be 
debated and subjected to further scrutiny.  
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THE WIDER PICTURE 
 
The question now arises as to the relevance of the findings of this study to other 
areas of medical practice. Have other studies found that practitioners make decisions 
on the basis of consensus? Are the recommendations about CECs relevant for other 
settings? 
 
Consensus decision-making 
 
There are obviously a number of important differences between the kind of decisions 
doctors in other fields of medicine have to make and those in infertility clinics. 
Infertility treatment is a voluntary decision – it is not, however much importance we 
give to childlessness – a condition that has to be treated like a heart attack or broken 
leg. This has a number of implications. First, patients can go elsewhere (if for 
instance a clinic will not treat them, a same sex couple could travel to a centre that 
did treat such couples), which is not an option for patients in intensive care, or in any 
other emergency procedure. Second, there is time to make decisions over who or 
how to treat, thus these decisions can be discussed in clinic meetings or CECs: there 
is time to develop a consensus decision-making process. Third, there is an option for 
the doctors of not doing anything at all to the patient, an option that would not be 
available for other conditions. Doing „nothing‟ in other circumstances, for instance if 
a patient was arresting and it was decided not to perform cardio-pulmonary 
resuscitation, would arguably be a particular management decision based on quality 
of life concerns. Therefore, there are important differences between infertility 
treatment and more acute medicine that limit the generalisability of these results. 
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The limited evidence that there is on this presents a mixed picture on whether doctors 
make group decisions over ethical matters. Some studies have found that consensus 
decision-making is used. Zussman‟s (1992) study on ICU found that this setting was 
one where collective decision-making was emphasised and Melia (2001) in a later 
study of ICU in the UK found that, „[c]onsensus and the social processes that 
promote it are important in intensive care, as agreement, or at least tacit agreement to 
disagreement, is the prime means through which the difficult work of intensive care 
is effected.‟ (2001:718) Hurst et al, (2005) in their survey of internists, oncologists 
and intensive care specialists found that one reason for doctors seeking assistance 
with ethical decisions was to „seek consensus‟ and they used discussions with 
colleagues and families to create a process out of which would, hopefully, arise an 
agreement over what to.
218
 However, other studies such as Sorensen & Iedema 
(2008) found that the lack of consensus among those involved in intensive care 
provision created problems for patient care. Saarni, et al (2008), who carried out a 
quantitative survey of Finnish physicians‟ reports of ethically problematic decisions, 
found that the area of medicine the doctor worked in made a „real difference‟ to the 
amount and type of ethically problematic situations reported. Thus, it could be 
questioned whether findings of studies conducted in infertility practice can be 
usefully applied to other areas. 
 
Further empirical research carried out in other medical specialities could shed an 
important light in this area. This would enable some comparisons to be made 
between specialities and address questions such as: is this consensus form of ethical 
decision-making used in other disciplines? What are the differences between 
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 See also Pool (2003) who argues that decisions over euthanasia in Holland can be seen as 
processes in which various people (patients, doctors, nurses) play a role. 
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specialities? Are some more hierarchical than others? And what can the different 
disciplines learn from one another in terms of improving ethical decision-making? 
There are also more theoretical areas of research that could be pursued based upon 
the findings of this study for instance: a more extensive examination of theories of 
consensus could be conducted, looking more closely at the moral warrant for 
consensus decision-making; and a more detailed consideration of how these findings 
relate to Rawls‟ theories of over-lapping consensus and public reason. 
 
Wider Use of CECs 
Having looked at the use of consensus in other medical specialities I will now ask 
whether the usefulness of CECs be transferred to another clinical context?  
 
Other studies that have looked at the cases brought before CECs suggest that there is 
a demand in other specialities for CEC support for specific cases. Slowther et al 
(2004a) list a number issues brought to CECs from other medical areas and Hurst et 
al (2007) in their survey of European doctors also found other medical specialties 
using ethics consultation. For UK doctors the first most cited issue was disagreement 
among care givers, followed by euthanasia and doctor assisted suicide. Of the most 
prevalent six issues none related to reproductive technologies or infertility treatment. 
Thus, one can argue that other disciplines are faced with ethical difficulties and 
clinicians in those areas are under the same external and internal pressures as 
infertility clinicians to make defensible ethical decisions. As discussed above there is 
research that suggests other medical specialisms make decisions on the basis of a 
group consensus and would, therefore, presumably, see the same benefits to be 
gained from the use of CECs as my informants did. However, it has also been argued 
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that different specialities have different approaches to shared decision-making 
(Eisenberg, et al, 1983) and therefore these conclusions about CECs might just be 
applicable to infertility specialists rather than to medicine in general. However, the 
use of CECs has not particularly been confined to the area of reproductive 
technologies.  
 
The debate over how applicable these findings are to other specialities is one that 
cannot be conclusively answered without more research comparing and contrasting 
the ethical decision-making processes of different specialities. The trends in modern 
medicine for decisions to be made by multi-disciplinary teams, which involve the 
patient and the closer scrutiny of all aspects of medical practice, all suggest that 
consensus decision-making with availability of a CEC, if needed, is likely to become 
the dominant model in health care practice. 
 
LIMITATIONS 
 
There are limitations to this study. As it was a qualitative study only a small number 
of clinicians were involved, therefore it cannot be said to be a comprehensive survey 
of infertility clinicians‟ views. However, I stopped my data collection when I had 
reached „theoretical saturation‟, when I felt I was not getting any new or different 
accounts of ethical decision-making (see Chapter Four). Thus, I do not think 
conducting more interviews would have substantially impacted on my analysis. Also 
the richness and detail of the data, for example not just asking, „do you use CECs?‟ 
but finding out why they used them and the subtle concerns they had, provided an 
invaluable insight into what was actually important to clinicians and this kind of data 
can be used to develop policies on how best to organise such committees. 
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Another limitation was that I did not observe what actually happened in the infertility 
clinic, I got my informants‟ accounts of how they made ethical decisions and these 
could, of course, be their public face and post hoc rationalisation of their decision-
making processes. There are two responses to this: first, as discussed in Chapter 
Four, with employing a form of respondent validation and by a recognition that these 
are accounts, I would argue that I built up a good picture of how they made 
decisions; second, this points to an area of further research. I would like to observe 
the functionings of an infertility clinic, both to see how it compares to the data 
collected in this study and to get a picture of the patient‟s role in decision-making 
and how the consultations are handled. There are, however, problems with this kind 
of ethnographic research in that being an observer in the consultation and clinic can 
affect the event one is observing. Therefore, no research methodology is without its 
limitations. Another way of approaching the study of ethical decision-making in the 
infertility clinic would be to conduct focus groups with other members of the 
infertility clinics; nurses, embryologist and counsellors for example, to build up a 
different picture of how ethical decisions are made. 
 
FINAL THOUGHTS 
This thesis set out to develop an approach to the examination of ethical issues that 
could both provide an insight into actual practice and develop ethical theorising in 
that area.  
 
This account of infertility practice can highlight new ethical problems and develop 
more nuanced moral norms and ethical theories to deal with the conflicts and issues 
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that arise in the clinic setting. This is what this thesis has attempted to do. This 
approach has proved fruitful in this study and, I would argue, could be used in other 
areas of practice that raise ethical issues.  
 
In using this approach I am not arguing that it is the only way of „doing‟ bioethics. 
Morality, ethical problems and issues are complex things that can benefit from many 
different approaches and theoretical schemas. As Daniels says: „“Doing ethics” 
involves trying to solve very different kinds of problems answering to rather 
different interests we may have, some quite practical, others more theoretical.‟ 
(1996:339)  
 
Despite the obvious limitations that any piece of research has, it is hoped that this 
thesis has contributed to the debate on both to how ethical decision-making in this 
setting can be improved and how bioethics can make a useful contribute to practical 
problems – these were the overriding aims.  
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APPENDIX ONE 
CHANGING ETHICAL ATTIDUDES TO SPERM DONATION 
 
This is appendix is a detailed consideration of one ethical issue raised by the development 
of reproduction technologies – the moral acceptability of sperm donation and the changing 
attitudes towards it and the changing ethical concerns it raises. 
 
Donor insemination was first used in clinical practice in England in the late 1930s and was 
generally practised in secret (Nachtigall,1993). In 1945 Mary Barton, a gynaecologist, 
published an article in the British Medical Journal (Barton & Walker, 1945) about her 
artificial donor insemination (AID) programme. The response to the article was one of 
outrage and wholesale condemnation of the practice. In 1948 a commission was set up to 
discuss the issue of AID and concluded that it should be made a criminal offence. Reasons 
for rejecting the practice were a mixture of religious concerns – an objection to 
masturbation and the perceived intrusion in the holy sacrament of marriage – fears of the 
possible eugenic implications and the association with its use in agriculture (Pfeffer,1987). 
Sperm donors were generally regarded with suspicion and the 1960 Feversham Committee 
– a committee of enquiry set up by the government to look into the legal aspects of AID – 
said sperm donating was, „an activity which might be expected to attract more than the 
usual proportion of psychopaths‟ (The Earl of Faversham‟s Report,1960). The Committee 
reported that while AID might be an acceptable treatment for some couples, it should be 
generally discouraged. Thus, sperm donation was seen as an activity that was in itself 
morally wrong and should not be encouraged. 
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The demand for AID continued to grow, however, and in 1968 it became available on the 
NHS if recommended on medical grounds. Subsequently, the 1973 Peel Committee – a 
committee of the British Medical Association set up to consider human artificial 
insemination – reiterated this view (The Peel Committee,1973). Sperm donation was 
gradually moving towards being seen as an acceptable medical technique for the alleviation 
of infertility. 
 
At the time of the Warnock Committee in 1982, set up by the government to examine 
the ethical implications of reproductive technologies, sperm donation was a practice that, 
although not unlawful, was carried out covertly without central record keeping or 
regulation. The donor offspring was illegitimate at law and the husband of the woman 
receiving the treatment had no legal responsibility or duties towards the child: the donor 
was considered the legal father (O‟Donovan,1989). The usual practice was for the 
husband to be entered on the birth certificate as the father. This involved the couple 
committing an offence by entering false information on the birth certificate, although 
one unlikely to be found out. Thus, the problems with legal paternity contributed to the 
desire to keep the practice secret. In this context, donor anonymity was the preferred 
way of organising such treatment as it was seen as a necessary practice both to protect 
the donor from parental responsibility and allow the husband parental rights 
(Dewar,1989).  
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With the development of technology, egg donation became possible and the debate became 
about gamete donation rather than just sperm donation. The Warnock committee endorsed 
the practice of gamete donation and recommended that, „the AID child should in law be 
treated as the legitimate child of its mother and her husband, where they have both 
consented to the treatment.‟ (Warnock, 1985:85). This resulted in a provision in the 1987 
Family Law Reform Act allowing the husband of the woman to be entered on the birth 
certificate as the father of the child. The Warnock Committee also recommended that 
gamete donation should be anonymous (1985:15). The reasons given for this decision 
reflected a number of different considerations: „Anonymity would give legal protection to 
the donor but it would also have the effect of minimising the invasion of the third party into 
the family. Without anonymity, men would, it is argued, be less likely to become donors‟ 
(1985:25).  
 
In 1990 the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act was passed which translated many of 
Warnock‟s recommendations into legislation. Although enshrining the practice of 
anonymous gamete donation the Act itself has, arguably, paved the way for the practice to 
be questioned. As the question of the donor offspring‟s legitimacy has been addressed 
couples do not have to keep the practice secret in order to falsify the birth certificate. At the 
same time, the donor is protected from any legal responsibility for the child (1990 Act, 
Section 28 (2)) and the legal status of all parties has been clarified (Morgan and Lee, 1991). 
Most importantly, in recognising that attitudes towards anonymity could change over time, 
the Act put in place the information gathering structures necessary for a programme of non-
anonymous donation. By legislating in this area the 1990 Act has also contributed to the 
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growing public acceptance of reproductive technologies by legally sanctioning such 
treatments (Lieberman & Hamer, 1994). The shame and secrecy which previously 
accompanied AID has been replaced by a much greater openness and willingness to discuss 
many of the issues involved (Haimes, 1993).   
 
Thus, once the practice of gamete donation became more accepted and accompanied by 
a form of legal sanction in both the Family Law Reform Act 1987 and the 1990 Act, the 
ethical debate shifted towards concerns over how to organise the practice ethically. One 
of the main concerns over gamete donation was that any resulting children born from the 
donation would be unable to find out the identity of their gamete donor. Many authors 
have argued that being denied knowledge about one‟s biological origins can be harmful 
to donor offspring (Snowden & Mitchell,1981; Turner,1993).  
 
Sants (1964) coined the term „genealogical bewilderment‟ to refer to children who had 
no or only uncertain knowledge of their natural parents and argued that such uncertainty 
could have a detrimental effect on the child‟s mental health. Although Sants was 
considering the issue in relation to adoptive children, McWhinnie (1996) has argued that 
such „bewilderment‟ can apply equally to donor offspring. Donor offspring are curious 
about the donor‟s physical characteristics, family aptitudes and have queries and 
uncertainties about the donor‟s medical history. However, some have argued that the 
concept of genealogical bewilderment has not been support by research evidence. 
Humphrey & Humphrey (1986) conducted a review of empirical studies conducted in 
the 20 years since the publication of Sants‟ paper and concluded that the existence of 
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genealogical bewilderment amongst adoptees has not been upheld by subsequent 
research.  
 
In 2000, almost a decade after implementation of the Act, and in the absence of any 
evident government action to address the issue of information for donor-conceived 
people, Joanna Rose, a donor-conceived adult, and an unidentified donor-conceived 
minor, jointly initiated a human rights challenge to the legislation in the English High 
Court. They claimed that the statutory enforcement of donor anonymity contravened 
their right to „respect for private and family life‟ guaranteed by Article 8 of the 1950 
European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (Rose and Another 
versus Secretary of State for Health and Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority, 
2002). 
 
While this case was being heard, the government launched a public consultation in 
December 2001 seeking views on what, if any, information should be provided for 
donor-conceived people. The government reasserted the previous Administration‟s 
position that: „There is no question whatsoever in making any changes in the law which 
would allow the identification of people who have already donated sperm, eggs or 
embryos. Such a change – if made – would only apply to donations made after the 
introduction of new legislation.‟ (DH, 2001, para 1.3) 
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The consultation ended in July 2002 and in January 2003 the government made public 
both the substance of the responses to the public consultation and its initial plan of 
action (DH, 2003 & 2003a). A significant majority of respondents endorsed the 
provision of non-identifying donor information to donor-conceived people, while a 
smaller proportion of respondents proposed the complete removal of donor anonymity. 
Responding to the consultation, the minister for public health, Hazel Blears, indicated 
the government‟s acceptance of, „a strong argument in principle for children conceived 
using donated sperm, eggs or embryos being able to find out the identity of their donor.‟ 
After further consultations in January 2004, Blears‟ successor, Melanie Johnson, 
announced that with effect from 1st April 2005, all new donors would be required to 
agree to their identity being disclosed to any individual conceived as a result of their 
donation, if so requested, once they reached 18 (HFEA, 2004). 
 
It can be seen that gamete donation moved from being a technique that was seen as 
largely immoral and one that should be carried out in secret, to one that was both legally 
and morally accepted. In its gaining acceptance a new ethical concern presented itself – 
should donors be anonymous to any offspring produced? The view of this enshrined in 
the 1990 Act was that they should be anonymous, but since then attitudes have, 
arguably, changed and all donor-conceived people born after April 2005 will be able to 
apply to the HFEA for identifying information about their gamete donor once they reach 
the age of majority.  
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APPENDIX THREE 
SAMPLING MATRIX 
 
 
Clinician 
Number 
Clinician NHS * Private Both Length of 
practice 
Sex Seniority/Position Clinic 
1 Dr Adams 
 
  Both 20 M Consultant 5 
2 Dr Brown 
 
  Both 14 years M Consultant 5 
3 Dr Case  Yes  16 years M Director of Unit 
 
 
4 Dr Down 
 
  Both 25 years M Clinical director 1 
5 Dr Evens 
 
Yes   29 years F Consultant 1 
6 Dr Francis 
 
Yes   10 years F Consultant 1 
7 Dr Grant 
 
Yes   2-3 years M Senior Registrar, just finished 
speciality training 
1 
8 Dr Havers 
 
  Both 25 years M Consultant 2 
9 Dr Iniman 
 
Mostly 
NHS 
 Both 20 years F Consultant 2 
10 Dr Jenson 
 
Mostly 
NHS 
 Both 12 years M Consultant, head of unit  
11 Dr Kilm 
 
  Both 15 years M Consultant 3 
12 Dr Lovate Some Now Both 35 years M Consultant semi-retired 2 
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 NHS mostly 
13 Dr Marsh 
 
Yes   Infertility 3 
years 
M Sub-speciality trainee,  2 
14 Dr Novack 
 
  Both 16 years M Consultant head of unit 4 
15 Dr Orben 
 
  Both 24 years M Consultant 3 
16 Dr Percy 
 
Yes   3 years F Sub-speciality trainee, just going 
onto to a consultant post 
2 
17 17 – Dr Quest 
 
Yes   3 years M Sub-speciality trainee 4 
18 Dr Robin Yes   Medicine 
1991, 
infertility 3 
years 
F Sub-speciality trainee 4 
19 Dr Street ** 
 
Yes   3 years F Sub-speciality trainee 4 
20 Mr Tarn 
 
Mostly 
NHS 
Some  20 years M Consultant, head of unit  
21 Dr Urban Yes   5 years F Sub-speciality trainee 
 
5  
22 Dr Vance Yes   26 years M Consultant head of unit  
 
 
*  Sub-speciality trainees never did private work, only the consultants 
 
** Interview did not record 
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Research subject information sheet. Version 2, 18
th
 February 2002 
 
 
ETHICAL DECISION-MAKING IN THE INFERTILITY CLINIC: THE 
CLINICIAN’S PERSPECTIVE 
 
Information Sheet 
 
 
This project is a small scale qualitative study comprising of approximately twenty semi-
structured interviews with infertility specialists from around the UK. The interviews 
will take about one hour. 
 
The purpose of this project is to explore how infertility specialists manage and approach 
ethical decision-making in their clinical practice. This project will explore how ethical 
issues are handled in clinical practice and what regulations and policies clinicians see as 
ethically acceptable. 
 
Aims of the project - The aim of this project is to examine clinicians‟ views on ethical 
issues raised by their infertility practice. The project aims to find out what aspects of 
their practice infertility clinicians find particularly ethically troubling and how they 
approach and manage such issues. 
 
Background - Although there has been a substantial body of research on ethical issues 
raised by reproductive technologies from an ethical perspective and sociological studies 
on doctors‟ work in particular areas, there has been little research carried out on the 
attitudes of infertility practitioners. The aim of this project is to readdress this 
imbalance.  
 
Work which has led up to the project - I have been interested in the ethics of 
reproductive technologies for many years and have published widely in this area. 
Further, I am a health care ethicist based in a Medical School and have an interest in 
how doctors approach and think about ethics. 
 
Confidentiality - The interviews will be audio taped and then transcribed and 
maintaining confidentiality will be of utmost concern. In order to ensure complete 
confidentiality all data tapes, transcripts and files will be labelled with a code rather 
than the name of the doctor. When the data is reported numbers and/or pseudonyms 
will be used to designate respondents and care will be taken that any information that 
could lead to respondent identification or identification of the clinic will be removed 
or changed. Data will be stored in locked filing cabinets in my office at the 
University and if stored on computers it will stored on the password protected 
managed network of the University. 
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Areas to be covered in the interviews – the interviews will, broadly, cover the 
following areas: what ethical issues clinicians face in their practice, how they 
approach such issues, how they resolve any ethical conflicts in their practice, what 
they think about regulation in this area. 
 
Dissemination – the results of the study will be disseminated in standard academic 
formats (conference papers, journal articles, and a thesis). 
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Research subject consent form.  Version 2, 18
th
 February 2002 
 
 
ETHICAL DECISION-MAKING IN THE INFERTILITY CLINIC: THE 
CLINICIAN’S PERSPECTIVE 
 
 
 
 
Consent Form 
 
 
 
 
I have read the Information Sheet on the above study. 
 
 I agree to participate in the project and I agree to the interview being tape recorded. 
 
 
 
 
 
…………………………… 
Please print name 
 
 
 
 
 
…………………………… 
Please sign name 
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APPENDIX FIVE 
 
ETHICAL DECISION-MAKING IN THE INFERTILITY CLINIC: THE 
CLINICIAN’S PERSPECTIVE 
 
TOPIC GUIDE  
(Remember to TURN ON MICROPHONE!) 
 
1. Background of the clinician 
 Length of time working in the clinic, length of time practising, role 
 
2. Information on the clinic setting 
 What kind of treatments the clinic offers, number of patients 
 How is treatment funded - private, NHS, are there any differences between the 
two groups? 
 
3. Screening recipients of treatment 
 How do you determine peoples‟ suitability for treatment, how do you define 
these factors 
 The HFEA Code of Practice says clinics considers the welfare of the child - 
how do you do this? New guidelines? 
 
4. Ethical dilemmas in practice 
 What do you see as the ethical issues raised by your practice, how do you think 
about these  
 Any examples of bad ethical decisions (by you/anyone else?), where systems 
haven‟t worked 
 How do you resolve any dilemmas/problems 
 
5. Decision-making 
 Explore influence and role of colleagues, other places worked that are different? 
 How could they make better decisions (support, info, structures?) 
 How much ethics training have you had, what did it contribute if anything?  
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Do you use CECs: 
 What is the structure of your ethics support 
 Who makes up the ethics committees, what gives them moral authority 
 How do you think they make decisions, how do they help? 
 
6. Role of ethics in practice 
 What are the underlying principles/imperatives that guides your practice? 
 What do you think the relationship between ethics and medicine is?  
 How do you see the role/place of ethical issues in your practice 
 
7. Regulation 
 What are your views on the regulatory structures in this area? 
 How do you feel it affects your professional autonomy? 
 Do you have any suggestions for policy changes 
 
8. Conclusions 
 Ask them if there is anything else they would like to add 
 Ask them if there is anything that I have not covered that is relevant or pertinent 
 Tell them about the confidentiality of the collected data and data storage 
 Tell them about dissemination plans 
 Thank them for their time 
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APPENDIX SIX 
 
ANALYSIS STRATEGIES 
 
In this appendix I want to describe my strategies of analysis in more detail. 
 
After my initial coding of all the interviews, coding that was conducted after each 
interview and previous interviews revised in the light of the new interview and 
associated codes, I had 102 codes. Some of these codes addressed quite precise 
issues such as: their views on altruistic donors; donor anonymity as a good thing; 
problems with donor anonymity; views on egg sharing; and decisions made by ethics 
committees. Other codes addressed more general themes in the data such as: how 
they made ethical decisions; what they saw as ethical issues; ethos of the clinic; and 
what they saw as non-medical matters. Some codes were based on my interpretations 
of the data such as: how they talked about ethical issues; what they saw as the basis 
for their ethical decision-making; where they adopted a laissez-faire approach to 
decision-making; how they defined an ethical issue; and transparency of decision-
making. Other codes were the informants‟ opinions such as: problems they saw with 
consensus decision-making; how useful they saw CECs; problems they saw with 
conscientious object; and their views on regulation. See the list of codes below. 
 307 
 
LIST OF CODES 
 
 
 
Altruistic donors 
Anonymity as a good thing 
Anonymity- problems with 
Anonymity - who decides 
Basis of morality 
Bias 
Case-by-case 
Clinic meetings 
Clinic policies 
Clinical area 
Consensus - problems 
Consensus - protection 
Conscientious objection 
Consensual decisions 
Consultation - what is covered 
Counselling 
Cycle numbers 
Decisions - transparency 
Decisions how made 
Difference ethical/clinical 
decisions 
Different views in the clinic 
Donated embryos 
Concerns over donor gametes 
Donor child relationship 
Donor numbers fall 
Double track on anonymity 
EBM 
Effective treatment 
Egg donation 
Egg sharing 
Ethics - help 
Ethics – how they talked about 
it 
Ethics - procedure 
Ethical issues - what is? 
Ethical issues 
Ethical motivation 
Ethics committee decisions 
Ethics committee multi-
disciplinary 
Ethics Committees - general 
Ethics Committees - refusing 
treatment 
 
 
Ethics committees - shared 
responsibility  
Ethics committees - usefulness 
Ethics training 
Ethos of centre 
Experience 
Expertise 
Fairness of decision 
Gamete donation - ethical issue 
Gamete donation - like adoption 
Gamete donation - not like 
adoption 
Genetic relationship 
Good medical practice 
Impartiality 
Laissez faire 
Medical criteria 
Multi-disciplinary 
Role of the natural 
Non-discrimination 
Non-medical matter 
Not an ethical issue 
Obstetrics & Gynaecology very 
ethical 
Obvious ethical decisions 
Patient autonomy 
Poor sperm quality 
Posthumous donation 
Private practice issues 
Private practise 
Professional autonomy 
Protection of recipient 
Reasons for stopping treatment 
Recipient - age limits 
Recipient - BMI 
Recipient - information on 
donor 
Recipient - need for screening 
Recipient - screening of 
Recipient - strain on 
Recipient - treating lesbians 
Recipient - treating single 
women 
Recipient - treatment criteria 
 
Referrals 
Refusing treatment 
Regulation - HFEA 
Regulatory remit of HFEA 
Relationship between 
ethics/medicine 
Relationship between patient 
and  decision-making 
Reproductive tourism 
Resource allocation 
Right to a child 
Right to treatment 
SET 
Surrogacy 
Telling non-directional 
Telling not 
Telling recipient own decision 
Telling the child 
Too much treatment 
Treating for genetic reasons 
Waiting lists 
Welfare of the child - defer 
decision 
Welfare of the child - more 
information 
Welfare of the child - policies 
Welfare of child 
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I adopted, in effect, two ways of coding my data: 
1. I coded the data for precise points and issues – for instance I had a collection 
of codes on CECs which picked out different aspects of the informants‟ views 
and thoughts on CECs: 
Ethics committees - decisions 
Ethics committees - multi-disciplinary 
Ethics Committees - refusing treatment 
Ethics Committees - shared responsibility  
Ethics Committees - usefulness 
 
2. I also coded the data into general codes as well, so the ethics committee codes 
above were also coded as „Ethics committees - general‟. This general code 
included all the other CECs codes. Another very general code was „how they 
made decisions‟, this obviously included a lot of material and was sub-
divided into codes such as: multi-disciplinary decision-making; benefits of 
consensus; clinic meetings. 
Thus, I had two levels of coding: the specific and the general. I did this so that I 
would not lose any data when formulating my codes. One problem with any coding 
scheme is the decision of what category bits of material should be allocated to (Dey, 
1993). Often certain parts of the interview address a number of issues relating to say 
CECs that could be coded as both shared responsibility and usefulness. In order to 
ensure that decisions such as these were not arbitrary I would also code them in the 
„Ethics committee – general‟ code.  
 
When I began to analyse my data I could search it for specific issues, such as the role 
they gave to experience in making ethical decisions, and very general issues, such as 
how they made decisions. ATLAS allowed me to print all the quotes and associated 
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memos of a code and would also highlight all the codes associated with the particular 
quote. For example: 
P 1: Int-1-m.doc - 1:38 [Yes, so nobody‟s refused treat..]  (116:116)   (Super) 
Codes: [Consensual decisions] [Ethics Comms general]  
No memos 
 
Yes, so nobody‟s refused treatment without going - well, refusing to treat is done by the 
Ethics Committee, on which there‟s only one doctor, the rest are all non-doctors.  And that‟s 
not me; I present the cases, but we have a - there‟s one gynaecologist, two nurses, two 
counsellors, an ethicist and a lay member of the public. 
 
 
P 2: Int-2-m.doc - 2:20 [Oh, yes, very helpful because ..]  (75:75)   (Super) 
Codes: [Consensual decisions] [Ethics com decs]  
No memos 
 
Oh, yes, very helpful because when you genuinely do have a problem or you think there‟s an 
issue, I mean it gives you guidance.  It also gives you some protection in the final decision, 
hopefully, which is going to be in line with the Ethics Committee in that it is a number of 
people, if you will.  It‟s decision by cabinet rather than one person‟s „well my view is this 
shouldn‟t be done, full stop‟, 
 
 
P 3: Int-3-m.doc - 3:34 [So if a new situation arises, ..]  (82:82)   (Super) 
Codes: [Consensual decisions]  
No memos 
 
So if a new situation arises, and I can‟t envisage any at the moment, but as each new situation 
has arisen we‟ve had a request from, say, a same sex female couple, we want treatment with 
donor sperm, when that first happened we sat down and said did we want to do that in this 
clinic and how did we feel about it, and we decided not to because we felt since we‟re a small 
number of people,  
 
Therefore, I could easily see which codes were associated with which quote.  
 
I used my coding scheme to help me find bits of data and initially to aid me in seeing 
what was going on and what the general themes of the data set were. When I had 
finished my data collection and had reached the position of having a stable set of 
codes I did not embark on further refining of the coding structure. Dey (1993), for 
instance, recommends slicing and splitting codes to further refine data analysis. I 
thought that as coding is a tool to organise data and make it more accessible it should 
not be slavishly followed simple for the sake of coding. When I began writing about 
the data, a task I undertook along side data collection in the form of memos, I would 
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look both at the quotes produced from the codes (at their various levels) and also the 
transcripts themselves. As I conducted all the interviews myself and, although the 22 
interviews produced about 660 pages of transcripts, I became very familiar with my 
data. I read each interview as an event in itself and saw it is a narrative to answer 
questions such as, „what does Dr Brown think of CECs? How does this fit in with his 
views on ethical expertise?‟ 
 
Coffey & Atkinson (1996) argue that a useful way to see an often mentioned goal of 
qualitative research, that of producing „thick‟ analysis, is to see it meaning the use of 
multiple analytic strategies. „We believe that it is important for qualitative 
researchers to explore their data from a variety of perspectives.‟ (1996:4) Therefore, 
I used both a coding strategy to make sense of the data and also a more narrative 
approach that looked at each transcript and sought to see what stories and themes 
developed in the interview as a whole. 
 
As a way of making my data analysis more transparent I have include three sections 
from different transcripts to illustrate how I coded particular segments of data. As 
discussed in Chapter Four it is impossible to present one‟s whole data set and coding 
for approval to ensure validity. However, we can develop „shorthand procedures‟ 
(Seale, 1999) to exemplify the validity of the research. 
 
Notes on the segments 
The star symbol is the code. 
The hand-writing symbol shows there is a memo associated with that bit of the 
transcript (see an example of a memo in Chapter Four). 
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APPENDIX SEVEN 
 
ETHICAL TOPICS - COMMENTARY OF THE GRAPH 
 
 
Issues or topics that were only mentioned once are not included on the graph. They 
are tabulated below. 
 
Posthumous use of 
sperm/eggs 1 
Not giving treatment too soon 1 
ICIS interfering with nature 1 
Donor embryos 1 
Should we do IVF? 1 
Single women, treated? 1 
Male age treatment limit 1 
Embryo donation 1 
Social sex-selection 1 
IVF league tables 1 
Storing gonadal tissue - adults 1 
Treating recipients as a couple 1 
Older donors 1 
 
 
EXPLANATION OF THE CATEGORIES USED IN THE GRAPH 
 
Welfare of the child – this was something that was mentioned by all the informants 
in some form as a recurrent ethical issue they faced in their practice. 
Non-anonymity – this is a reflection of those clinicians that thought that the law 
change on donor anonymity (that made donors non-anonymous to any future 
offspring) was a wrong and that it affected their practice in reducing donor numbers. 
Egg-sharing – this was the ethical problems raised by programmes of egg-sharing, 
some clinics did not do this (Clinic 1) as they thought it was unethical. 
Funding disparity – this is the differences in funding criteria from region to region 
and the unfairness of criteria such as not having any children living with you as a 
criteria for getting funding for infertility treatment. 
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Gamete donation – this category includes worries over whether it should be done at 
all, how to tell the child and if they should be told, problems with egg donation, such 
as if donors should be allowed to choose the recipient. 
Who to treat – this category could be categorised as an aspect of welfare of the child, 
but the seven instances that are included in this are specific cases such as: a 
transsexual using their own sperm; a gay man who had stored his sperm wanting to 
have a child with his sister‟s lesbian partner, where the informant deliberated over 
whether they were suitable for treatment, and any refusal could/would have been 
couched on welfare of the child grounds. 
Treatment age limit – pre-menopausal – this category is those women usually 
between 40 and up to natural menopause and the informants were unsure if it was 
ethical to treat them as the success rate would be so low in that age group. 
Recipients with severe health problems – here is the issue was should those patients 
with very severe health problems, one case was a women with cardiac problems, be 
given treatment due to the risks to their health. Some thought that if the patient 
accepted the risk why should they refuse, but there was a welfare of the child 
consideration if life-expectancy was reduced. 
Cross-cultural differences – this was ethical issues raised by differences in recipients 
cultures, such as Jewish orthodox couples not having sex at the right time of the 
month, one informant mentioned difficulties with couples who could not speak 
English, two informants mentioned the problem of recipients (Jewish and Muslim) 
wanting to get a religious representative to inspect the laboratories where sperm was 
stored. 
Same-sex couples – a number of informants (five) thought that it was unethical to 
treat lesbian couples. 
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Multiple births – this was the issue over how many embryos to transfer and the 
problems created by multiple pregnancies and births. 
Private practice – four informants highlighted ethical problems that could be raised 
by practicing privately, for instance giving couples unnecessary treatment and biased 
advice on treatment options. 
Partner age difference – this was the issue of a large age difference between partners, 
the four informants who talked about this were concerned with older men and 
younger women and if it was appropriate to treat such couples. 
Treatment age limit – post-menopausal – all the informants who mentioned this were 
against treating post-menopausal women. 
Inter-family gamete donation – this was people wishing to use their relatives as 
gamete donors and the cases the informants found problematic were, fathers acting as 
sperm donor for their sons and daughters donating eggs to their mothers. These cases 
were thought to be unacceptable and they would not offer treatment. 
When to stop treatment – this was the issue of how many cycles a couple should be 
given, not on financial grounds, but on the grounds of the couples‟ best interests. 
Reproductive tourism – this was the problem of patients going abroad for treatment, 
either coming home with problems that would then have to be managed in the UK, or 
the issue of getting treatments that would not be available here due to ethical 
concerns. 
Foetal reduction – the issues raised by having to reduce multiple pregnancies through 
selective abortion. 
Pre-implantation genetic diagnosis – this was a disquiet with the procedure and what 
conditions it should be used for. 
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Payment of donors – this was the issue over much and if at all donors should be paid. 
One respondent thought it was wrong that private clinics made money out of donors 
(by charging high fees for treatments using donated gametes) when donors were only 
paid expenses. 
Surrogacy – complex issues surrounding the use of this such as, if the surrogate does 
not want to give up the baby. 
Storing children‟s‟ gondal tissue – this was the issue of when to do this, if the child 
was having chemotherapy for example, and if that was creating problems for the 
future. 
Posthumous use of eggs and sperm – this was raised in context of a woman who 
wanted to use her dead husband‟s sperm, the informant thought that this was alright 
but it was discussed in the CEC. 
Giving treatment too soon – this was the issue of giving IVF before it was 
established that the couple needed it. The example given was of a couple in their 
very early thirties being given IVF after only a year of trying, the informant thought 
that this was too early and was harmful to the couple. 
ICIS – the informant wondered if ICIS was interfering with nature, as it circumvents 
male infertility. 
Donor embryos – these were thought to be more ethically problematic than simply 
donating gametes, as the embryo was thought to be more akin to a child and the 
resulting child would not be genetically related to either of the couple. 
 
 
 
